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Johnson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 690, 538 S.E.2d 766 (August 28, 2000). Rape conviction affirmed. 1. “The trial court correctly excluded all reference to the fact that 16–year–old S.S. had a child of approximately 21 months of age. The only possible desired inference arising from the victim's motherhood is that, because she had had prior sexual experience with someone other than defendant, she consented to his indecent liberties on this occasion. Such inference is clearly prohibited under Georgia's Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24–2–3(a),[fn] and does not come within any exception under subsection (b).” 2. “Nor did the trial court err in restricting cross-examination of the medical witness with the victim's medical history by reference to a C-section (Caesarian section birth) and the victim's last reported voluntary intercourse.” Alford v. State , 243 Ga.App. 212, 534 S.E.2d 81 (March 28, 2000). Convictions for rape, incest and cruelty to children affirmed; trial court properly disallowed defendant’s “questions about the victim's mode of dress at the time of the rape.” “Under the rape shield statute, evidence of the past sexual behavior of a victim is generally inadmissible either on direct or cross-examination of the complaining witness. OCGA § 24-2-3(a). Inadmissible past sexual behavior includes ‘evidence of the complaining witness's marital history, mode of dress, general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, [and] sexual mores contrary to the community standards.’ Id. The trial court therefore properly refused to permit Alford to introduce evidence or to make inquiry about the mode of the victim's dress on the night of the rape. OCGA § 24-2-3.” Cox v. State, 241 Ga.App. 388, 526 S.E.2d 887 (December 9, 1999). Conviction for child molestation, incest, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence that victim was sexually active with her boyfriend. Trial court allowed evidence that victim told her doctor she was sexually active, but excluded reference to the boyfriend. “This evidence regarding the identity of her sexual partner goes directly to the stepdaughter's past sexual behavior and, under the facts of this case, is inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law, OCGA § 24-2-3.” Defendant here was charged with, but acquitted, of rape. Williams v. State, 236 Ga.App. 667, 512 S.E.2d 363 (February 15, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, trial court properly granted State’s motion in limine to prevent defendant from presenting evidence that victim had previously been molested by someone else. “Williams contends the evidence was relevant to explain to the jury the source of the victim's shocking knowledge of sexual acts. It is well established that evidence of a prior unrelated molestation generally is not admissible. Blackwell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 452, 454(2), 494 S.E.2d 269 (1997). The few recognized exceptions include: (a) to show that someone other than the defendant caused the injuries to the child; (b) to show lack of victim credibility if the victim’s prior allegations of molestation were false; and (c) to show other possible causes for the symptoms exhibited. Wand v. State, 230 Ga.App. 460, 462(2)(b), 496 S.E.2d 771 (1998) (physical precedent only); Wilson v. State, 210 Ga.App. 705, 706-707(1), 436 S.E.2d 732 (1993). None of these exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility applies in the present case. Furthermore, this Court has previously rejected similar arguments regarding a child victim’s knowledge of sexual acts. In McGarity v. State, 224 Ga.App. 302, 303(1), 480 S.E.2d 319 (1997), the defendant sought to introduce evidence of a child’s prior sexual activities ‘in order to counter any belief by the jury that a child of that age would not know of such matters unless she had in fact been molested by the defendant.’ Id. We rejected this argument, finding that the rape shield statute barred such evidence. Likewise, in Washington v. State, 225 Ga.App. 262, 263(2), 483 S.E.2d 683 (1997), we held that ‘knowledge of a crime gained through being a victim of that crime at the hands of others can have no relevance to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial. The past sexual experience of a child in a case such as this is irrelevant to the issue of whether molestation was committed by the defendant on trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) See also Cantrell v. State, 225 Ga.App. 680, 681, 484 S.E.2d 751 (1997). The trial court correctly excluded any reference to the past molestation of the victim.” CCCCC. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (March 21, 2005). While “this state has not yet recognized rape trauma syndrome as an accepted principle in the scientific community,” witness’s testimony “that there was no typical or common behavior among rape victims” was not testimony of any such syndrome. “And although she testified that alleged victims of sexual assault may delay reporting such crimes, this Court has previously upheld the admission of similar testimony from a similar witness. Thomas v. State, 239 Ga.App. 460, 462-463(3) (521 S.E.2d 397) (1999).” DDDDD. REBUTTAL Moore v. State, 242 Ga.App. 208, 529 S.E.2d 210 (February 2, 2000). Convictions for burglary and theft by taking of