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admissibility of the results of a polygraph examination valid and binding upon the accused. [Cit.]’ Patterson v. State, 212 Ga.App. 257, 258(2) (441 S.E.2d 414) (1994) (physical precedent only).” Accord, Thomas (November 21, 2014), above. Jones v. State, 309 Ga.App. 886, 714 S.E.2d 590 (June 14, 2011). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; where defendant stipulated to admissibility of lie detector results, he couldn’t challenge qualifications of polygraph operator. “While one part of the test results are the graphs made by the machine, ‘[t]he other part is the opinion of the examiner as to what those responses indicate.’ [ State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 78 (239 S.E.2d 324) (1977)]. Thus, Jones has agreed to admission of [expert's] opinion testimony concerning the polygraph examination, and failed to provide any reason he should not be bound by his agreement. See Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 17, 18(3) (354 S.E.2d 433) (1987) (admitting stipulated polygraph test since contentions regarding the objectivity of the examiner go to the weight of the testimony); Harris v. State, [March 17, 2011, below] (finding it contrary to the spirit of a stipulation agreement to compel the State to provide funds to retain a polygraph expert to testify regarding the inherent unreliability of polygraphs in general).” Harris v. State, 308 Ga.App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (March 17, 2011). Convictions for rape and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly declined to provide funds for defendant to retain an expert “to testify regarding the inherent unreliability of polygraphs in general” where defendant stipulated to the admissibility, accuracy and voluntariness thereof. “The Georgia Supreme Court has expressly held ‘that upon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.’ State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 (239 S.E.2d 324) (1977). Here, before administration of the polygraph examination, Harris and the State specifically stipulated to the admissibility of the results thereof and that neither party would contest the voluntariness or accuracy of the test, nor the qualifications of the examiner. In denying Harris's motion for funds, the trial court concluded that the relief sought therein ‘r[a]n contrary to the spirit of the agreement into which [Harris] voluntarily entered’ and that ‘[t]he ends of justice would not be served by the granting of th[e] motion.’ We agree.” Distinguishing “ Sisson v. State, 181 Ga.App. 784 (353 S.E.2d 836) (1987), in which we concluded that a defendant who stipulated to the admissibility of the results of a polygraph examination was entitled to present testimony from his own expert regarding the results of the examination. See id. at 788-789. Harris's reliance is misplaced. In Sisson, the defendant stipulated only to the admissibility of the examination results. As we noted in that case, ‘[m]erely because a party stipulates to admissibility of testimony or evidence, does not deny that party the right to contest the accuracy of that testimony or evidence.’ Id. at 788. Here, in contrast to Sisson, Harris stipulated to the admissibility, accuracy, and voluntariness of the examination. Furthermore, the trial court in Sisson actually excluded the testimony of the proposed defense expert. In the instant case, the trial court merely denied Harris's request for funds for a defense expert regarding polygraph examinations; it did not specifically exclude the expert testimony itself.” Corn v. State, 290 Ga.App. 792, 660 S.E.2d 782 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only . Methamphetamine trafficking conviction affirmed. Co-conspirator testified for State; defense challenged his motivations for testifying, including his potential reduced sentence. State then examined him about full terms of his deal with State, including fact that he passed a polygraph. Held, trial court properly admitted evidence of co-conspirator’s polygraph. “Our Supreme Court has held ‘that upon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.’ (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 (239 S.E.2d 324) (1977). Further, the results may be admissible to explain an actor’s conduct or motive when such is relevant to the issues on trial. Morris v. State, 264 Ga. 823, 824(1) (452 S.E.2d 100) (1995).” “Further, it is clear from Corn’s cross-examination that he was making the argument that Messer was falsely accusing him in order to benefit himself and that this false testimony was the basis of the deal which he made with the State. Therefore, Messer’s motive for testifying was directly called into issue by Corn, and the State was properly allowed to rebut Corn’s allegations with the true terms of the deal, even though that involved the results of a polygraph. See Morris v. State, supra; Newberry v. State, 260 Ga. 416, 418-419(3) (395 S.E.2d 813) (1990); Bantz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 Ga.App. 855(1) (589 S.E.2d 621) (2003).” Note, only stipulation to admission of polygraph results here appears to come from witness, not defendant. While prior consistent statements of witness should be admissible due to defendant’s attack on witness’s veracity, polygrapher’s opinion of witness’s veracity would appear to be inadmissible, contrary to Court of Appeals’ conclusion here. Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356 (October 3, 2005). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “The results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible except by stipulation of the parties ( State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 (239 S.E.2d 324) (1977)), or to explain an actor’s conduct or motive when such is relevant to the issues on trial ( Morris v. State, 264 Ga. 823(1) (452 S.E.2d 100) (1995)). … While a document summarizing the ramifications of taking a