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motor vehicle affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed State to present matters in rebuttal that should have been covered in case in chief. “Moore argues that the trial court erred in allowing rebuttal witnesses for the state to testify regarding whether the dental laboratory's owner authorized Moore to enter the business when it was closed and whether [victim] Buzbee's mother authorized Moore to use the truck, when the defense did not raise these issues in its case-in-chief. Moore does not claim that the testimony was inadmissible, just that it was not proper rebuttal testimony. ‘Regardless of technical niceties as to what evidence should be offered in chief and what may be offered in rebuttal, this court will not reverse a trial court for admitting in evidence at any stage of the trial any testimony that is both relevant and competent.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sheffield v. State, 107 Ga.App. 610, 613(9), 131 S.E.2d 76 (1963). Testimony regarding whether Woods authorized Moore to enter the dental lab and whether the mother authorized others to use the truck was competent and relevant to the burglary and theft by taking charges. Even if the testimony was not strictly in rebuttal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. See Goodwin v. State, 222 Ga.App. 285, 287(3), 474 S.E.2d 84 (1996). This enumeration presents no grounds for reversal.” EEEEE. RECORDINGS See subheadings FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS - PHOTOGRAPHS, RECORDINGS & VIDEOTAPES, and PHOTOGRAPHS, RECORDINGS AND VIDEOTAPES, both above FFFFF. RELATIONSHIP/STATE OF FEELINGS Onyekwe v. State, 332 Ga.App. 267, 772 S.E.2d 64 (April 21, 2015). Convictions for family violence simple battery affirmed; no error in excluding defendant’s proffered “evidence related to his divorce and child custody arrangements with his ex-wife. … The evidence that Onyekwe attempted to introduce did not relate to the question being tried, i.e., whether Onyekwe committed the charged acts of striking his ex-wife and grabbing his daughter.” Defendant was attempting to show “that his ex-wife made accusations against him and continually denied him his right to visit with his children.” Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 856, 742 S.E.2d 460 (April 29, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed, based on second- degree child cruelty, to wit: “failing to prevent her son from accessing her medication and in failing to seek medical treatment once it became clear he was ill.” No error in admitting testimony by defendant’s boyfriend “that he witnessed Johnson put what he believed was a Xanax pill in Shane's milk bottle … to prove the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim and to show the defendant's motive, intent, and bent of mind in committing the alleged crime. Dunn v. State, 292 Ga. 359(2), 736 S.E.2d 392 (2013). … Tate's testimony was clearly relevant to the charge of unlawful administration of a controlled substance as well as to the criminal negligence charge, in that it showed Johnson's willingness to expose her son to dangerous prescription medication.” Chambers v. State, 308 Ga.App. 748, 708 S.E.2d 651 (March 24, 2011). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence about victim’s bad character. “Chambers contends that a thorough and sifting cross- examination would have revealed that, in the week leading up to the alleged assault, he and the victim argued about her failure to comply fully with a drug rehabilitation program in which she was enrolled and that he was upset about the possibility that she would have to leave Georgia if she failed to complete the program, thereby ending their relationship. Chambers contends that, because such evidence would inform the jury about the status of the couple's relationship, it was relevant and material to his defense.” “[T]he evidence that Chambers intended to elicit about the status of the couple's relationship and the nature of their arguments in the week leading up to their fight would not have shed any light on whether Chambers was in reasonable fear of suffering immediate serious harm to himself when he choked the victim and threatened to kill her. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the evidence was irrelevant and in sustaining the State's objection to the evidence on that basis. [Cits.]” Edwards v. State, 308 Ga.App. 569, 707 S.E.2d 917 (March 18, 2011). Obstruction convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, by ruling out testimony “that the supervising officer involved in the November 21 incident subsequently made a threat against him. He proffered that his wife would testify that, when officers came to her home to serve an arrest warrant on Edwards two days after the incident, the supervising officer told her that he would give Edwards a ‘double dose of what he got last time.’ The trial court excluded as irrelevant the proffered evidence regarding the officer's alleged threat. Edwards contends that the excluded evidence ‘cuts directly at the heart of [the supervising officer's] credibility and casts significant doubt as to whether the events of November [21], 2008, were indeed the result of Mr. Edwards's conduct as asserted by the officers at trial.’ We agree with Edwards that this evidence was admissible under OCGA § 24-9-68, which provides that the ‘state of a witness's feelings toward the parties ... may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.’” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt.