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allowed to show Kall committed the crime of simple battery by proving a touch of either an insulting or provoking nature. The change in accusation did not alter that burden of proof.” Accord, Jarrett v. State , 299 Ga.App. 525, 683 S.E.2d 116 (August 5, 2009) (trial court properly charged that defendant could be convicted of possession of motor vehicle with vin “removed, altered or defaced,” although indictment read “removed, altered and defaced.”) Brown v. State, 242 Ga.App. 347, 529 S.E.2d 650 (February 11, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly instructed jury that it could find defendant guilty if it found that he had committed aggravated assault in either of the two ways alleged in the indictment. “‘Because the statute requires proof of only one act ..., inclusion in the indictment of more than one such act is mere surplusage, which is unnecessary to constitute the offense, need not be proved, and may be disregarded.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ranson v. State, 198 Ga.App. 659, 661(3)(a), 402 S.E.2d 740 (1991) (full concurrence as to Division 3). Moreover, when an indictment alleges that an aggravated assault was committed by two means, the State need prove only one of the two acts constituting the crime of aggravated assault to sustain the conviction. Lubiano v. State, 192 Ga.App. 272, 273–274(1)(a), 384 S.E.2d 410 (1989) (full concurrence as to Division 1) (no fatal variance where indictment alleged assault by feet and revolver but evidence showed assault by feet only). The trial court's response to the jury, therefore, was a correct statement of the law and not error. Id. at 276(2)(b), 384 S.E.2d 410 (full concurrence as to Division 2); Ranson, supra.” Disapproved on other grounds, Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (January 7, 2013). Accord, Skelhorn v. State , 332 Ga.App. 782, 773 S.E.2d 45 (June 16, 2015) (where indictment alleged multiple acts of enticing a child, proof of any of them was sufficient). Hall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 454, 525 S.E.2d 759 (November 19, 1999). Defendant’s Medicaid fraud conviction affirmed. “[W]hen a crime may be committed in more than one way, it is permissible to incorporate the different methods in one count, conjunctively, as was done here. Lumpkins v. State, 264 Ga. 255(1), 443 S.E.2d 619 (1994); Robinson v. State, 143 Ga.App. 37, 39(3), 237 S.E.2d 436 (1977).” Here, Medicaid fraud “was alleged to have been committed by submitting billings for services that were ‘not medically necessary and in excess of the number of psychological services that were actually provided....’” Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899 (February 9, 1999). Where indictment charged defendant with reckless driving by “speeding, and following too closely, and failing to keep a proper lookout,” trial court properly charged jury that “[i]f you should find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense of reckless driving based upon one, all three or any combination of speeding, failure to keep a proper lookout, or following too closely, you would be authorized to find the Defendant guilty.” “‘When an indictment charges a crime was committed in more than one way, proof that it was committed in one of the separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment makes a prima facie case for jury determination as to guilt or innocence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rucker v. State, 177 Ga.App. 779, 781(3), 341 S.E.2d 228 (1986). It is sufficient for the State to show that a crime was committed in any one of the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the indictment uses the conjunctive rather than disjunctive form. Stone v. State, 229 Ga.App. 367, 370, 494 S.E.2d 48 (1997). There was no error in the charge.” Accord, Emerson v. State , 315 Ga.App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600 (March 23, 2012); Moore v. State , 319 Ga.App. 696, 738 S.E.2d 140 (February 5, 2013) (where indictment listed two different ways defendant allegedly enticed child, proof of either was sufficient to convict). 16. ESSENTIAL ELEMENT NOT ALLEGED Chapman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 514, 733 S.E.2d 848 (November 2, 2012). Convictions for attempted burglary and attempted rape affirmed; indictment for attempted rape wasn’t required to recite each element of rape. “‘Because [Chapman] was charged with criminal attempt, the [S]tate was required to allege that, with an intent to commit the underlying crime, he performed some overt act toward its commission.’ State v. Marshall, 304 Ga.App. 865, 866 (698 S.E.2d 337) (2010).” Lizana v. State, 287 Ga. 184, 695 S.E.2d 208 (May 17, 2010). Defendant’s felony murder conviction based on aggravated assault affirmed; allegation was sufficient to set out aggravated assault ““by striking [victim] about the head and body, using his hands and feet as objects likely to, and which actually did result in serious bodily injury....” Contrary to defendant’s contention, indictment didn’t have to include the words “when used offensively.” “Lizana argues that omission of the phrase ‘when used offensively’ effectively silenced his defense of justification by implying that his hands and feet could have been used in a defensive manner. However, Lizana does not support this argument with authority, and we conclude that the absence of self-defense, like general intent, ‘need not be expressly alleged in an indictment. [Cits.]’ State v. Austin, 297 Ga.App. 478, 479 (677 S.E.2d 706) (2009).”