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Under these circumstances, this argument presents no basis for reversal. See Duncan v. State, 232 Ga.App. 157, 162- 163(5) (500 S.E.2d 603) (1998) (evidence of prior molestation by others inadmissible where State presents no medical evidence of molestation and does not assert that child suffered from syndrome).” Segura v. State, 280 Ga.App. 685, 634 S.E.2d 858 (July 26, 2006). Trial court properly excluded evidence of prior sexual abuse of child victims by persons other than defendant. “The court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant because the state did not intend to introduce physical evidence that the victims had been sexually assaulted or that they suffered from post- traumatic stress disorder or child abuse syndrome. ‘Absent a showing of relevance, evidence of a child's past sexual history, including acts committed by persons other than the accused, is inadmissible.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Chambers v. State, 213 Ga.App. 284, 286(1)(b) (444 S.E.2d 833) (1994), citing Marion v. State, 206 Ga.App. 159(1) (424 S.E.2d 838) (1992). However, ‘when evidence of the child abuse accommodation syndrome is introduced at trial, evidence that the victim has been molested by someone other than the accused may be admissible to establish other possible causes for the behavioral symptoms exhibited by the child.’ (Citation omitted.) Marion, supra.” Only evidence presented here was as to the children’s allegations, with only limited reference to their affect, and no effort to link affect to child abuse accommodation syndrome. Holloway v. State, 278 Ga.App. 709, 629 S.E.2d 447 (March 15, 2006). Trial court committed error (but harmless) in excluding evidence of a prior claim of molestation by victim . “Holloway seeks to demonstrate that M.B.R. lacks credibility by impeaching her statement that she had not been molested at another time. The trial court should have permitted Holloway to show that M.B.R. made an allegation of molestation that she now denies, as it bears directly on her credibility. See Tyson v. State, 232 Ga.App. 732, 733(2) (503 S.E.2d 640) (1998).” Murrell v. Ricks, 280 Ga. 427, 627 S.E.2d 546 (February 27, 2006). Evidence that victim had a sexually transmitted disease when she first reported her rape by defendant, 13 months after it happened, “was inadmissible under the Rape Shield statute. See Walker v. State, 234 Ga.App. 40(3), 506 S.E.2d 179 (1998); Rouse v. State, 204 Ga.App. 845(1), 420 S.E.2d 779 (1992). Although it could not be determined when the victim had contracted the sexually transmitted disease, the law makes no distinction between the victim’s behavior before or after the crime. ‘[P]ast sexual behavior includes evidence of any sexual behavior by the victim before trial.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Mooney v. State, 266 Ga.App. 587(4), 597 S.E.2d 589 (2004).” Testing of defendant at time of trial would likewise not have been relevant; “[a] negative result for Ricks at the time of trial would not have established his medical condition at the time of the crimes, or rule out the possibility that he had molested the victim.” Distinguishes cases where “the evidence created the impression that the defendant had infected the victim,” and defendant offered evidence that he didn’t have the disease. Accord, Birdsong (June 12, 2009), above. Warner v. State, 277 Ga.App. 421, 626 S.E.2d 620 (January 30, 2006). Trial court did not err “in permitting the victim to testify that, prior to the rape, she had not had sex for five months . Warner asserts that the admission of this testimony violated the rape shield law [Cit.] and that the testimony was irrelevant to the issue of whether or not a rape had occurred. The State counters that the testimony was not introduced to demonstrate the victim’s character, but rather as evidence that she had been raped by Warner since she could not have contracted herpes from anyone else .” “We have held that a defendant may introduce evidence that the victim has a sexually transmitted disease, ‘not to prove that the victim had engaged in sexual intercourse with other men, but to exclude the possibility that he had had intercourse with her.’ [Cits.] Likewise, the victim’s testimony here was relevant to exclude the possibility that someone other than Warner had sexual contact with her and gave her herpes. It was not introduced to bolster the victim’s character or show consent. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony.” “See Demetrios v. State, 246 Ga.App. 506, 514(7)(c) (541 S.E.2d 83) (2000) (rape shield law ‘cannot be invoked by a defendant to prevent a victim from offering otherwise relevant evidence.’).” Montgomery v. State, 277 Ga.App. 142, 625 S.E.2d 529 (January 4, 2006). Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from making reference to the child victim’s alleged viewing of her brother’s pornographic movies, absent any showing of relevance. Accord with Cantrell v. State , 225 Ga.App. 680, 484 S.E.2d 751 (1997); distinguished from Pope v. State , 228 Ga.App. 897, 494 S.E.2d 345 (1997), where “the seven-year-old victim used words of a sexual nature that would not normally be found in such a young child's vocabulary” and thus “[t]he trial court allowed defense counsel to elicit testimony from the child that she had learned the sexual vocabulary from a person other than Pope, but the court [properly] would not admit evidence that the child claimed this other person had molested her.” Also distinguished from Payne v. State , 267 Ga.App. 498, 600 S.E.2d 422 (2004), where trial court improperly prohibited defendant from making a showing similar to that described above in Pope (victim recanted prior to trial, said “she had gained knowledge of the