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v. Hardrick , 266 Ga. 54 (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995) (intent to injure could not be inferred from allegation that defendant “placed his hands around the victim’s neck and used his hands to apply pressure to her neck contrary to the law”). “[A]llegations of taking another person’s property from the immediate possession of the other person by use of an offensive weapon implicitly include an intent to commit a theft. [Cit.]” 20. LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES Hill v. Williams, 296 Ga. 753, 770 S.E.2d 800 (March 27, 2015). Following conviction on statutory rape as a lesser- included offense to forcible rape, habeas court properly denied relief. No due process violation, even conceding that statutory rape is never a lesser-included offense to forcible rape, because statutory rape is a lesser offense of child molestation and aggravated child molestation for which defendant was also charged. “In his brief to this Court, Hill focuses exclusively upon the count of the indictment charging Hill with the forcible rape of A.G., noting that it says nothing about her age, and relying on Stuart [ v. State, 318 Ga.App. 839 (734 S.E.2d 814) (2012)] for the proposition that statutory rape is not included in forcible rape in any event. We do not dispute those points, but the question here is not whether that particular count of the indictment gave Hill notice of statutory rape, but rather, whether the indictment as a whole did so. As this Court has explained, due process requires that an indictment ‘put the defendant on notice of the crimes with which he is charged and against which he must defend.’ McCrary [ v. State, 252 Ga. 521, 524 (314 S.E.2d 662) (1984)]. And we have said that, under Georgia law, ‘A defendant is on notice of the crime charged (named) in the indictment or accusation and (1) lesser crimes which are included in the crime charged as a matter of law ... and (2) other lesser crimes which are shown by the facts alleged to show how the crime charged was committed.’ Id. (citation omitted). See also Lewis v. State, 283 Ga. 191, 196(6) (657 S.E.2d 854) (2008) (‘A defendant is held to have notice of all crimes charged in the indictment, as well as lesser crimes shown by the facts alleged therein.’ (Citation omitted)). Moreover, … by the time Hill was tried, this Court had endorsed an approach that looked for constitutional notice purposes to the allegations of the indictment as a whole, without drawing lines between the allegations of particular counts. See McCrary, 252 Ga. at 524. … That the facts essential to the statutory rape of A.G. are alleged in the indictment, and that the statutory rape properly could be included in two counts of the indictment as a matter of fact, show that the indictment afforded Hill constitutionally adequate notice that he could be convicted at trial of the statutory rape of A.G.” Irrelevant that the elements necessary to statutory rape are not all found in any one count of the indictment – sexual intercourse is alleged in the rape count, the victim’s age in three other counts. “Reading the indictment upon which Hill was tried as a whole, we find each element of the statutory rape of A.G. alleged, either expressly or by necessary implication. … The facts essential to proving that Hill committed the statutory rape of A.G. are alleged in the indictment, even if those allegations are scattered across several counts. Cf. McCrary v. State, 252 Ga. 521, 524 (314 S.E.2d 662) (1984) (endorsing approach that examines multiple counts of an indictment together, noting that ‘a defendant indicted in two counts, one for the malice murder of the deceased and the other for the armed robbery of the deceased at the same time, is on notice that he may be found guilty of the felony murder of the deceased, armed robbery being the felony’).” 21. LOCATION Martin-Argaw v. State, 311 Ga.App. 609, 716 S.E.2d 737 (September 8, 2011). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment may have identified the wrong room in the house where the shooting took place. “[T]he part of the indictment that Martin–Argaw argues was unsupported by the evidence — i.e., the exact room of the house where this specific aggravated assault occurred — was ‘an unnecessary specification of a legally unnecessary fact,’” quoting Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 425(1) (662 S.E.2d 235) (2008). Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga.App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (June 18, 2008). Fatal variance required grant of directed verdict where accusation charged defendant with failure to maintain lane on one road, evidence showed that the alleged violation occurred on a different road in same county. Chambers v. State, 284 Ga.App. 400, 643 S.E.2d 871 (March 21, 2007). No fatal variance where street address of location of burglary was erroneously stated in indictment. “Here, the indictment alleged that Chambers ‘did unlawfully without authority, enter into the building located at 5530 Dixie Lake Drive, property of Regal Ezuruike, with intent to commit a burglary within.’ The evidence at trial established that there was no such address in Fulton County, that the address where the crime was allegedly committed was actually 5530 Lakeside Drive, a new construction site upon which the victim was constructing three homes – 5510 Lakeside Drive, 5520 Lakeside Drive and 5530 Lakeside Drive. Chambers argued that his defense was prejudiced because he had mounted a defense predicated on his investigation of the 5520 address based on a conversation with the victim, rather than the 5530 address alleged in the indictment. Chambers’ attorney apparently talked with the victim and knew that there was a defect on the address before the trial. It was also apparent that he mounted a defense against the burglary at that residence. As the trial court noted, Chambers