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went into either the center console or his left pocket as the officer followed Floyd after he left the trailer, and Floyd said, ‘Mike, Go’ when he saw Moore flee from the police officer.” Mock v. State, 306 Ga.App. 93, 701 S.E.2d 567 (September 16, 2010). Evidence didn’t support defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving. “Here, the police found the stolen guns in a bathtub in a ‘dilapidated,’ ‘abandoned’ trailer, which was located on the property where Mock lived with his mother. … At most, the State has established that the stolen guns were located in a separate building on property where Mock lived. But there was no evidence that Mock had any knowledge, control, or possession of the trailer. Similarly, ‘[t]here was no evidence that he was ever in possession or control of the [guns], a necessary element of theft by receiving.’ Gonzales v. State, 276 Ga.App. 11, 13 (622 S.E.2d 401) (2005).” Martin v. State, 305 Ga.App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871 (August 31, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine affirmed; “ [e]vidence of intoxication , when combined with the presumption of possession and control found here, is sufficient to support a conviction for possession.” Drugs were found in defendant’s residence. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga.App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841 (August 30, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine found in backseat of police car after defendant’s transport. “[W]hile mere spatial proximity to contraband is insufficient to exclude the possibility that someone else possessed the drugs, spatial proximity combined with other evidence, such as evidence of the defendant's possession of drug paraphernalia or of similar transactions, will support a conviction for drug possession. See Eubanks v. State, 239 Ga.App. 796, 797(1) (522 S.E.2d 240) (1999) (defendant's possession of crack pipe was additional evidence beyond mere spatial proximity that supported conviction for possession of cocaine); White v. State, 225 Ga.App. 74, 76(3) (483 S.E.2d 329) (1997) (holding that ‘[t]he similar transaction evidence provided proof of intent sufficient to negate beyond a reasonable doubt [defendant]'s claims of mere presence and equal access’).” Additional evidence here included defendant’s possession of a “homemade smoking pipe containing methamphetamine residue,” plus similar transaction evidence. Compare Scott (August 18, 2010), below. Smith v. State, 306 Ga.App. 54, 701 S.E.2d 490 (August 25, 2010). Defendant’s probation revocation reversed; evidence didn’t support finding that defendant, passenger in vehicle, possessed “‘a pretty large piece of marijuana’ on the center console and marijuana residue on the passenger seat and the floorboard under the passenger seat,” where defendant was sitting. Citing Kier (June 25, 2008), below, but note, in Kier, drugs weren’t found in defendant’s seat . Scott v. State, 305 Ga.App. 596, 699 S.E.2d 894 (August 18, 2010). Defendant’s probation revocation reversed; evidence didn’t support finding that defendant possessed drugs in question. Defendant was a passenger in a truck; in a consent search, the officer found two pills in one of several empty cigarette packs in the center console. None were found on defendant, he denied any knowledge of the drugs, and he smoked a different brand of cigarette. After defendant and the driver were arrested and transported to jail, two more pills were found in the back of the patrol vehicle , but the driver had equal opportunity to place them there, and in fact had been alone in the back seat of the patrol vehicle while his truck was searched. “Thus, the evidence does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that [driver] Gaines possessed the pills found in his own truck and that he hid the pills found in the patrol vehicle.” Compare Taylor (August 30, 2010), above. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (August 3, 2010). Evidence did not support co-defendant Royal’s conviction for possession of cocaine: “Here, the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom were insufficient to connect Royal to the cocaine found in an upstairs bedroom occupied by his co-defendants. See Paden v. State, 216 Ga.App. 188, 190(1) (453 S.E.2d 788) (1995). When the police entered the apartment, Royal was on the couch on the first floor, trying to eat a baggie of marijuana. While this evidence authorizes his conviction of misdemeanor marijuana possession, it does not permit an inference that he possessed the 37 baggies of cocaine that were hidden in a piggy bank in an upstairs bedroom. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 593 (492 S.E.2d 204) (1997) (‘ A finding of constructive possession of contraband cannot rest upon mere spatial proximity to the contraband, especially where ... the contraband is hidden’ ) (citations omitted). No other drugs, drug-related paraphernalia, or cash were found on the first floor. Significantly, no evidence was introduced to show that Royal resided in the apartment, which might authorize an inference that he possessed the property therein. See In re: E.A.D., 271 Ga.App. 531, 532-533 (610 S.E.2d 153) (2005) (‘a mere occupant, as distinguished from a resident, does not necessarily have the requisite control over the premises to authorize the inference that he possesses all property found thereon’) (citations and footnotes omitted); compare Whitfield v. State, 217 Ga.App. 402, 405(3) (457 S.E.2d 682) (1995) (lessee, as opposed to social guest, is presumed to be in possession of the entire premises and all property, including contraband, found on the premises).”