☢ test - Í

Johnson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481 (August 17, 2000). Evidence didn’t support defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession. “Mere presence at the time and place a crime is committed is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Reese v. State, 157 Ga. 766, 122 S.E. 195 (1924); Sweat v. State, 119 Ga.App. 646(1), 168 S.E.2d 654 (1969). The State must provide evidence of a connection linking the defendant to the contraband other than his mere spatial proximity. Francis v. State, 231 Ga.App. 112, 113(1), 497 S.E.2d 827 (1998). … Here the evidence showed that others were present at the residence, and that at most Johnson was a mere temporary occupant of the premises, with no evidence showing he had any control over the premises or that he had any connection to the rooms where the cocaine was found. See Francis, supra, 231 Ga.App. at 113(1), 497 S.E.2d 827 (no evidence connected defendant to bedroom where marijuana was found). Evidence of occasional or even frequent visits to a residence cannot alone constitute occupying and controlling the residence. Morrison v. State, 220 Ga.App. 151, 153(1), 469 S.E.2d 686 (1996). The presence of the children at the residence and the indications the room was occupied by children further distance Johnson from the bedroom in which the cocaine rocks were found.” “Here evidence showed that Johnson and several other people were outside the apartment the day the drugs were found, and that the drugs were found in a bedroom obviously occupied by the sister's children. No evidence linked Johnson to the three rocks of cocaine,[cit.] to the matchbox,[cit.] or to the bedroom or bathroom in which these were found; thus, the evidence did not exclude the hypotheses that the drugs belonged to the sister, or to the children, or to any of the others present at the apartment.[Cits.]” Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 440, 535 S.E.2d 785 (June 12, 2000). Controlled substance convictions affirmed; drugs and cash on Brown’s person were circumstantial evidence beyond “mere spatial proximity” allowing an inference that the other drugs in his home belonged to Brown, not someone else. Perkins v. State, 244 Ga.App. 412, 535 S.E.2d 802 (June 12, 2000). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking upheld; evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly possessed drugs where he accepted delivery, from an undercover narcotics agent, of contraband addressed to a fictitious person. A subsequent search of Defendant’s house revealed that: Defendant was from the place where the package originated; drug paraphernalia and a gun were in Defendant’s house; Defendant had a large amount of cash despite not having worked for over two weeks; and Defendant had the tracking number for the delivery service in his wallet. Accord Baltazar (March 19, 2002), above, wherein the defendant’s conviction was overturned because the state’s evidence consisted mainly of the mere fact the defendant signed for the package and a business card found in the defendant’s trailer could not be linked to the defendant. Widener v. State, 242 Ga.App. 438, 529 S.E.2d 899 (February 21, 2000). Evidence supported conviction for marijuana possession where defendant was among “a group of people sitting around a coffee table smoking marijuana. Widener was sitting at the coffee table, where less than an ounce of marijuana was lying ‘in plain view’ in a plastic bag and two or three marijuana cigarettes were burning in the ashtrays on top of the coffee table. The officer did not testify that he observed Widener with a marijuana cigarette in his hand.” “[T]he evidence showed the marijuana was not only within arm's reach of Widener but in plain view and being smoked in Widener's immediate presence at the time the police entered the home. Even though the officer did not testify that he saw Widener or any other person at the coffee table in the act of smoking a marijuana cigarette, the trial court was authorized to find that Widener was, at the least, in joint and constructive possession of the marijuana.” Carlisle v. State, 242 Ga.App. 253, 529 S.E.2d 385 (February 4, 2000). Evidence supported cocaine possession conviction. “Although ‘[t]he head of household presumption of possession of contraband found therein is no longer a viable presumption in this state[,]’ Ramsay v. State, 175 Ga.App. 97, 100(7), 332 S.E.2d 390 (1985), there was circumstantial evidence upon which the jury might reasonably have concluded that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the cocaine found on her nightstand. See Anderson v. State, 166 Ga.App. 459, 460(3), 304 S.E.2d 550 (1983) (sole constructive possession of a thing obtains when, though not having actual possession thereof, one has power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over it). In particular, there was evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant had cleaned up her bedroom, hidden the cocaine but forgotten to hide the residue of a marijuana cigarette, and nervously persisted in hiding the cocaine as her bedroom was searched.” Knight v. State, 242 Ga.App. 363, 528 S.E.2d 855 (January 26, 2000). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed. “Here, the cocaine was found in plain view of Knight in the lap of the front seat passenger of the [rental] car Knight was driving. Under the circumstances, the jury was authorized to find that the cocaine was in Knight's joint, constructive possession.”