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dishonesty or false statement.” Even if otherwise admissible, a prior conviction for prostitution would be excluded by the rape shield statute “where, as here, it relates to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness in a prosecution for rape and does not come within an exception in OCGA § 24–2–3. Fuller v. State, 169 Ga.App. 488, 489–490(1), 313 S.E.2d 505 (1984). Compare Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188, 313 S.E.2d 469 (1984). ‘Allowing evidence of prostitution that does not relate to the incident itself discourages reporting and prosecution of rapes. Even if such evidence is accurate, it does not remove the protection of the Rape Shield Statute. [Cits.]’ Brown v. State, 214 Ga.App. 676, 678(2), 448 S.E.2d 723 (1994). See also Grier v. State, 276 Ga.App. 655, 662(4)(a), 624 S.E.2d 149 (2005).” Turner v. State, 312 Ga.App. 315, 718 S.E.2d 545 (November 1, 2011). Rape conviction affirmed; 1. trial court properly prohibited defendant from testifying to statements allegedly made to him by victim about having sex with other men as violative of the Rape Shield Statute. Defendant “contends these statements are essential to his sole defense that the victim consented to having sexual intercourse with him.” OCGA § 24-2-3(b) allows sexual history evidence “where the past sexual behavior of the victim directly involves the accused's participation and supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the victim had consented to the conduct at issue. The evidence may also be admitted on a finding that it ‘is so highly material that it will substantially support a conclusion that the accused reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of and that justice mandates the admission of such evidence.’ OCGA § 24–2–3(c)(2).” Neither exception applies here: the alleged conduct was with other people, not defendant, and given the testimony that “the victim was intoxicated, in and out of consciousness, and unable to move” when defendant had sex with her, “Turner would not have ‘reasonably believed’that the victim consented to sex.” 2. On direct, State asked Turner’s daughter if she had called victim a “slut” on her MySpace page – apparently to show her state of feelings toward victim. Contrary to defendant’s argument, this question didn’t open the door to evidence otherwise prohibited by the Rape Shield Statute. “‘[I]t is well settled that the Rape Shield Statute ... supersedes all evidentiary exceptions.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Logan v. State, 212 Ga.App. 734, 735– 736(1)(a) (442 S.E.2d 883) (1994). ‘The defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses concerning the victim's past sexual behavior with others must bow to accommodate the [S]tate's interest in the Rape Shield Statute.’ Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666, 668(1)(c) (362 S.E.2d 211) (1987).” McIntyre v. State, 311 Ga.App. 173, 715 S.E.2d 431 (July 1, 2011), affirmed on other grounds sub nom Disharoon v. State , 291 Ga. 45, 727 S.E.2d 465 (May 7, 2012). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly excluded “evidence that J.M. fabricated her claims in retaliation for McIntyre's disclosure to J.M.'s mother that J.M. was sexually active. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion here, as explained by this Court in Abdulkadir v. State, 264 Ga.App. 805 (592 S.E.2d 433) (2003), affirmed by Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122 (610 S.E.2d 50) (2005), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Robinson v. State, 308 Ga.App. 562, 567(1) (708 S.E.2d 303) (2011). In that case, the defendant contended that he should have been allowed to introduce evidence that the victim had falsely accused him of sexual abuse when her mother discovered her engaged in sexual relations with another individual based on information the mother received from the defendant. See Abdulkadir, 264 Ga.App. at 807(3)(a). This Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of any evidence of the victim's sexual relationship with the other individual under the Rape Shield Statute. The Court determined that it was within the trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination of the victim to whether a disciplinary dispute between the victim and defendant motivated the victim to fabricate the allegations. See id. at 808(3)(a).” Also citing Green v. State , 221 Ga.App. 436 (472 S.E.2d 1) (1996).” Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga.App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (October 1, 2010). Conviction for aggravated child molestation reversed; trial court erred by prohibiting defendant from presenting evidence that victim had sex with her boyfriend, thus countering State’s contention that her damaged hymen was caused by defendant’s molestation. “OCGA § 24-2-3(b) – applicable in child molestation cases – excludes evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness with some limited exceptions, including: ‘(a) to show that someone other than the defendant caused the injuries to the child; (b) to show lack of victim credibility if the victim's prior allegations of molestation were false; and (c) to show other possible causes for the symptoms exhibited.’ See Taylor v. State, 268 Ga.App. 333, 334(2) (601 S.E.2d 815) (2004). … This first exception clearly applies to the case at bar. Tidwell sought to introduce evidence (admissions by the 15-year-old on an Internet social networking site) that she had been having sex with her boyfriend, which evidence would provide an alternate explanation why the 15-year-old's hymen had been penetrated. See Wand v. State, 230 Ga.App. 460, 464(2)(f) (496 S.E.2d 771) (1998) (physical precedent only) (‘prior molestation evidence is admissible to explain the medical evidence showing repeated penetration of the victim's anus and vagina’). Absent the evidence of the sexual relationship with the boyfriend, the obvious inference was that Tidwell had caused the penetration injuries. Indeed, the State