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from victim that he didn’t want to see defendant prosecuted. “See Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 407(1) (383 S.E.2d 555) (1989) (‘it is the [S]tate, not the victim, that has an interest in criminal prosecutions.’) (citation omitted). In light of the improper purpose for which it was apparently offered, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony. See id.” Gaines v. State, 285 Ga.App. 684, 647 S.E.2d 357 (June 4, 2007). Trial court properly ruled out as irrelevant defendant’s cross-examination of child molesting victim’s mother regarding whether victim had a boyfriend. “Unlike the case Gaines cites to, there is no indication in this case that A.W. was trying to hide or to explain away evidence of a relationship with one man by attributing that evidence to another. See Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 639, 641(1) (581 S.E.2d 528) (2003) (because the victim needed an explanation for the semen-stained jacket she returned to her boyfriend, she allegedly fabricated a rape charge against the defendant).” Holloway v. State, 283 Ga.App. 823, 643 S.E.2d 286 (March 1, 2007). No abuse of discretion where trial court limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of officer regarding errors in incident reports relating to defendants in other cases arising out of the same undercover drug operation. “Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ruling that the inquiry was impermissible because it was at best only marginally relevant to the charge filed against Holloway. [Cits.]” Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (February 26, 2007). Evidence that the murder weapon was recovered by police as a result of “a separate armed robbery at a club in which Stokes did not participate” was properly admitted. “Inasmuch as the same AK-47 was used in the armed robbery of the club and the crimes committed in this case, evidence relating to the use of this weapon and its recovery in the club incident was admissible. Collins v. State, 240 Ga.App. 289, 290-291(1) (523 S.E.2d 359) (1999). Moreover, evidence of the truck and travel orders was relevant inasmuch as it was part of the trail that ultimately led to Stokes as Norby’s killer. As to the assertion that the evidence was used for merely an improper bolstering effect, it too does not prevail. The evidence was authorized as corroboration of the testimony of the State’s witness, Gary, who was Stokes’s accomplice in the present crimes. Baines v. State, 276 Ga. 117, 119(1) (575 S.E.2d 495) (2003).” Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (January 22, 2007). Defendant was charged with murder by strangulation. During the investigation of the murder, officers encountered defendant, who used another man’s name, Borders, and showed them Borders’s id. At the trial for the murder, Borders testified that defendant used a gun to rob him of his id. Borders identified a gun resembling the one used in the robbery (which was not one of the charges on trial); the trial court admitted the gun into evidence. Held, trial court did not err in admitting the gun. “While no gun was used in committing the crimes for which [defendant] was being tried, evidence of the gun was relevant to the charges being tried because it connected [defendant] to the identification documents presented to police in close proximity to the victim’s body by the person who had custody of the victim’s car on the day the victim was killed. We see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting the gun into evidence, especially since the trial court’s action was accompanied by an explanatory instruction to the jury.” Revells v. State, 283 Ga.App. 59, 640 S.E.2d 587 (October 25, 2006). In defendant’s child cruelty prosecution, defendant “argues that the trial court improperly allowed nurse Joyce Saville to testify concerning her decision to report the March incident to DFACS, contending that this was not relevant. Saville served as the pediatric case manager, in charge of any social issues which would impact a child’s life, such as whether the family had insurance, a regular doctor, working utilities, ‘and any issues that might involve DFACS.’ … As for the relevancy objection, the evidence was relevant to explain the course of conduct of the hospital regarding L. R.’s care and future well-being. The trial court has wide discretion in determining relevancy and materiality and, where relevancy is doubtful, evidence should be admitted and its weight left for the determination of the jury. Owens v. State, 248 Ga. 629, 630 (284 S.E.2d 408) (1981).” Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). 1. Where victim’s body was never found, trial court properly admitted evidence of murder victim’s “strong ties to family and friends” to show that it was unlikely she would have completely abandoned those relationships, thus indicating that she was probably dead. “‘ Relevancy is determined by answering the following question: “Does the evidence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence [?]” [Cits.]’ Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 685(2) (341 S.E.2d 451) (1986). In a case such as the present where the victim’s body has not been found, evidence that the victim was a person with personal relationships that uncharacteristically seemed to have been abandoned supports a finding that the victim has died by criminal means.” 2. The converse, however, is not true: trial court properly refused to allow defendant to present evidence of victim’s