☢ test - Í

Glass v. State, 304 Ga.App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (June 11, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant possessed drugs found in hotel room. “In this case, in addition to evidence that Glass rented Room 248, had a key to the suite, and was going to the suite at a time when a great quantity and variety of drugs were in open view, there was other evidence linking him to the contraband found there, including his suspicious behavior upon seeing officers near the suite and the presence of his personal property inside the suite. We conclude that the verdict is not insupportable as a matter of law.” English v. State, 304 Ga.App. 285, 696 S.E.2d 106 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s marijuana possession convictions affirmed. “Here, the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that English constructively possessed the marijuana located in Woods' pocket. [fn] Testimony established that drug dealers often work in pairs; one person possesses the drugs and the other person possesses the money. In addition, a large amount of cash was found on English and in Woods' glove box, a small empty bag with marijuana residue, similar to those located on Woods, was discovered in English's seat, pictures of marijuana and cash were found on English's cell phone, and Woods testified that he and English were ‘pretty tight.’” In re: J.S., 303 Ga.App. 788, 694 S.E.2d 375 (April 16, 2010). Adjudication of delinquency, based on cocaine possession, reversed; evidence failed to establish juvenile’s constructive possession of drugs. Officer observed juvenile get into front passenger seat of someone else’s car in store parking lot at 11:00 a.m. “The officer pulled behind the first car, and J.S. ‘glanced back at [him] and appeared to be hiding something in the console, moving around the console area with his hands.’” Driver of car gave consent to search, which revealed cocaine in center console, accessible to all three occupants. “The officer did not observe J.S. in physical possession of the cocaine. J.S., who had been in the car for two or three minutes when the officer approached, denied possessing or knowing about the cocaine, and no drugs or drug paraphernalia were found on him.” “We find that evidence that J.S. moved his hand in the area of the closed center console next to where he was sitting did not satisfy the state's burden of excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than that he intended to exercise dominion or control over contraband found within the console.” Hunt v. State, 303 Ga.App. 855, 695 S.E.2d 53 (March 31, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for sexual exploitation of children, based on possession of USB drive with pictures of children performing sexual acts. “The jury could also conclude that Hunt knowingly possessed material depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in light of evidence that on April 15, 2007, 13 sexually explicit images of children were saved to the USB drive within seconds of the time two photographs of Hunt were saved to such drive. [Cits.] Further, on April 29, 2007, six files listing Hunt's name and/or his business, two sexually explicit images of children, and two photographs of Hunt were saved to the USB drive within four minutes of each other. And three of the foregoing files listed the name of Hunt's business.” Belcher v. State, 302 Ga.App. 36, 690 S.E.2d 431 (January 13, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession. “Belcher signed for and accepted packages under a name other than his own. He did not live at the address yet he told the residents of the home that he was expecting a delivery at their address. He put the packages in his own car, which also contained electronic scales. He was willing to place two packages addressed to someone else in his own car without checking the contents. He started to drive away, but once he saw officers closing in, he backed the car back into the driveway in what appears to have been an attempt to flee. Considering the totality of the evidence, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Belcher knew or should have known the contents of the packages. See generally Perkins v. State, 244 Ga.App. 412, 535 S.E.2d 802 (2000).” Distinguishing cases without circumstantial evidence that defendant was expecting package or otherwise aware of contents, Sandoval v. State, 260 Ga.App. 61, 579 S.E.2d 75 (2003), and Baltazar v. State, 254 Ga.App. 773, 564 S.E.2d 202 (2002). Accord, Hitchcock (April 21, 2008), below. Foster v. State, 300 Ga.App. 446, 685 S.E.2d 422 (October 13, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking reversed; evidence was insufficient to convict passenger of possession of drugs hidden in trunk of car. “Foster did not own, drive, or otherwise ‘possess’ the car, so no presumption of possession or ownership arose. “The other factors argued by the State – that Foster and Woods were in the same band, that Woods ditched the car in a neighborhood where Foster had family, and that they ran in the same general direction – are not even circumstantial evidence of a crime, and are ‘insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that [Foster] was in constructive possession of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.’ Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 593 (492 S.E.2d 204) (1997). See also Gillis v. State, 285 Ga.App. 199 (645 S.E.2d 674) (2007); Hodges v. State, 277 Ga.App. 174 (626 S.E.2d 133) (2006); Hughes v. State, 215 Ga.App. 6, 8-9(1) (449 S.E.2d 547) (1994).”