☢ test - Í

had constructive possession of it.” Context is probation revocation, hence “preponderance of evidence” standard. Similar conclusion at trial, Giang (May 22, 2007), above. Slaughter v. State, 282 Ga.App. 276, 638 S.E.2d 417 (November 6, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to establish possession: “While Slaughter is correct that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish possession of the contraband, Hodges v. State, 277 Ga.App. 174 (626 S.E.2d 133) (2006), there was significant evidence in this case to establish more than presence alone. Slaughter was the only person at the scene when police executed their warrant, and a search of his person turned up keys to both the car and the house. A search of the car revealed that he owned it jointly with his mother and the trunk contained a significant amount of money in various denominations. Moreover, during a search of the house, police uncovered bills indicating that Slaughter paid the utilities on the property for at least two months. This evidence when coupled with evidence of Slaughter’s prior drug offense was sufficient to establish that he possessed the contraband at issue and thus to support his convictions. See Jackson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (August 11, 2006). Williams v. State, [277 Ga.App. 106, 107-108(1), 625 S.E.2d 509 (2005)]; Ballard v. State, [268 Ga.App. 55, 57-58(1), 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004)].” Johnson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 52, 637 S.E.2d 775 (October 20, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for drug possession reversed. “There was no evidence that [defendant James] Johnson had the power or the intent to exercise control over the drugs. [Cit.] The evidence showed that the home belonged to Rhonda Johnson, and that several other people were present at the residence when the drugs were discovered. No witness testified that Johnson resided on the premises or that he was even seen in the bedroom in which the drugs were found. The only officer who testified about the search stated that, as far as he could tell, Rhonda Johnson resided in that bedroom. Furthermore, the drugs were found in a corner, concealed in a ball of tape. The officer admitted the drugs were not visible through the tape. [fn] Thus, even assuming the state proved that Johnson had been in the bedroom, the evidence is not sufficient to establish that he exercised control over the drugs or even knew the drugs were present. The only evidence presented at trial purportedly connecting Johnson to the drugs was that he ran from the doorway or direction of the bedroom, and that a ball of tape containing concealed drugs was found in a corner of that bedroom. It is well-established that neither presence nor flight, nor both together, without more, is conclusive evidence of guilt. Myers v. State, 193 Ga.App. 372, 373 (387 S.E.2d 640) (1989); Denham v. State, 144 Ga.App. 373, 374(1) (241 S.E.2d 295) (1977); see generally Scott v. State, 238 Ga.App. 258, 259(1) (518 S.E.2d 468) (1999). The evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that Johnson constructively possessed the drugs .” “[I]t is not clear from the record how [James Johnson and Rhonda Johnson] are related.” Accord, Brown (April 16, 2007), and Gray (December 29, 2011), both above. Wright v. State, 279 Ga.App. 299, 630 S.E.2d 774 (April 13, 2006). “ As long as there is ‘slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion’ over an instrumentality, ‘the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.’ [Cit.] Since the evidence here showed that Wright had continuous access to the firearms in her house on the day of the incident, and that she intended to and did in fact exercise control over her sons’ access to one of the guns in the minutes leading up to the shooting, we will not disturb the trial court’s finding that she had constructive possession of the firearm taken from her bedroom and used to kill her son’s friend. That same evidence also suffices to sustain the revocation of Wright’s probation. [Cit.]” Hodges v. State, 277 Ga.App. 174, 626 S.E.2d 133 (January 9, 2006). Conviction for trafficking in cocaine reversed for insufficient evidence . Defendant was passenger in girlfriend’s car when a large amount of cocaine was found in a yellow plastic bag behind the driver’s seat. Neither party made any statements, there was no flight, “and the officers testified that they did not observe any unusual of suspicious activity … during or after the stop.” “Because mere spatial proximity to the hidden cocaine was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hodges had constructive possession of the cocaine, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, the conviction must be reversed. Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 593 (492 S.E.2d 204) (1997); Whipple v. State, 207 Ga.App. 131, 132 (427 S.E.2d 101) (1993).” Accord, Fluker v. State , 296 Ga.App. 347, 674 S.E.2d 404 (March 2, 2009) (“The arresting officer testified that nothing linked Fluker to the drugs other than the fact that he was in the car [as a passenger].”). Distinguished, Vines (March 10, 2009), above (drugs in backpack within defendant’s arm’s reach, overwhelming odor of marijuana in car, defendant armed and “incredibly and unusually nervous,” defendants lived together in home where drug sales were believed to be taking place). Williams v. State, 277 Ga.App. 106, 625 S.E.2d 509 (December 28, 2005). “In this case, there was significant evidence other than Williams’ mere presence inside the car that he possessed the marijuana. Upon his removal from the car he voluntarily told the officers exactly where the marijuana was hidden, the marijuana was found directly underneath the seat