☢ test - Í

in his testimony, however, shows that the contents of the bag were visible to Gillis. At trial, Akridge asserted that the bag of drugs ‘appeared to have been ... smashed up under the seat for concealment from’ the officers. But the State offered no evidence that Gillis hid the drugs.” No evidence here of furtive movements by Gillis. Accord, Millsaps v. State , 300 Ga.App. 383, 685 S.E.2d 371 (October 7, 2009) (insufficient evidence to convict backseat passenger of possession of drug where plastic baggy was sticking out of box under his seat, but drug was not visible, passenger was not owner of vehicle, not furtive movements or other suspicions acts on passenger’s part). Brown v. State, 285 Ga.App. 330, 646 S.E.2d 273 (April 16, 2007). Conviction for cocaine trafficking reversed; evidence was insufficient to connect defendant “to the cocaine found in the house in whose yard he was standing when the police confronted him.” Residence belonged to defendant’s cousin; defendant didn’t live there, have a key to the residence, or “have permission to enter the residence at will.” Defendant agreed to meet informant at residence to sell him an ounce of cocaine. Police accompanied informant to residence, found defendant in yard, and arrested him as he tried to flee. Police then looked through glass door and saw what looked like an ounce of cocaine in a bag on a table. More cocaine was found upon searching the residence pursuant to a warrant. “The police found nothing in the residence that linked Brown to the residence such as clothing, bills, fingerprints, financial statements, photographs, records, books, or other personal belongings. They found no drugs on his person nor did they find anything on his person linking him to the house or its contents.” “[E]ven if the cocaine in plain view (from just outside the front door) on the glass table near the front door could somehow be connected to Brown, the different form of cocaine found some distance away in a place (not visible from just outside the front door) on top of the entertainment center certainly could not [and was required to support the trafficking charge]. The State points to Brown’s attempt to flee as evidence linking him to the drugs. But we have expressly held that mere spatial proximity combined with flight is insufficient to connect a defendant to nearby contraband. See Johnson [(October 20, 2006), below ]; Myers v. State, 193 Ga.App. 372, 373 (387 S.E.2d 640) (1989). Nor does the fact that Brown promised the informant an ounce of cocaine fill the evidentiary gap between him and the two packages of cocaine found in the house.” Another reasonable hypothesis existed: “the evidence showed that another individual who was later incarcerated on drug charges lived at the residence at that time.” Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to prove possession: “Jackson was driving a car that belonged to his sister, who testified that there was no cocaine, marijuana, or a gun in her car before Jackson took it. The passenger’s girlfriend corroborated the passenger’s story that they were together until they had an argument and he got out of the car. … We find … that this evidence when coupled with evidence of Jackson’s prior drug offenses was sufficient to establish that he possessed the contraband at issue and thus to support his convictions. [Cit.]” Daugherty v. State, 283 Ga.App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (February 21, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s possession of drugs. “Constructive possession exists where a person ‘though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing.’ Meridy v. State, 265 Ga.App. 440, 441(1) (594 S.E.2d 378) (2004). … [Defendant] argues that because there were several people in the residence at the time police conducted their search, the briefcase could have belonged to any of them and the State therefore failed to prove possession. The evidence showed that Daugherty was selling crack cocaine out of his residence. Although several people were in the house when [undercover agent] Burns asked to purchase drugs, he was taken to Daugherty. While buying the drugs, Burns saw a number of bags apparently containing crack cocaine on a table next to Daugherty. No more than an hour later, approximately 58 grams of crack cocaine were found in a briefcase hidden in the same room where Burns made his purchase. The arresting officers had seen Daugherty go into that room before admitting them to the house, and it was clear to the police officers conducting the search that Daugherty was the individual in ‘control of the scene’ inside the house. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Daugherty’s conviction on the cocaine trafficking charge.” Reason v. State, 283 Ga.App. 608, 642 S.E.2d 236 (February 16, 2007). “Prior to executing the warrant, officers watched Reason make several trips to and from an overturned bucket in the yard as a steady stream of unrelated people walked up from the street. Upon executing the warrant, the officers were not able to locate Reason, who had been at the location minutes before, but they found 2.97 grams of cocaine hidden under the bucket frequented by Reason.” Held, evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s possession of the cocaine, as there was no evidence that anyone else visited the bucket immediately before the seizure. Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (December 20, 2006). “Given that marijuana was found in what appeared to be Wilkinson’s lingerie drawer, the preponderance of evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that she