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was arrested at the scene of the burglary, and his actions in court demonstrated that he was fully aware of the location of the home he was accused of burglarizing.” Distinguishing Charles v. State , 167 Ga.App. 806, 307 S.E.2d 703 (1983) (fatal variance where “[t]he indictment alleged that a warehouse at a specific address was burglarized, but the proof at trial showed that the crime actually occurred at another of the victim’s warehouses at a different address. We held that failure to grant a directed verdict of not guilty was error.”). “We are not persuaded by Chambers’ argument that Charles applies because the ‘victim was a developer who owned three houses in the same county;’ particularly given the fact that the houses were next to each other on the same street in the same subdivision.” 22. MANNER IN WHICH OFFENSE COMMITTED New case! Whaley v. State, A16A0569, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2339714 (May 4, 2016). Reckless driving conviction reversed; “the State failed to prove that Whaley committed reckless driving in the manner alleged in the indictment. More specifically, there was no evidence presented at trial that Whaley ran several red lights at a high rate of speed while driving the victim’s car. ‘While an unnecessary description of an unnecessary fact averred in an indictment need not be proved, in criminal law even an unnecessarily minute description of a necessary fact must be proved as charged. If the indictment sets out the offense as done in a particular way, the proof must show it so [.] No averment in an indictment can be rejected as surplusage which is descriptive either of the offense or of the manner in which it was committed. All such averments must be proved as laid[.]’ (Footnote omitted.) Ford–Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga.App. 835, 836(1), 761 S.E.2d 388 (2014).” State v. Thomas, 331 Ga.App. 220, 770 S.E.2d 301 (March 17, 2015). In theft by taking prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to quash indictment. Indictment was defective for stating that defendant took funds of victim during a range of dates without specifying the manner of taking or the specific dates. At hearing, State contended that defendant made unauthorized charges to victim’s credit card, then deducted $2500 from victim’s bank account to cover the charges. “[T]he indictment fails to mention the manner of commission of the alleged thefts, that is, whether the thefts were separate instances of use of the credit card or whether the theft was the $2,500 taken from Lee's account to cover that balance. Conceivably, Thomas could later be charged with some other violation for the individual unauthorized uses of the card separately from the theft of the $2,500, or perhaps Thomas was not the individual using the card in all those instances.[fn] Moreover, the State could easily ascertain the dates the alleged crimes occurred, and could have stated the manner in which the theft occurred and it was, therefore, appropriate for the trial court to grant the motion to quash.” Distinguishing cases where convictions were affirmed based on series of small thefts aggregated into felony amounts : Stack–Thorpe v. State, 270 Ga.App. 796, 798–799(1), 608 S.E.2d 289 (2004); Christian v. State, 288 Ga.App. 546, 548– 549(2), 654 S.E.2d 452 (2007); and Patterson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 663, 798–791(1), 658 S.E.2d 210 (2008). “[T]hose cases … are inapposite because they were post-conviction appeals addressing sufficiency of the evidence in which the indictment was not alleged to be infirm or in which this Court declined to review the alleged imperfect indictment after conviction.” State v. Leatherwood, 326 Ga.App. 730, 757 S.E.2d 434 (April 1, 2014). Trial court erred by granting defendant’s special demurrer to charges of battery and criminal trespass; accusation charging that defendant committed battery “by striking” victim, causing a “bruised bloody lip” was sufficient. Likewise allegation that defendant damaged “a closet door … by punching a hole in the door” was sufficient. The accusation wasn’t required to state “ what he used to strike to the victim's lip and to punch her closet door. … None of the crimes charged require proof that Leatherwood used any specific object or weapon to cause the injury or damage alleged. Whether Leatherwood struck the victim's lip with his fist or with a shoe does not materially affect what he must be prepared to meet at trial. The issue the jury must resolve will be whether he intentionally struck the victim, causing visible injury to her lip. The same is true for the criminal trespass count—did Leatherwood intentionally punch a hole in the victim's closet door? The resolution of that question does not turn on whether Leatherwood used his fist or a hammer.” McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314 (October 21, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied demurrer. Contrary to defendant’s argument, indicttment for kidnapping with bodily injury wasn’t deficient for failing to specify “the manner in which he allegedly injured [victim] Robbins. The indictment, however, tracked the language of the kidnapping statute. And as we have explained before, ‘[a]n indictment which charges a defendant with the commission of a crime in the language of a valid statute [generally] is sufficient to withstand a demurrer charging that the indictment is insufficient to charge the defendant with any offense.’ Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 72(2) (268 S.E.2d 906) (1980). See also Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 815(3) (631 S.E.2d 365) (2006). Moreover, the evidence shows that Robbins's body was so dismembered and decomposed that the medical examiner was unable to definitively ascertain his injuries and cause of death. We previously have held that an indictment need not specify the