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not, in charge of aggravated assault, allege that defendant’s hands were “used as deadly weapons and were likely to cause bodily injury.” “The indictment here charged Scott with aggravated assault by choking Hill around the neck with his hands, and the indictment alleged that Scott’s hands were being used offensively against Hill in such manner as to have been likely to have resulted in serious bodily injury or to have actually resulted in serious bodily injury. Although the aggravated assault count of indictment did not additionally allege that Scott had attempted to commit a violent injury or that his act had placed Hill in reasonable apprehension thereof, another count charging him with kidnapping with bodily injury alleged that he had caused bruising around her throat and hemorrhaging in her eyes. Under the circumstances, even though the aggravated assault count was deficient, it was not so fundamentally flawed as to have charged no crime at all. [Cit.] Consequently, Scott waived the defect in the indictment by proceeding to trial without complaint. [Cit.]” Reagan v. State, 281 Ga.App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (October 2, 2006). Trial court did not err “in charging the jury that he could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malice murder.” “Aggravated assault may merge into malice murder as a matter of fact, Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 66(2) (623 S.E.2d 491) (2005), and therefore it may constitute a lesser included offense of malice murder.” “[A]n indictment charging that the defendant ‘did unlawfully and with malice aforethought cause the death of Paul McKeen, Jr., a human being, by striking him’ places the defendant on notice that he could be convicted of assaulting the victim with the intent to murder him or to commit a violent injury. The only difference is that the malice murder indictment alleges that the defendant actually accomplished the murder, in addition to having intended to accomplish the murder. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in charging the jury that Reagan could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malice murder.” Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). Defendant’s murder indictment was not insufficient because it failed to state how the defendant killed the victim . “‘An indictment failing to specify the cause of death is sufficient “when the circumstances of the case will not admit of greater certainty in stating the means of death.” [Cits.]’ Phillips v. State, 258 Ga. 228(1) (367 S.E.2d 805) (1988).” Accord, Griffin v. State , 282 Ga. 215, 647 S.E.2d 36 (June 25, 2007). Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 627 S.E.2d 579 (March 13, 2006). No fatal variance where indictment charged defendant “with felony murder while in the commission of the felony of cruelty to children in the first degree, ‘by using blunt force, causing trauma to [child victim’s] head and shaking her.’” Although evidence showed that defendant was not present when the injuries were inflicted by co-defendant, evidence shows that defendant was party to the crime based on pattern of child abuse by the co-defendant parents. “With regard to the crime of cruelty to children, ‘criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime.’ Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632, 634, 501 S.E.2d 815 (1998).” Three justices (Sears, joined by Hunstein and Benham) dissent, saying they are “unwilling, ... to expand the ‘party to a crime’ concept to such an extent that a defendant’s past participation in a pattern of conduct qualifies as aiding, abetting, encouraging, or otherwise assisting in a future crime in which he does not participate.” Collins v. State, 269 Ga.App. 381, 604 S.E.2d 240 (August 31, 2004). “The indictment charged Collins with child molestation in that he ‘... did perform an immoral and indecent act to [the victim], a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by inserting his penis into said victim’s vagina, with intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused....’” Held, “any variance between the indictment and the proof was not fatal. The evidence showed that Collins either (1) showed her his penis and put it in her vagina, or (2) showed her his penis and put his finger in her vagina. Under either scenario, Collins acted with the intent to arouse or to satisfy his sexual desires by touching the victim. [Cit.] And Collins was on notice that he was being tried for touching the girl in a private area. [Cit.]” See also Cherry (February 22, 2007), above (no distinction between allegation of touching child’s “breast” and testimony of touching “chest.”). Accord, Hernandez v. State , 319 Ga.App. 876, 738 S.E.2d 701 (February 22, 2013) (jury could infer that victim was referring to her vagina when she testified that defendant put his mouth on her “lower private area”). Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 592 S.E.2d 656 (February 2, 2004). “It is not necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect. [Cits.]” Allegation that the aggravated assault was committed with a gun was sufficient. Westbrooks v. State, 263 Ga.App. 566, 588 S.E.2d 335 (October 7, 2003). No fatal variance where indictment alleged theft of “currency,” and evidence showed that defendant electronically debited from defendant’s account to her own. See also Merritt v. State , 254 Ga.App. 788, 564 S.E.2d 3 (2002) (no fatal variance where “indictment alleged that the defendant stole ‘U.S. currency,’ but the evidence showed that he had stolen checks”).