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apartment because he claimed ownership of the TV and Play Station, because it was a one-bedroom apartment to which he had a key, because he was sleeping in the bedroom when the police arrived, and because no one else was present. Ballard’s own statements provided additional evidence demonstrating his possession of the cocaine hidden in the kitchen cabinets. Ballard’s claim that, “You ain’t smart enough to get a warrant to get my dope,” clearly implies he had dope in the apartment and that he did not believe the police could have obtained a warrant to find it. Ballard also made several statements demonstrating his knowledge of the amount of drugs found by the police, as well as his status as a drug dealer, from which the jury could infer that the drugs belonged to Ballard. Ballard also had $1,905 dollars on his person with large numbers of denominations used to purchase drugs. We find this evidence sufficient to support Ballard’s convictions under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).” 2. “We find no merit in Ballard’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his possession-of-a-firearm-by-a- convicted-felon conviction. For the reasons stated in Division 1, the jury could infer that Ballard actually lived in the apartment and that the items found in the apartment belonged to him. We further note that the gun was found in plain view on the television, which Ballard claimed as his own, next to Ballard’s keys to the apartment, and his vehicle was found outside. As a result, Ballard’s conviction is supported by more evidence than just his mere spatial proximity to the gun. See Brackins v. State, 249 Ga.App. 788, 789(1), 549 S.E.2d 775 (2001) (evidence sufficed to support cocaine possession conviction when cocaine found in pocket of windbreaker and defendant inquired about his money found in the other pocket); Young v. State, 242 Ga.App. 681, 684(1), 530 S.E.2d 758 (2000) (evidence sufficed to support cocaine possession conviction where cocaine found with gun that defendants owned); Noble v. State, 225 Ga.App. 470, 471-472, 484 S.E.2d 78 (1997) (sufficient evidence supported possession conviction when contraband was found inside pillowcase of a pillow that was lying on top of a gun that defendant admitted that he owned).” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L Ed.2d 769 (December 15, 2003). Defendant occupied front passenger seat of car stopped and searched by police. Police found large amount of cash in glove compartment, and five baggies of cocaine in back seat. Held, this evidence gave officers probable cause to arrest defendant, as well as the other two occupants of the vehicle. “We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” “In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), we noted that ‘a car passenger … will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.’ Id., at 304-305, 119 S.Ct. 1297. Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him.” State court erred in dismissing the money “as a factor in the probable-cause determination, stating that ‘[m]oney, without more, is innocuous.’ [Cit.] The court’s consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light of our precedents. [Cits.]” Baltazar v. State, 254 Ga.App. 773, 564 S.E.2d 202 (March 19, 2002). California law enforcement contacted Georgia authorities about a suspicious package addressed to “Kevin Kline” at a Cobb County address and en route to Georgia via Federal Express. When the package arrived, narcotics agents discovered it contained cocaine. A Cobb County narcotics agent dressed in a FedEx uniform and took the package and a clipboard with a FedEx sign-in sheet to the door of the trailer found at the address. Defendant opened the door and was asked to sign for the package. Defendant did not understand and began to speak in Spanish. The officer, who doesn’t speak Spanish, pointed to the clipboard to get defendant to sign for it. Defendant was “basically calm, smiling, as if to say that he didn’t understand.” After the officer pointed to the clipboard two or three times, Defendant printed the name “Kevin Kline” on the signature line while looking at the face of the package. The officer handed the package to defendant and left. Another officer then came to the door and when defendant answered, he was arrested. A subsequent sweep of the trailer found the unopened package as well as a Spanish business card with the name “Fortino Cisneros” printed on the front and the name “Kevin Kline” printed on the back. The trailer had been leased to a person with the name Fortino Cisneros, so an officer called the number on the card. Someone answered who only spoke Spanish, so the officer was not able to inquire about Cisneros. The jury found defendant guilty. Held, conviction must be reversed because the evidence that defendant knew the package contained cocaine is circumstantial and in considering the evidence in its totality, a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Defendant’s guilt is the only reasonable hypothesis. Mere suspicion will not sustain a conviction. The court found that there was not additional evidence, as in Perkins (June 12, 2000), below, that linked defendant to the cocaine; however, if the business card had been found in defendant’s wallet, the case might have had a different result. Compare Hitchcock (April 21, 2008), above (circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s knowledge of contents of package, although he hadn’t opened it yet).