☢ test - Í

S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011). Golden v. State, 299 Ga.App. 407, 683 S.E.2d 618 (July 17, 2009). Indictment was not defective for variance in factual allegation from arrest warrant. “There is no requirement … that an arrest warrant and a subsequent indictment use identical language to describe the accused's allegedly criminal conduct.” Accord, Falagian v. State , 300 Ga.App. 187, 684 S.E.2d 340 (September 23, 2009) (“the fact that the warrant charged Falagian with theft by conversion has no bearing on this case because the State indicted Falagian for theft by taking.”); Holmes v. State , 306 Ga.App. 656, 703 S.E.2d 115 (October 29, 2010) (indictment was not void because it named a different victim than the original arrest warrant.). Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006). Dicta: defendant was charged with raping the same victim twice in the same day; the second count was identical to the first, with the added language “separate and distinct from Count 1 of this indictment.” Issue was not properly preserved for appeal, but Court of Appeals notes that “the language in the second rape count that that count was ‘separate and distinct’ from the first rape count (though both were alleged to have occurred on the same day against the same victim) would appear to be sufficiently specific. See Henry v. State, 274 Ga.App. 139, 141-142(2) (616 S.E.2d 883) (2005).” Banks v. State, 269 Ga.App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (September 16, 2004). “‘It is permissible under Georgia law for an indictment to allege that a defendant has been known by an alias. It is also permissible for a jury to hear or see the allegation pertaining to the alias, and such a reference or disclosure does not, in and of itself, place the defendant’s character in issue.’ (Citation omitted.) Scott v. State, 185 Ga.App. 887(1) (366 S.E.2d 196) (1988) (indictment properly listed defendant’s alias as ‘Iceman’). See Hawes v. State, 266 Ga. 731, 732-733(2) (470 S.E.2d 664) (1996) (alias as ‘Stomper’ permissible). Here evidence showed that Banks was also known as ‘Psycho.’ We discern no error.” Accord, Thompson v. State , 277 Ga.App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (January 23, 2006) (not error to admit evidence that defendant’s nickname was “Shotgun” where that was the name the victim knew him by; defendant charged with aggravated assault with a gun.). South v. State, 268 Ga.App. 110, 601 S.E.2d 378 (June 10, 2004). Indictment was not defective for containing the phrase “‘Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney[,] Special Presentment’ on its face.” No basis for defendant’s speculation that this phrase may have influenced grand jury’s consideration. “[I]n light of the fact that it is the undisputed and well-known legal duty of the district attorney to prosecute felonies, a statement to that effect on the indictment, as in this case, does not harm a defendant or prevent him from receiving consideration of his charges before a fair tribunal.” Roseberry v. State, 251 Ga.App. 856, 554 S.E.2d 816 (October 11, 2001). Defendant’s conviction for making harassing phone calls affirmed. Trial court did not err in charging jury that the word “solely” as used in the accusation was legally insignificant . The state was only required to prove that Defendant made repeated calls for the purpose of harassing the victim; the word “solely” is not descriptive of the manner in which the crime was committed and is mere surplusage. It can be entirely omitted without affecting the charge and without detriment to the accusation. Also, there was no reasonable probability that Defendant misunderstood the charges against her, or was surprised or harmed by the words of the accusation. 18. INCORPORATION OF OTHER COUNTS/ALLEGATIONS State v. Harris, 292 Ga.App. 211, 663 S.E.2d 830 (June 25, 2008). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment after defendant’s conviction for interference with an emergency call; accusation was defective for failure to allege intent. “The state … argues that the requisite intent to cause or allow physical harm or injury to another person can be inferred based on other counts of the accusation which allege family violence battery. However, our Supreme Court has held that “each count set forth in an [accusation] must be wholly complete within itself, and plainly, fully, and distinctly set out the crime charged in that count.” Smith [ v. Hardrick. 266 Ga. 54, 55(1) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995)]. ‘Allegations set forth in one count of an [accusation] cannot be imputed to a separate count, absent specific reference to the allegation sought to be imputed.’ (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 56(3). Here, the allegations of the obstruction charge did not specifically reference the other counts of the accusation. Nor does the obstruction offense involve a predicate or compound offense to which it directly relates as a matter of law. [Cits.] As such, the sufficiency of the obstruction charge of the accusation must be based solely upon its own distinct allegations.” Hester v. State, 293 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (March 31, 2008). Indictment charging aggravated assault with a lamp was not defective for “failure to specify how the lamp was used.” “The rule relied upon by [defendant] that, with certain exceptions, each count must be wholly complete within itself applies only to the essential elements of the crime, and not