☢ test - Í

child, like murder, see OCGA § 16–5–1, this evidence would have supported an accident instruction, because it would tend to show that she did not act with the requisite “criminal ... intention.” OCGA § 16–2–2. As explained above, however, that was not the type of intent required to commit a strict liability traffic offense.” Rather, the defense raises an issue of proximate cause with regard to the vehicular homicide charge. “In the language of § 40–6–393(c), the evidence raised the issue of whether Ogilvie's alleged violation of § 40–6–91 was ‘the cause of [the child's] death.’ The trial court committed no error in this regard, however, giving the jury a full charge on proximate cause, in addition to charging the relevant language of those two statutes.” “Cause” here means “proximate cause,” citing State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010). Harrison v. State, 313 Ga.App. 861, 722 S.E.2d 774 (February 1, 2012). Conviction for interference with government property affirmed; unlike criminal damage to property and criminal trespass, conviction for interference with government property doesn’t require specific intent to interfere with the property. “[The criminal damage to property] statutes, as well as the criminal trespass statute, include a requirement that the person ‘intentionally’ (OCGA §§ 16–7–21(a), (e), 16–7–23(a)(1)), ‘knowingly’ (OCGA §§ 16–7–21(b), 16–7–22(a)), or ‘recklessly or intentionally’ (OCGA § 16–7–23(a)(2)) commit the proscribed act. OCGA § 16–7–24(a), in contrast, contains no such requirement, but states in its entirety: ‘A person commits the offense of interference with government property when he destroys, damages, or defaces government property.’ Compare OCGA § 16–7–24(b), which requires that a person ‘forcibly’ interfere with or obstruct passage into or from government property. … Here, that a police officer may fall into the water and damage his equipment is a reasonably probable consequence of resisting arrest and struggling with the officer at the side of a swimming pool. In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the general standard of proximate cause applies. ” “Our Supreme Court ‘has explained that proximate cause is the standard for criminal cases in general. In a criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused's act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the victim's injury or damage and the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 648–649(2) (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010).” In re: Q.S., 310 Ga.App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (June 16, 2011). Evidence was insufficient to support delinquency adjudication based on aggravated battery (or disrupting public school, but sufficient as to aggravated assault); although victim suffered short-term memory loss and cognitive impairment after being beaten by Q.S. and her accomplices, no evidence supported a finding that the beating was the proximate cause of these injuries. “For purposes of aggravated battery, one causes another to suffer an injury when her conduct is a ‘proximate cause’ of the injury , or, put another way, a cause that, ‘in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces [the] injury, and without which the [injury] would not have occurred.’ State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 648(2), 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). ‘In a criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused's act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the victim's injury ... and the injury ... was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.’ Chaney v. State, 281 Ga. 481, 482(1), 640 S.E.2d 37 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).” After the beating, doctors ordered an MRI of victim’s brain, “and this imaging revealed a preexisting brain tumor.” Victim had surgery to remove the tumor, following which she suffered complications, including memory loss and cognitive impairment. Victim’s neurosurgeon testified “that it was as likely as not that the assault had no effect at all upon the tumor” – not enough to establish probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Chaney v. State, 281 Ga. 481, 640 S.E.2d 37 (January 8, 2007). “In a criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused’s ‘act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the victim's injury or damage and the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. [Cits.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19-20(1) (596 S.E.2d 159) (2004). Even assuming arguendo that the injuries suffered in the fall was the immediate cause of Rutherford’s death, as in Skaggs, ‘the fall itself was the direct and immediate result of the blows administered,’ id. at 20, and ‘[t]he only intervening force was gravity.’ Id. After the pistol whipping, the fall was reasonably foreseeable. Thus, Chaney’s acts of striking the victim in the head with the pistol either directly or proximately caused his death. Id.” Victim died of blunt force trauma after defendant struck him with a handgun and victim then fell to the ground. Expert testified that either the force of the handgun or the force of the fall could have caused victim’s skull fracture and brain trauma which led to death. Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19, 596 S.E.2d 159 (May 3, 2004). Defendant punched and kicked victim, causing him to fall headfirst on concrete. The fall resulted in fatal injuries. Held, gravity is not an “abnormal response” or “a coincidence that is not reasonably foreseeable” such as would prevent defendant’s blows from being the legal cause of victim’s death.