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injury inflicted upon the victim ‘when the circumstances of the case will not admit of greater certainty in stating [such injury].’ Phillips v. State, 258 Ga. 228, 228(1) (367 S.E.2d 805) (1988) (citations and punctuation omitted). The trial court did not err when it denied the demurrer.” Clemens v. State, 318 Ga.App. 16, 733 S.E.2d 67 (October 12, 2012). In child molestation prosecution, trial court properly denied motion to quash indictment; indictment wasn’t required to specify whether defendant was accused of performing “an immoral or indecent act to, with, or in the presence of ” the victim. “The indictment charged that Clemens masturbated while straddling I.M., which ‘apprised [Clemens] of the charge against him, and when and how it was committed. Accordingly, the indictment was sufficient to withstand a special demurrer.’ Raybon v. State, 309 Ga.App. 365, 367, 710 S.E.2d 579 (2011).” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 418, 721 S.E.2d 883 (January 23, 2012). Felony murder conviction affirmed; contrary to defendant’s contention, evidence was sufficient to show that victim died by suffocation, as opposed to choking. “In order to find Appellant guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault, the jury must find that he committed the offenses in the manner alleged in the indictment. Elrod v. State, 238 Ga.App. 80, 82(2) (517 S.E.2d 805) (1999).” Cooper v. State, 286 Ga. 66, 685 S.E.2d 285 (November 2, 2009). No fatal variance where indictment alleged that defendant “caused the victim’s death by beating and choking him,” while “expert testimony showed that the cause of death was not beating and choking, but was smoke and soot inhalation. Contrary to the premise of Cooper's argument, there was not a variance between the allegations in the felony murder indictment and the proof as to the cause of death. There is no requirement ‘that the victim must die during the commission of the underlying felony under a felony-murder indictment. OCGA § 16-5-1(c), defining felony murder, requires that the death need only be caused by an injury which occurred during the res gestae of the felony. [Cits.] (Emphasis in original.)’ State v. Cross, 260 Ga. 845, 847(2) (401 S.E.2d 510) (1991). Moreover, ‘“[w]here one commits a felony upon another, such felony is to be accounted as the efficient, proximate cause of the death whenever it shall be made to appear ... that the felony directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of death....” [Cit.]’ Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 21, 22(1) (334 S.E.2d 691) (1985). Here, the evidence showed that the victim sustained a broken neck bone and lost consciousness as a result of the beating and choking. Therefore, the aggravated assault by beating and choking directly and materially contributed to the death by smoke and soot inhalation by rendering him unable to leave the burning house. Accordingly, as alleged in the indictment and as proved by the evidence, the death was proximately caused by beating and choking. See Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19, 20(1) (596 S.E.2d 159) (2004) (aggravated assault by kicking and hitting victim, which caused him to fall and sustain fatal injuries, proximately caused death); Williams v. State, supra (aggravated assault by shooting victim in the leg, which caused him to be run over by a motor vehicle, proximately caused death).” State v. Pendergrass, 298 Ga.App. 801, 681 S.E.2d 241 (July 8, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s demurrer to indictment charging him with reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter; allegations tracked the language of the code sections and were sufficiently specific to notify defendant of the charges against him. Defendant was charged with reckless conduct by “causing ‘bodily harm to [the] firefighter, by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act of leaving a candle burning in a vacant house would endanger the safety of [the firefighter], and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.’” State v. Delaby, 298 Ga.App. 723, 681 S.E.2d 645 (July 6, 2009). Trial court properly granted defendant’s special demurrer to indictment for influencing a witness; allegation tracking language of code section by charging that defendant “did knowingly use intimidation,” “did not ‘sufficiently apprise’ Delaby of ‘what he must be prepared to meet at trial’” because it was “generic.” “An indictment must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. ‘The defendant is entitled to know the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable him to prepare for trial.’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Black, 149 Ga.App. 389, 390-391(3) (254 S.E.2d 506) (1979).” Citing Military Circle Pet Center No. 94 v. State, 181 Ga.App. 657 (353 S.E.2d 555) (1987) (term “neglect” was generic in describing animal cruelty); State v. Jones, 251 Ga.App. 192, 193 (553 S.E.2d 631) (2001) (term “visual signal” in charge of fleeing and eluding was inadequate to “allege the manner in which the visual signal was given). “Similarly in this case, the intimidation of a witness could come in a number of ways, none of which is alleged in the indictment.” Accord, State v. Outen, 304 Ga.App. 203, 695 S.E.2d 654 (May 10, 2010), reversed on other grounds, 289 Ga. 579, 714 S.E.2d 581 (June 27, 2011) (reckless driving allegation needed to specify manner in which driving was reckless). Newsome v. State, 296 Ga.App. 490, 675 S.E.2d 229 (March 5, 2009). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s special