☢ test - Í

rendered void simply by the fact that the stipulation was made before the defendant was arrested or indicted,” citing Beaudoin v. State, 311 Ga.App. 91, 93-94(3), 714 S.E.2d 624 (2011), and Lockett v. State, 258 Ga.App. 178, 179, 573 S.E.2d 437 (2002). “Indeed, because polygraph exams usually are administered during the investigation of a case, it would be illogical to require that they contain specific case information that would be available only after a suspect is arrested or indicted. … Rather, in determining the validity of a stipulation, courts examine whether, at the time the stipulation was made, the defendant was aware he was the subject of a criminal investigation; was aware that criminal charges could be filed against him with respect to the matter that was the subject of the polygraph exam; and understood his constitutional rights, including his right to counsel, his right to remain silent and refuse the exam, and his right to terminate the exam at any time. See Beaudoin, 311 Ga.App. at 94(4), 714 S.E.2d 624 (where defendant took the polygraph and stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and ‘the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court's determination that stipulation was valid ... will be affirmed’) (citations omitted); [other cits.].” 2. Consent form providing ““that the results of the [polygraph] Examination will be made known only to [Thomas], CCPD [Clayton County Police Department], and/or others as may be required by law,” didn’t mean “that the results would not be admissible at trial. … Rather, that paragraph simply provides that the results of the exam (including, presumably, any potentially embarrassing responses unrelated to the incident under investigation) would not be indiscriminately disseminated to third-parties.” Barnes concurs specially, would find the forms to be ambiguous and construe them against the State, but finds the evidence against Thomas overwhelming. Boggs concurs in judgment only. Parrott v. State, 318 Ga.App. 545, 736 S.E.2d 436 (November 15, 2012). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no error in allowing prosecutor to ask defendant’s expert oblique questions about polygraph he administered to defendant. Expert testified to his opinion that defendant molested victim in his sleep, but on cross admitted that he gave defendant an “objective test” with questions about whether he fondled the child, and that defendant didn’t pass “this test.” Prosecutor highlighted this testimony in closing. 1. Defendant waived this objection. “Below, Parrott raised a continuing objection only to ‘any mention of this other test.’ However, on appeal he argues that the prosecutor exceeded the scope of the trial court's ruling by referring to the polygraph as an ‘objective test’ as opposed to ‘the other test,’ and he complains about references to the ‘results’ of the test. Parrott made no objection below either to the prosecutor's exceeding the scope of the instructions, or to the mention of the test results.” 2. Contrary to defendant’s argument, jury wouldn’t have inferred “that the ‘objective test’ was a polygraph. … Given that a polygraph is not an objective test, and that jurors were repeatedly told that Parrott was willing to take a polygraph administered by police, we find unpersuasive Parrott's argument that jurors then inferred from the prosecutor's statements that a second, privately-administered polygraph was conducted or that one of several “objective tests” referred to by the expert was a polygraph. [fn] Absent such an inference, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.” Curry v. State, 291 Ga. 446, 729 S.E.2d 370 (July 9, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; no mistrial required where State’s witness “‘communicated to the jury in a spontaneous remark that he took a lie detector test. Since [Burt] did not further apprise the jury of the results of the test, there is no prejudice. [Cits.]’ Durden v. State, 274 Ga. 868, 870(5) (561 S.E.2d 91) (2002). And, the trial court's curative instruction to the jury to disregard the unsolicited statement was sufficient to prevent the testimony from having any prejudicial impact. Id.” Gandy v. State, 290 Ga. 166, 718 S.E.2d 287 (November 21, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; mistrial wasn’t required when State’s witness “testified that he had taken a polygraph examination. “Defense counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial, emphasizing that the mention of the polygraph was unsolicited by the State. The trial court did, however, issue a curative instruction to the jury to disregard any reference to a polygraph test.” Beaudoin v. State, 311 Ga.App. 91, 714 S.E.2d 624 (June 29, 2011). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted “the polygraph examiner's testimony that Beaudoin was deceptive in his answer as to whether he had sex with the victim. … “[U]pon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a polygraph test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have. And, such stipulation is binding on both parties.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lockett v. State, 258 Ga.App. 178, 180–181(2) (573 S.E.2d 437) (2002). Because Beaudoin requested the polygraph examination and expressly stipulated to the admissibility of its results, the trial court did not err in allowing the examiner's testimony as to those results. See Fatora v. State, 185 Ga.App. 15, 19(3) (363 S.E.2d 566) (1987). Beaudoin's further challenge to the validity of the stipulation on the ground that he did not have an attorney with him is without merit. ‘It is not required that the accused have counsel present or act only upon the advice of counsel in order to render a stipulation to the