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sexual acts she had described by watching pornographic movies at her father’s house.”). Accord, Walker v. State , 308 Ga.App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122 (March 3, 2011) (“any alleged exposure to the sexually explicit photographs of her mother or her mother's sexually explicit conversation was wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether Walker committed the acts alleged by S.T., and was thus properly excluded by the trial court.”). Zepp v. State, 276 Ga.App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (November 18, 2005). Trial court properly excluded evidence of prior molestation of child molesting victim . “The State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that the babysitter may have molested the child, and that the child had previously disclosed that the babysitter molested her. The trial court granted the motion, finding that no exceptions applied that would authorize Zepp’s use of a prior molestation or sexual experience. ‘[E]vidence of prior molestation or previous sexual activity on the part of the victim is not relevant in a molestation case to show either the victim’s reputation for nonchastity or his or her preoccupation with sex. An exception to this exclusion may be authorized when the State introduces evidence that the child has been sexually abused in the past or when the State presents evidence that the child exhibits symptoms of the child abuse accommodation syndrome. Here the State presented neither medical evidence showing that the victim had been molested nor evidence showing that she had indicated symptoms consistent with the child abuse accommodation syndrome. As a result, the exception was inapplicable and inquiry into the victim's sexual history was properly precluded under OCGA § 24-2-3(b).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bishop v. State, 252 Ga.App. 211, 214(3) (555 S.E.2d 504) (2001).” Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122, 610 S.E.2d 50 (March 7, 2005). Rape shield statute, by its express language, applies only to rape cases, not to child molestation or other offenses. Reverses Court of Appeals decision at 264 Ga.App. 805, 592 S.E.2d 433 (December 5, 2003). Followed, Brown v. State , 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005) (harmless error analysis applied); Gresham v. State , 281 Ga.App. 116, 635 S.E.2d 316 (July 25, 2006) (child molestation and incest convictions reversed). See also Segura v. State , 280 Ga.App. 685, 634 S.E.2d 858 (July 26, 2006) ( Abdulkadir does not preclude court from excluding irrelevant evidence); Krirat v. State , 286 Ga.App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786 (July 6, 2007) (rape shield statute improperly applied to defendant’s 2004 trial for child molestation and statutory rape, but harmless error; “issues of consent and chastity are not material in cases of statutory rape.”); Osborne v. State , 291 Ga.App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792 (May 29, 2008) (rape shield statute properly applied in defendant’s trial for rape, aggravated sexual battery and child molestation; date of offenses and trial not indicated) . Statute amended effective for trials occurring after July 1, 2005, HB 170, extended “to prosecutions related to aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery,” see Collins v. State , 310 Ga.App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (July 7, 2011). Clanton v. State, 271 Ga.App. 444, 609 S.E.2d 761 (January 27, 2005). Defendant, charged with child molestation, proffered a witness who testified that six-year-old victim had been exposed to adults having sex when she was three. Held, trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, inasmuch as there was no evidence that the child “focused on the sexual activity or … retained any memory of it for approximately the next three years. Nothing in the record showed that [victim] ever mentioned seeing her mother engaged in any sexual activity or related in any way that one episode to [the incident with defendant].” Although the trial court excluded the testimony as “part of the child’s sexual history,” Court of Appeals makes no ruling on whether that holding was correct. Payne v. State, 267 Ga.App. 498, 600 S.E.2d 422 (May 19, 2004). Trial court should have granted defendant’s plea in bar based on double jeopardy where there was no manifest necessity for trial court’s grant of state’s motion for mistrial at first trial. Trial court had properly granted state’s motion in limine as to fact that child victim had been exposed to pornographic movies by another adult. DFCS caseworker, however, mentioned child’s exposure to movies without saying where. Defense counsel sought to elicit that defendant was not the one who exposed the child to the movies, whereupon the trial court granted state’s motion for mistrial. “[T]he defense was certainly entitled to show that Payne’s stepdaughter had recanted her allegations against him, as well as the reason for the recantation, i.e., that she had fabricated the charges because she had been mad at Payne for disciplining her. In recanting her allegations, the victim also explained how she had acquired knowledge of the alleged sexual acts, i.e., by viewing a pornographic movie at her natural father’s house. Therefore, although the victim’s viewing of the pornographic movie was part of her sexual history or behavior and thus irrelevant under the rape shield statute and Georgia case law to show her nonchastity or preoccupation with sex, it had relevance for another purpose in this case. As in Pope [v. State, 228 Ga.App. 897, 494 S.E.2d 345 (1997)] , however, the defense could have shown that the victim had acquired knowledge of the sexual acts from someone other than Payne without specifying that her viewing of pornography was the mechanism through which she had gained the knowledge. For that reason, the trial court’s grant of the state’s motion in limine was not an abuse of discretion.” There was no “manifest necessity” for mistrial, however, because defense counsel did not elicit the caseworker’s first reference to the movies;