☢ test - Í

Flournoy v. State, 299 Ga.App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (July 9, 2009). Indictment wasn’t “fatally flawed” where it failed to allege that rape of victim occurring prior to 1996 was forcible (at a time when all rape charges had to be forcible). “[B]y alleging ‘unlawful’ carnal knowledge during 1992 to 1995, the indictment asserts a charge of forcible rape under the law in effect prior to the 1996 amendment.” Miller v. State, 283 Ga. 412, 658 S.E.2d 765 (March 17, 2008). Indictment for felony murder was not required to state the underlying felony. “[I]t is irrelevant to a charge under OCGA § 16-11-131(b) what felony formed the basis of the prior conviction, and specification of the underlying felony in the indictment is unnecessary.” Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (February 7, 2008). Indictment for first degree arson was defective where it omitted essential element that the vehicle in question “was designed for use as a dwelling” or insured against fire damage. Accord, Palmer v. State , 299 Ga.App. 192, 682 S.E.2d 323 (July 15, 2009). Orr v. State, 283 Ga.App. 372, 641 S.E.2d 613 (February 1, 2007). Indictment was not required to specify whether the statutory rape offense charged was a felony or misdemeanor. “There is no allegation that Orr was 21 years or older, so as to enhance the statutory minimum sentence. Likewise, there is no allegation that the victim was 14 or 15 years of age and the defendant no more than 3 years older than the victim so as to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. Because the indictment makes no mention of Orr’s age, its allegations only set forth a charge of felony statutory rape, punishable by no less than one, but no more than twenty years imprisonment. [fn] The jury was only charged as to this species of felony statutory rape and, thus, the jury’s verdict must be reasonably construed as finding Orr guilty of statutory rape as charged. See Browning v. State, 31 Ga.App. 150, 152 (120 S.E. 649) (1923) (‘Verdicts are to be ... construed in the light of the pleadings, the issues made by the evidence, and the charge of the court.’) (citations omitted).” Accord, Attaway v. State , 284 Ga.App. 855, 644 S.E.2d 919 (April 10, 2007); Kolar v. State , 292 Ga.App. 623, 665 S.E.2d 719 (July 9, 2008) (at trial for child molestation, State was not required to prove absence of mitigating factors – victim over 14 and defendant 18 or under – that would have made offense a misdemeanor rather than felony); Rodriguez v. State , 306 Ga.App. 169, 702 S.E.2d 10 (September 22, 2010). State v. Daniels, 281 Ga.App. 224, 635 S.E.2d 835 (August 22, 2006). Trial court properly quashed counts of indictment which failed to set forth all elements of offense, although all elements of the same offense were set out in other counts of the same indictment against other defendants. “The … indictment … charged Daniels in Counts 5, 6, and 7, as a party to the crime of aggravated assault in that he ‘did encourage, aid, or abet ... Clay and others by informing them that the victim ... was in possession of a sum of cash, with knowledge that they were looking for someone to rob.’” “‘[T]here can be no conviction for the commission of a crime an essential element of which is not charged in the indictment.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55(1) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995). A criminal indictment which does not recite language from the Code must allege every essential element of the crime charged. Furthermore, each count set forth in an indictment must be wholly complete within itself, and plainly, fully, and distinctly set out the crime charged in that count. Aggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) an attempt to commit a violent injury, or an act that places another in reasonable apprehension thereof, and (2) that the assault was aggravated by either (a) an intention to murder, rape or rob, or (b) the use of a deadly weapon. (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Bolman, 222 Ga.App. 534 (474 S.E.2d 721) (1996), citing Smith v. Hardrick, supra. Finally, ‘ [a]llegations set forth in one count of an indictment cannot be imputed to a separate count, absent specific reference to the allegation sought to be imputed.’ (Footnote omitted.) Smith v. Hardrick, supra at 56(3). See also Polk v. State, 275 Ga.App. 467, 468-469(1) (620 S.E.2d 857) (2005).” 17. GENERALLY White v. State, 312 Ga.App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (November 7, 2011). Voluntary manslaughter and related convictions affirmed; contrary to defendant’s contention, indictment was not defective. “There is no express requirement that the indictment contain a written statement that it was received in ‘open court,’ or that it be signed. OCGA § 17–7–54.” Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga.App. 55, 686 S.E.2d 847 (November 16, 2009). No fatal variance where charge of aggravated stalking gave the wrong date for the bond which defendant violated. “In this case, there is no contention that there was more than one bond which prohibited Vaughn from having violent contact with the victim. And although the dates differ, the case number referred to in the indictment and that contained on the special condition are the same. Moreover, Vaughn's signature appears on the special condition, establishing his awareness of the imposition of the condition that he have no violent contact with [victim]. Further, the indictment clearly put Vaughn on notice that the aggravated stalking charge was based on a violation of the special condition.” Reversed on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718