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demurrer to accusation for violation of family violence order; “the accusation failed to state any specific acts that violated any specific terms of a family violence order. In fact, the accusation is circular in that it essentially charges Newsome with violating a statute by violating a family violence order in violation of the statute. Thus, the accusation, read in conjunction with the statute, fails to set out the essential elements of the crime or to apprise Newsome of the charges against him.” “[A] defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment perfect in form as well as substance. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 868, 877(2) (534 S.E.2d 182) (2000).” Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 662 S.E.2d 235 (May 6, 2008). Indictment charged defendant with committing aggravated assault “by holding a knife to the neck of” the victim. Evidence at trial, however, showed that the defendant only pointed the knife at the victim. Held, this was not a fatal variance; “the part of the indictment unsupported by the evidence in this case (holding a knife to the [victim’s] neck) was an ‘unnecessary specification of a [legally] unnecessary fact.’ Ross v. State, 195 Ga.App. 624, 625(1)(b) (394 S.E.2d 418) (1990); see also Nash v. State, 222 Ga.App. 766, 766- 767(1) (476 S.E.2d 69) (1996) (variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendant’s hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault). When we ignore this portion of the indictment as mere surplusage, it appears that the remainder of the indictment sufficiently apprised Quiroz that he was being charged with assaulting the victim with a knife on a specific date. Because the indictment so informed Quiroz of the aggravated assault charge, and because he could not be prosecuted again for that offense, the variance between allegations and proof was not fatal. [Cits.]” Accord, In re: J.H.M ., 295 Ga.App. 483, 672 S.E.2d 411 (December 5, 2008) (no fatal variance between allegation of hitting with beer bottle and evidence of hitting with fist). Hester v. State, 293 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (March 31, 2008). Indictment charging aggravated assault with a lamp was not defective for “failure to specify how the lamp was used.” “Citing Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54 (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995), [Defendant] argues that, because a lamp is not a deadly weapon per se, its specific use in an assault is not readily apparent and, thus, must be specifically alleged. However, Hardrick does not support this argument. ‘[T]he proper reading of [ Hardrick ] is “that an indictment charging aggravated assault is fundamentally flawed when the essential elements of aggravation and intent to assault are not contained therein.” [Cit.]’ Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 841(4) (561 S.E.2d 109) (2002). Thus, because the indictment alleged that the lamp is ‘an object which when used offensively against a person, is likely to and actually does result in serious bodily injury,’ an allegation that it is a deadly weapon was not required. State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 345(1) (578 S.E.2d 413) (2003); Pye v. State, supra. An indictment alleging an assault by use of an instrument which is not a deadly weapon per se is not required to be more specific regarding its use than indictments charging assault with an instrument which is a deadly weapon per se, as even the latter type of weapon, including guns, can be used in more than one way to commit an assault. See Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 791(2) (573 S.E.2d 44) (2002).” “The rule relied upon by [defendant] that, with certain exceptions, each count must be wholly complete within itself applies only to the essential elements of the crime, and not to the form of the indictment or to factual details alleged therein. State v. Jones, 274 Ga. 287, 288-289(1) (553 S.E.2d 612) (2001); Smith v. Hardrick, supra at 54(1). The indictment must be read as a whole. State v. Jones, [274 Ga. 287, 289(1) (553 S.E.2d 612) (2001)].” Accompanying felony murder count gave more specific allegation as to how lamp was used, striking victim about the head. Accord, Greene v. State , 295 Ga.App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (January 30, 2009) (indictment need not allege defendant’s teeth and hands were deadly weapons when alleging that they were likely to and did result in serious bodily injury). Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007). Accusation charging fleeing and eluding was not insufficient despite omitting the word “pursuing” police vehicle found in the code section. “We find that the indictment provided sufficient notice of the charge that the omission of the term ‘pursuing’ did not prove prejudicial to Jackson’s presentation of his defense.” Cherry v. State, 283 Ga.App. 700, 642 S.E.2d 369 (February 22, 2007). Evidence that defendant touched child’s “chest” was sufficient to support allegation in indictment that he fondled her “breast.” “[T]here is no requirement that the State present testimony that precisely tracks the language found in the indictment. ‘The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 233 Ga.App. 696, 698(2) (505 S.E.2d 239) (1998). These criteria were clearly met in this case.” Scott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 813, 637 S.E.2d 751 (October 6, 2006). Indictment was not fatally defective although it did