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“[I]t is irrelevant that, statistically, falls are seldom fatal. The only fall at issue is that which [victim] suffered, and he did not simply fall to the ground. He fell only because he was the victim of aggravated assault.” Defendant was properly convicted of felony murder. Accord, Rivers v. State , 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015) (murder conviction affirmed; proximate cause shown where “appellant hit Tanks in the head, causing Tanks to fall and strike his head on a concrete step.” Victim lay “in a coma for several weeks before his ultimate death from a blood clot which was caused by his prolonged immobility after the fall.”). ZZZZ. RACE Harden v. State, 239 Ga.App. 700, 521 S.E.2d 829 (August 24, 1999). At defendant’s trial for selling cocaine, trial court properly sustained State’s objection to defense counsel’s question on cross-examination of police officer: “[M]ost of these people on these ... crime busts are generally two things, poor and black, is that right?” “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Harden to question Chapman about the race and/or income level of other arrestees as the testimony was not relevant to Harden's guilt or innocence. See Sandoval v. State, 264 Ga. 199, 200(2)(a), 442 S.E.2d 746 (1994) (evidence as to race is not admissible where it is not relevant to any issue).” AAAAA. RADAR See OFFENSES – UNIFORM RULES OF THE ROAD – SPEEDING, below BBBBB. RAPE SHIELD STATUTE Sutton v. State, A16A0446, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1577187 (April 20, 2016). Aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions affirmed, under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly excluded portion of victim’s statement where she “merely misspoke and initially said the wrong name,[fn] but then corrected herself to identify Sutton as the offender, and was consistent in that testimony throughout the remainder of the interview.” “The general rule is that evidence of prior unrelated molestation is barred, and ‘is not admissible simply to show the victim was confused.’ Blackwell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 452, 454(2), 494 S.E.2d 269 (1997).” Citing former OCGA § 24-2- 3; compare 2013 OCGA § 24-4-412. Davis v. State, 329 Ga.App. 797, 764 S.E.2d 588 (October 29, 2014). Rape, aggravated child molestation, and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to “investigate alternate sources of injury or pregnancy because the theory of the case was simply that Davis had not attacked K.C.” and that “she was impregnated in early March, after Davis's arrest.” Trial counsel correctly concluded “that identifying an alternate sexual partner might have conflicted with the Rape Shield Statute” because “[a]ny sexual contact after the crime, … would not have been relevant to K.C.'s injuries and would have been highly prejudicial. See Crane v. State, 199 Ga.App. 548(2) (405 S.E.2d 550) (1991) (victim's subsequent sexual activities are prejudicial and irrelevant).” Disproving State’s claim that defendant fathered victim’s aborted child would seem to be relevant, however. Hall v. State, 320 Ga.App. 48, 739 S.E.2d 61 (February 27, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence that victim had sex with another man thirty minutes before encounter with defendant. Distinguishing Hall v. State, 196 Ga.App. 523, 524, 396 S.E.2d 271 (1990), and Blackwell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 452, 494 S.E.2d 269 (1997) (evidence of child’s past sexual activity admissible to rebut medical evidence of “physical or psychological injuries which would warrant the admission of proof that they were caused by someone other than [the defendant].”). “We do not agree with Hall that the victim's testimony that she sought counseling after the incident with Hall constituted ‘medical testimony indicating that [she] ha[d] been sexually abused.’ [ Chambers v. State, 213 Ga.App. 284, 286(1)(b), 444 S.E.2d 833 (1994)]. Nor has Hall shown that the victim's testimony that she felt embarrassed and ashamed amounted to medical testimony, id., or that feelings of embarrassment and shame were ‘psychological injuries,’ as he contends. Indeed, this court has found ‘medical testimony indicating that [a] child has been sexually abused,’ id., in cases where medical doctors testified as to their findings after they examined intimate body parts. Id.; Burris v. State, 204 Ga.App. 806–807, 810(2), 420 S.E.2d 582 (1992); Hall, supra at 196 Ga.App. 523–524, 525(2), 396 S.E.2d 271; compare Brown v. State, 280 Ga.App. 884, 886(1), 635 S.E.2d 240 (2006) (no medical evidence adduced which showed that child had been sexually abused where the state did not call to the witness stand the doctor who had examined the child). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of prior sexual abuse committed by a person other than Hall on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant. See Segura v. State, 280 Ga.App. 685, 688(3), 634 S.E.2d 858 (2006); Holmes [ v. State, 275 Ga. 853, 572 S.E.2d 569 (2002)]; Blackwell, supra at 454(2).” Green v. State, 291 Ga. 287, 728 S.E.2d 668 (June 25, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly ruled out impeachment of rape victim with her prior conviction for prostitution. “A prostitution conviction is inadmissible under [OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3)], as it is not in the nature of crimen falsi, involving some element of