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hammered this very point home when during its closing argument, it urged to the jury four times that the physical evidence of penetration injury to the 15-year-old's hymen corroborated her testimony of sexual intercourse with Tidwell, and even went so far as to say that the lack of penetration to the 13-year-old's hymen was entirely consistent with her testimony also. The State went on to note that this corroborating physical evidence gave the jury reason to find that all of the testimony given by both girls was truthful, and that therefore Tidwell should be convicted on all counts. With his hands tied by the exclusion of the evidence regarding the 15-year-old's sexual relationship with her boyfriend, Tidwell was not allowed to present an effective defense as to these points. Reversal of the convictions on all counts is required. See Lemacks [ v. State, 207 Ga.App. 160, 161 (427 S.E.2d 536) (1993)]; Chambers [ v. State, 205 Ga.App. 78, 82(4) (421 S.E.2d 326) (1992)].” Cantu v. State, 304 Ga.App. 655, 697 S.E.2d 310 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; although Rape Shield Statute doesn’t apply to child molestation cases, trial court still had discretion to rule out evidence about victim’s history with boyfriends and similar evidence as irrelevant. Accord, Robinson v. State , 308 Ga.App. 562, 708 S.E.2d 303 (March 18, 2011) (Whole court opinion) (Rape Shield Statute still doesn’t apply to child molestation cases, disapproving contrary language in Purvis v. State , 301 Ga.App. 648, 689 S.E.2d 53 (2009) ( Reversed on other grounds, 288 Ga. 865, 708 S.E.2d 283 (March 18, 2011)). Morgan v. State, 303 Ga.App. 358, 693 S.E.2d 504 (January 25, 2010). At defendant’s trial for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and related offenses committed against his girlfriend, trial court properly excluded letters written to defendant by victim while defendant was in jail awaiting trial. Trial court wrongly held that letters violated Rape Shield Statute, but exclusion was proper anyway as the letters were irrelevant. “Specifically, Morgan contends that the letters ‘were admissible to prove consent, to impeach [M.S.], and to prove the state of her feelings towards ... Morgan.’” Trial court excluded the letters based on the Rape Shield Statute based on references in the letters to other past and future sexual acts between defendant and victim, but this would not be a proper basis for exclusion of the letters here. “‘[T]he Rape Shield Statute bars the admission of evidence relating to the victim's past sexual behavior unless it directly involves the accused's participation and supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the conduct at issue.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bing v. State, 256 Ga.App. 88, 90(2) (567 S.E.2d 731) (2002), citing OCGA § 24-2-3(b) & (c)(2).” “We recognize that the Rape Shield Statute bars the admission of the victim's past sexual behavior. See OCGA § 24-2-3(a).” No error here, however, both because the letters were cumulative of the victim’s testimony and because “[t]he evidence in the letters that M.S. had a previous sexual relationship with Morgan before the incident and wanted to have one with him in the future was not relevant to the charges for which Morgan was convicted.” Birdsong v. State, 298 Ga.App. 322, 680 S.E.2d 159 (June 12, 2009). Trial court properly denied plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds; court didn’t abuse discretion by granting prior mistrial based on defense counsel’s violation of rape shield statute. “‘A manifest necessity exists when the defendant's right to have the trial completed must be subordinated to the public interest in affording the prosecutor a fair opportunity to present evidence to an impartial jury, and the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Perez v. State, 266 Ga.App. 82, 84 (596 S.E.2d 191) (2004). ‘The trial court's decision that there was a manifest necessity to grant a mistrial is entitled to great deference.’ Id. Based on Abdi v. State , 249 Ga. 827, 829, 294 S.E.2d 506 (1982) (mistrial manifestly necessary after defense counsel’s deliberate rape shield statute violation). “Birdsong ‘does not have the right to force the State either to endure a prejudiced trial or forego prosecution entirely.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Height v. State, 212 Ga.App. 410, 411 (442 S.E.2d 8) (1994).” Ellison v. State, 296 Ga.App. 752, 675 S.E.2d 613 (March 19, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated child molestation, trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered “evidence of the victim’s allegedly ‘seductive behavior’ and dress prior to the incident.” At hearing on motion in limine, defendant “stated that he wanted to show that the victim had been ‘dancing around’ and that she pulled his arm to her vagina. The court ruled that the victim's alleged ‘dancing around,’ as well as her manner of dress, were inadmissible but that Ellison would be able to raise the issue of whether or not the victim took his hand. … On appeal, Ellison concedes that a child does not have the capacity to consent to a sexual act, so consent is not a defense to the crimes involving sexual acts committed against minors. [Cit.] For this reason, Ellison admits, ‘such evidence is normally properly excluded.’ Ellison argues, however, that he should have been able to cross-examine this 15-year-old victim about her alleged ‘dancing around’ in order to test her credibility and veracity. We disagree. The trial court correctly exercised its sound discretion to exclude this line of inquiry.” Smith v. State, 294 Ga.App. 692, 670 S.E.2d 191 (November 19, 2008). In defendant’s trial for rape and related charges,