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ineffectiveness of police. See Fair v. State, 168 Ga. 409 (148 SE 144) (1929) (quoting murder statistics was error where the prosecutor used those facts to argue that lax law enforcement was largely responsible for crime conditions in Georgia and to urge the jury that sentencing the defendant to a life sentence instead of death would almost be a farce, in that after three years the defendant would be eligible for parole).” Kay v. State, 306 Ga.App. 666, 703 S.E.2d 108 (October 29, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly limited defendant’s “cross-examination of a DFCS employee about whether the department at some point thought the evidence was not sufficient to warrant referring the case to the District Attorney and whether the victim's mother laughed when she was told of the victim's allegations . … Even if DFCS had initially concluded that a referral was not warranted or that the mother had laughed, such evidence could have no relevance to any issue in the case.” Dyer v. State, 287 Ga. 137, 695 S.E.2d 15 (May 3, 2010). “[Co-defendant] Rozier argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence both the shell casings and the aluminum cans with bullet holes found in the backyard of his home. The basis for Rozier's contention on appeal is that this evidence is generally irrelevant. … [T]he shell casings which matched those found at the murder scene were relevant to the question of who committed the murder, and the aluminum cans were relevant to show the possibility that a gun had been fired at the premises and to counter Rozier's argument that the shell casings had been planted at the scene.” Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, “[t]he State presented evidence in the guilt/innocence phase showing that the victims' dogs perished in the fire that was set by Stinski and his co- defendant, which utterly destroyed the victims' home. We agree with Stinski's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to exclude this evidence in the guilt/innocence phase on the ground that its probative value in proving the charges in the indictment was outweighed by undue prejudice. Compare Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 516- 517(3) (640 S.E.2d 280) (2007).” Davis v. State, 301 Ga.App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (November 13, 2009). DUI conviction of defendant, an attorney, affirmed. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony that deputies who were unrelated to the case at bar allegedly planted drugs on Davis's clients, as such testimony would not shed light in any reasonable degree on any fact in controversy.” Duke v. State, 298 Ga.App. 719, 681 S.E.2d 174 (June 17, 2009). 1. No abuse of discretion in keeping out “emails, letters and cards” to defendant from his daughter/rape victim over the years after the rapes “to show the nature of their relationship.” “The State objected on the grounds of hearsay and continuing witness, and the trial court sustained the objection on hearsay grounds. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the admission of said writings because Duke's trial counsel was allowed to thoroughly examine the victim about the items, and elicit testimony that she had a good relationship with Duke such that she loved him, shared holidays, and attended family activities with him.” Documents clearly aren’t hearsay, as they were identified by the victim/author on the stand; a better ground for objection might be either relevance or cumulative to the witness’s testimony. 2. “Duke also contends that the trial court erred in failing to admit family photographs, which showed a positive and happy relationship between the victim, her siblings, and him. The fact that Duke allegedly had a positive relationship with the victim is irrelevant to whether Duke committed the rapes and has little or no probative value. Again, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to exclude the family photographs.” Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga.App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (March 13, 2009). At defendant’s trial for simple battery, trial court properly excluded as irrelevant evidence that victim had cheated on defendant. “The record reflects that the state moved to exclude as irrelevant allegations that [victim] Hysten and Burrowes cheated on each other. The trial court's ruling on the motion was limited in scope, allowing evidence as to the nature of the discussion precipitating the battery, i.e., alleged infidelity, but prohibiting both sides from exploring the details of any alleged affairs and/or delving into the truthfulness of the allegations. … We are not persuaded that delving into the details of an alleged affair and/or questioning Hysten's truthfulness on the issue was relevant to whether Burrowes committed a battery on her.” Burden v. State, 296 Ga.App. 441, 674 S.E.2d 668 (March 5, 2009). Trial court properly sustained State’s objection to irrelevant defense question to officer on cross-examination: “[a]nd when you accuse somebody of armed robbery, and you lock them up, you arrest them and you bring them down to the jail, often people spend months in jail even before coming into court; isn't that right?”