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In re: J.D.T., 262 Ga.App. 860, 586 S.E.2d 748 (August 25, 2003). No fatal variance where delinquency petition charged juvenile with taking an International truck, but witness testified it was a Mack truck. Georgia courts do not favor “overly- technical applications of the fatal variance rule, at least with respect to the description or amount of the stolen property.” “‘The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.’” quoting Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800, 801- 802(3), 221 S.E.2d 576 (1976). See also “Hechevarria v. State, 202 Ga.App. 502, 503-504(3), 414 S.E.2d 723 (1992) (no fatal variance where the indictment alleged a Emerson television was stolen and the proof showed the stolen television was a Sharp and that the serial number had been removed); Graves v. State, 180 Ga.App. 446, 447-448(2), 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986) (no fatal variance where indictment alleged a 1976 Ford LN 700 truck was stolen and proof showed the truck was a 1977 model); Clark v. State, 178 Ga.App. 47, 47-48(1), 341 S.E.2d 909 (1986) (variance between allegation and proof of vehicle identification number not a fatal variance); Bain v. State, 144 Ga.App. 470(2), 241 S.E.2d 586 (1978) (variance between allegation and proof of the model of the vehicle not fatal).” See also Flanagan v. State , 265 Ga.App. 122, 592 S.E.2d 894 (January 9, 2004) (No fatal variance where indictment alleged that defendant “pried open the door” of the premises, but evidence showed that the attempt to pry open the door failed ) ; In re: M.M. , 265 Ga.App. 381, 593 S.E.2d 919 (February 2, 2004) (damage was to officer’s personal vehicle, not police car, as alleged; evidence showed only two broken windows at police station, not 18); Nelson v. State , 269 Ga.App. 103, 603 S.E.2d 691 (August 12, 2004) (No fatal variance where “neither the owners of the vehicles [broken into by defendant] nor the model year of the vehicles, as alleged in the indictment, were proven by the evidence.”). Harris v. State, 258 Ga.App. 669, 574 S.E.2d 871 (December 3, 2002). Indictment was not defective because it omitted the word “knowingly” in charging defendant with drug possession. Defendant could not admit allegations of accusation and still be innocent of the offense charged. Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 573 S.E.2d 44 (November 25, 2002). Indictment alleging assault “with a handgun, a deadly weapon,” was not subject to demurrer for failing to specify manner in which gun was used to assault victim. “The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more certain and definite, but whether it contains the elements of the offense charged, apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to defend against, and protects against double jeopardy.” Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (November 12, 2002). References to speeds on a speeding ticket are not “allegations,” nor essential averments, but mere references to evidence, and need not be proven at trial. Speeding can only be committed in one manner, “i.e., exceeding the designated speed limit.” Reddings v. State, 255 Ga.App. 483, 565 S.E.2d 850 (May 22, 2002). Where accusation alleged that defendant kicked officer in thigh, it was not a fatal variance where evidence established that officer was in fact kicked in the shin. “The true inquiry is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused. Here, we do not find the difference between a shin and a thigh to be a fatal variance affecting Reddings’ substantial rights. Reddings knew he was being charged with kicking a police officer in the leg. We cannot conceive that the discrepancy caused Reddings such surprise that it affected his trial strategy and preparation.” Felder v. State, 270 Ga. 641, 514 S.E.2d 416 (March 8, 1999). No fatal variance where indictment alleged that the robbery was committed by taking cigarettes “from the person of the victim,” but “the evidence showed only that the cigarettes had been taken from the victim’s immediate presence.” Held, the victim’s “person” and “immediate presence,” as used in the robbery statute, OCGA § 16-8-41(a), are synonymous. “Although the victim’s ‘person’ and his ‘immediate presence’ are separated by the word ‘or,’ the former has always been deemed to include the latter for purposes of proving the elements of a robbery. ‘The meaning of this legal phrase is, not that the taking must necessarily be from the actual contact of the body, but if it is from under the personal protection that will suffice. Within this doctrine, the person may be deemed to protect all things belonging to the individual, within a distance, not easily defined, over which the influence of the personal presence extends.’ Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 246(1), 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975).” “The word ‘or’ ‘is sometimes used to introduce a reiteration of the same idea, and to express it in a somewhat different way.’ Whitaker v. State, 11 Ga.App. 208, 211(5), 75 S.E. 258 (1912).” D’Auria v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 512 S.E.2d 266 (February 8, 1999). Defendant’s prosecution for misdemeanor sexual