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“[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding as barred by the rape shield statute evidence of [victim’s] prior miscarriage .” Jennings v. State, 292 Ga.App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (June 23, 2008). At defendant’s trial for aggravated sodomy, rape, and related offenses, trial court properly refused to admit defendant’s proffered evidence that he and victim had had consensual sex on prior occasions. “OCGA § 24-2-3 prohibits admitting the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim unless the trial court finds that the past behavior directly involved the participation of the defendant and further finds that the behavior supports an inference that the defendant could have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the conduct at issue. Davis v. State, 235 Ga.App. 362, 363(1) (509 S.E.2d 655) (1998). When making a determination as to the latter factor, a court may rely on evidence of force and of lack of consent in finding that the defendant could not have reasonably believed that the victim willingly had sex with him. Williams v. State, 257 Ga.App. 54, 56(1) (570 S.E.2d 362) (2002). See Davis, supra, 235 Ga.App. at 363(1). Here, evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Jennings could not have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the sodomy and intercourse at issue. Substantial evidence showed that Jennings brandished a gun and threatened to shoot [victim’s boyfriend] Norris and the victim if she did not comply with his demands for sex. The court was authorized to find that evidence of prior sexual encounters with the victim did not lead to an inference of consent here.” Accord, Johnson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 612, 744 S.E.2d 903 (July 2, 2013) (trial court properly excluded evidence of parties’ prior sexual relationship where defendant couldn’t, under the circumstances, have believed that victim consented to sex here). French v. State, 288 Ga.App. 775, 655 S.E.2d 224 (November 6, 2007). Trial court properly “excluded as irrelevant evidence that [victim] B.F.’s stepfather had sexually molested her sister. ‘The admission or exclusion of evidence which is objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ (Footnote omitted.) Schneider v. State, 267 Ga.App. 508, 510(2) (603 S.E.2d 663) (2004). French claims that the excluded evidence was relevant to show that B.F. could have been victimized by the stepfather instead of by French. However, there was no evidence that suggested that B.F. had been molested by her stepfather or any person other than French. Both victims named only French as their molester. As such, the trial court did not err in declining to admit the evidence on this ground. See Bell v. State, 235 Ga.App. 825, 826 (510 S.E.2d 589) (1998); Burris v. State, 204 Ga.App. 806, 808-809(2) (420 S.E.2d 582) (1992) (trial court properly excluded evidence of an unrelated molestation by a third party when the victim never named the third party as her molester and there was no evidence supporting the defendant’s position that the victim was molested or abused by the third party).” Stanford v. State, 288 Ga.App. 463, 654 S.E.2d 173 (October 29, 2007). Defendant was convicted of two counts of child molestation and other offenses for convincing two young teenagers to have sex while he watched, and for acts committed by defendant against the victims. State introduced evidence that the two victims were young and inexperienced, and believed defendant when he told them things, i.e., telling the girl that she would die if her hymen wasn’t broken. Defendant contends that the court improperly admitted evidence of the victims’ sexual history (or lack thereof). Held, trial court properly admitted the evidence. “Here, contrary to Stanford’s assertion, the fact that the victims were naive and inexperienced was relevant and part of the actual crime. In this case, the victims’ naivete and lack of sexual experience or education explains why Stanford was able to abuse the victims the way he did.” Brown v. State, 280 Ga.App. 884, 635 S.E.2d 240 (August 2, 2006). In defendant’s trial for aggravated child molestation, trial court properly applied the Rape Shield Statute to exclude defendant’s proffered evidence of molestation of victim by others. “We have held that ‘[a]bsent a showing of relevancy, evidence of a child’s past sexual history, including sexual activity involving a person other than the defendant being tried, is inadmissible.’ Rocha v. State, 248 Ga.App. 53, 56(2) (545 S.E.2d 173) (2001). This is true even if the other sexual encounter also involved allegations of molestation. See id. There are exceptions to this exclusionary rule for cases in which the State introduces medical evidence, which shows the child has been sexually abused, or cases in which ‘the child exhibits symptoms of the abuse accommodation syndrome.’ Id. Here, however, neither exception applies. Although the State could have tendered evidence from the doctor who examined K.J. to demonstrate that there was physical evidence of intercourse, it did not do so. [fn] And Brown has not pointed to any proffer of evidence that the victim suffered from abuse accommodation syndrome. Rather, Brown merely cites to [nurse] Pittman’s testimony that the victim’s ‘behavioral characteristics were consistent with those of a child who had been sexually molested.’ This testimony, however, falls far short of the expert testimony regarding abuse accommodation syndrome that we have held warrants admitting evidence of previous molestation by others. See Hall v. State, 196 Ga.App. 523, 524-525(2) (396 S.E.2d 271) (1990) (evidence of prior molestation by others admissible where State presents expert testimony that child suffered from sexual abuse accommodation syndrome).