☢ test - Í

GGGGG. RELEVANCE See new OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 403

Owens v. State, 334 Ga.App. 203, 778 S.E.2d 830 (October 20, 2015). Drug possession conviction affirmed; under pre- 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly excluded defense witness offered to prove that defendant was framed. Defendant’s aunt would have testified that a Ms. Bannister told her that “she did it.” “In its order denying Owens’s motion for mistrial, the trial court explained that the aunt’s failure to define ‘it’ as related to Bannister’s alleged admissions rendered the proposed testimony ‘vague and non-specific,’ and thus inadmissible because ‘it was not probative of any issue before the jury.’ We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the transcribed testimony.” Freeman v. State, 333 Ga.App. 6, 775 S.E.2d 258 (July 9, 2015). Convictions for cruelty to children affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed severely-injured child to be displayed to the jury. “At trial, E.F.'s foster mother testified regarding his condition, including the fact that he was not able to talk, walk, feed, or toilet himself at four years old. The State asked her to step down and bring E.F. into the courtroom. Over the defendants' objections, the trial court allowed her to do so.[fn] After she wheeled E.F. into the courtroom in a stroller, the State asked her one final question regarding her care of E.F. The record reveals that during this brief questioning, E.F. ‘groaned several times out loud.’ Freeman asserts that the State presented E.F. to the jury not as evidence but to inflame the jury and prejudice it against Freeman.” Trial court properly determined that the jury view of the victim was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. 1. “[E]vidence of E.F.'s condition is clearly relevant to the State's charges, including that Freeman caused E.F. ‘bodily harm ... by rendering his brain, a member of his body, useless by violently shaking him, causing permanent brain damage.’ See Smith v. State, 246 Ga.App. 191, 193–194(3) (539 S.E.2d 881) (2000) (injuries sustained in aggravated assault are always relevant and trial court did not err in permitting victim to display his injuries); Prayor v. State, 217 Ga.App. 56, 58(4) (456 S.E.2d 664) (1995) (rejecting defendant's contention that the paralyzed victim should have been forced to testify via camera so that his injuries would not be apparent to the jury); Cail v. State, 194 Ga.App. 584, 584–585(1) (391 S.E.2d 444) (1990) (trial court did not err in permitting the State to exhibit child victim to the jury for the purpose of displaying his scar from the assault despite the child's tender age and lack of any actual dispute over the nature of his injuries). 2. “ And although viewing E.F. in person may have been prejudicial to Freeman, we cannot say that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, ‘in a criminal trial relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631(III) (11 th Cir., 1983). Thus, ‘[t]he major function of Rule 403 is to exclude evidence of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Aguila–Urbay, 480 Fed. Appx. 564, 567 (11 th Cir., 2012). And we do not find that direct evidence of the permanent nature of E.F.'s injury was of scant probative force.” Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga.App. 694, 725 S.E.2d 824 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of separate armed robbery committed the day before. The separate robbery involved some of defendant’s co-conspirators, but not defendant. One conspirator was arrested for the first robbery, so his brother stepped in to help with the offense on trial “‘to help [his] brother out’ and obtain money to pay for an attorney. This evidence explained the State's theory of how the robbery was planned and the motive of the perpetrators, including Mitchell. The evidence did not implicate Mitchell in the prior robbery, so the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion was low. [fn] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mitchell's relevance objection.” Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571, 707 S.E.2d 353 (February 7, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed State to present statistics and information about violent crimes and gun ownership in the neighborhood where he crime was committed, “to explain why the police had such a difficult time gaining any information from the 60 to 100 people at the crime scene, including the victim's brother. Contrary to Evans' contentions, this evidence was not used to suggest that Evans had been involved in any other previous crimes committed in the neighborhood. See Griffin v. State, 266 Ga.App. 50, 52(2) (596 S.E.2d 405) (2004) (no error where trial court allowed State's witness to testify that area where the crime occurred was ‘high crime area,’ because ‘the statements did not suggest that the [defendant] had himself been involved in any previous criminal misconduct at that or any other location’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, the statements were neither made to show that the police had been lax nor to convey to the jurors that it was up to them to enforce the law as a result of the