☢ test - Í

Ortiz v. State, 295 Ga.App. 546, 672 S.E.2d 507 (January 14, 2009). In defendant’s prosecution for child molestation by placing his penis “on” victim’s vagina, no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence that some penetration may have occurred, tearing the hymen. The “evidence also indicated that some penetration may have occurred at that time or that Ortiz also may have touched the child's vagina with his hand, even though the State did not charge Ortiz with those crimes. See id.; see also Simpson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 729, 730(1), 507 S.E.2d 860 (1998) (‘ Even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. ’) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Craven v. State, 292 Ga.App. 592, 664 S.E.2d 921 (July 9, 2008). At defendant’s trial for child molestation and aggravated sodomy, defendant’s wife testified for the State. “During direct examination, the State asked the victim's mother if the investigating detective had informed her of the specific allegations the victim ‘had made regarding anal sodomy.’ She replied, ‘I told him that that's when I knew David had done that because that's how David wanted it with me too.... And that's what he wanted all the time.’ On cross-examination, the defense asked the mother if she would say that her relationship with Craven was ‘sexually normal,’ and the State objected that such matters were not relevant. The defense responded that the State had already elicited testimony from the witness regarding her sexual relationship with Craven, and further explained, ‘I want to know was she satisfying him.... If your wife has got you happy at the house, you ain't got to go out shopping for children.’ The trial court sustained the objection, noting that the State's evidence related to whether the witness believed the allegations against Craven or not. While Craven could explore that area he could not have ‘free room to go into their whole sexual life.’” Held, trial court properly ruled out the cross-examination as irrelevant. “[A] party has no right to cross-examine a witness regarding irrelevant matters, and in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's objection to questions about Craven's sexual relationship with his wife. Miles v. State, 201 Ga.App. 568, 569(4) (411 S.E.2d 566) (1991).” Dunagan v. State, 283 Ga. 501, 661 S.E.2d 525 (May 19, 2008). Reversing 286 Ga.App. 668, 649 S.E.2d 765 (July 3, 2007). In defendant’s trial for vehicular homicide, trial court abused its discretion in excluding defendant’s proffered evidence of dangerous design of intersection which allegedly resulted in numerous prior accidents. “Dunagan’s claim regarding the inherent dangerousness of the intersection plainly included much more than the request to admit into evidence a history of prior mishaps at the scene. He sought to introduce documentary and testimonial evidence, allegedly illustrating the hazardous design and consequent malfunctioning of the intersection during the time in question, and evidence of corrective masures taken since the collision which he hoped would demonstrate the intersection’s known design defects contributing to the collision.” “[Defendant] sought to argue that the design flaws, and consequent known inherent dangers, in the intersection negated the elements of criminal negligence and proximate cause in regard to the reckless driving charge and his claim of accident.” Evidence of a design defect could negate the element of negligence, and could be relevant to the defense of accident as raised by defendant. Further, “any evidence of known design defects in the intersection was relevant on the issue of proximate cause of the collision, and would bear directly upon the ultimate issue of Dunagan’s guilt of the charged crimes.” Citing Gibson v. State , 280 Ga.App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006) (Defendant’s convictions for homicide by vehicle and related charges reversed based on ineffective assistance; counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate history of traffic light malfunctions at intersection where collision occurred). Also, “evidence of subsequent modifications to the intersection … was admissible not only to attempt to show that there were known flaws in the intersection, and hence known dangers, at the time of the collision but also that the Department of Transportation was the responsible party. [fn: This is in contrast to the general rule in negligence actions that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible. Brooks v. Cellin Mfg. Co., Inc ., 251 Ga. 395, 397 (306 S.E.2d 657) (1983). The exclusion of this kind of evidence in civil actions is grounded in the public policy that parties should be encouraged to make needed repairs without fear of admission of liability. Department of Transp. v. Cannady , 270 Ga. 427, 428 (1) (511 S.E.2d 173) (1999). Thus, the propriety of the admission of the evidence of post-collision remedial measures in the present criminal case does not affect the principles and policies governing the admission of such evidence in civil cases. ] This is so because ‘[g]enerally, evidence implicating another named [party] as the actual perpetrator of the crime is relevant and admissible as tending to exonerate the defendant.’ Azizi v. State , 270 Ga. 709, 714 (6) (512 S.E.2d 622) (1999).” Garcia v. State, 290 Ga.App. 164, 658 S.E.2d 904 (March 7, 2008). No reversal based on admission of hearsay “not relevant to the determination of Garcia’s guilt as an abetter of the crime.” Evidence referred to actions not attributed to defendant. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (August 7, 2007). Defendant was not entitled to elicit testimony