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which he had just occupied, [co-defendant] gave testimony establishing that the marijuana belonged to Williams, and Williams has previously been found in possession of similarly packaged marijuana. Such evidence authorized the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. [Cit.]” Jackson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 694, 624 S.E.2d 270 (December 6, 2005). “Here, the evidence suggesting Jackson’s constructive possession of the cocaine was not limited to his presence in the room where it was found, but included (1) his actual possession of a key to the apartment and $346 in cash; (2) Wilcox’s testimony that he and Jackson were partners in the drug trade; and (3) Jackson’s giving a false name. … Giving a false name was also evidence of Jackson’s consciousness of guilt. See Turntime v. State, 206 Ga.App. 226, 227(1) (424 S.E.2d 877) (1992).” Turner v. State, 276 Ga.App. 381, 623 S.E.2d 216 (November 15, 2005). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession reversed, evidence demanded acquittal based on equal access rule. “‘The proper application of this rule means that, in the case of an automobile found containing contraband, no presumption arises that the driver or owner is in possession of the contraband, where there is any competent evidence that persons other than the accused have had access to or control of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband. Where there is such evidence, the burden will remain where it first came to rest, upon the state – without benefit of any presumption against the defendant – to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis that the accused was in possession of the contraband,’” quoting Whipple v. State , 207 Ga.App. 131)(1), 427 S.E.2d 101 (1993). “ Howren v. State, [271 Ga.App. 55, 58(4), 608 S.E.2d 653 (2004)] recently summarized this principle: ‘The equal access rule entitles a defendant to acquittal when (1) the sole evidence of his possession of contraband is his possession of a vehicle in which contraband is found; and (2) others have equal access to the area where the contraband is found or the vehicle has recently been in the possession of others.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Because these two criteria apply in the present case, we must reverse.” Defendant could have been convicted based on joint constructive possession had the other occupant of the vehicle been charged, but where, as here, “the State does not charge the other occupant of the vehicle who is contended to be in joint possession, the State bears the burden of showing that the defendant ‘was in sole constructive possession of the drugs.’ (Emphasis in original.) Reid v. State , 212 Ga.App. 787, 788 (n.1) 442 S.E.2d 852 (1994). See Warren v. State , 254 Ga.App. 52, 54(1), 561 S.E.2d 190 (2002). The State’s passing reference in its closing argument that Turner may have been in joint constructive possession of the cocaine is insufficient; formal charges against the other occupant are required. [Cits.]” Distinguished in Waters v. State , 280 Ga.App. 566, 634 S.E.2d 508 (July 14, 2006) (defendant could be convicted of joint constructive possession where both defendants were charged); Jackson (January 5, 2009), above (proper to charge on joint possession despite failure to indict other occupant where defendant didn’t deny actual possession, only challenging his knowing possession). Poston v. State, 274 Ga.App. 117, 617 S.E.2d 150 (June 29, 2005). “Poston reported to his supervising probation officer and, at her request, submitted to a urine drug screen test. Because a preliminary test of the urine was positive for amphetamines, the urine sample was forwarded to the State crime lab. A gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test performed on the sample by the State forensic toxicologist confirmed that methamphetamine was present in Poston’s urine sample. This evidence was sufficient to support Poston’s conviction of possession by ingestion of methamphetamine.” In re: E.A.D., 271 Ga.App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153 (February 7, 2005). Juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency reversed; finding was based on her mere proximity to cocaine hidden under sofa cushions where she was sitting at home of probationer where officers executed search at 2:30 a.m. “The police officers who conducted the search further testified, however, they had no idea how long E.A.D. had been in the home, they did not know the purpose of her visit, and they never saw her put anything under the cushions of the couch.” Drugs were also found in multiple other locations in the house. Accord,Johnson (October 20, 2006), above; Brown (April 16, 2007); above . Barrow v. State, 269 Ga.App. 635, 605 S.E.2d 67 (September 16, 2004). Jury was authorized to find defendant guilty of possession of cocaine where evidence showed that defendant “refused to stop the car while [co-defendant] was throwing blocks of what appeared to be cocaine out the window;” some of it was retrieved and tested positive as cocaine. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga.App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (June 21, 2004). 1. “Ballard contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine trafficking and possession-of-cocaine-with-intent-to-distribute convictions because there was no direct evidence linking him to the cocaine, which was not in plain view, and because his mere presence in the apartment could not support his convictions. We find no merit in this argument because there was more evidence than Ballard’s presence in the apartment that linked him to the cocaine. The jury could infer that Ballard actually lived in the