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battery was barred by statute of limitation where State’s accusation was defective in failing to set out the elements of the offense, and was not amended within the statute. Accusation alleged that the defendant “committed the offense of SEXUAL BATTERY by making contact with the intimate body parts of [the victim] in violation of OCGA § 16-6-22.1 contrary to the laws of this State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.” The statute defines “Intimate parts” as including “the primary genital area, anus, groin, inner thighs, or buttocks of a male or female and the breasts of a female.” Defendant was a doctor treating victim for injuries sustained in an auto accident. “[T]he May 1993 accusation does not identify which body parts were allegedly touched without her consent or more specifically identify the manner in which the illegal touching allegedly occurred. The May 1993 accusation does nothing more than reference the statute alleged to have been violated and recite some, but not all, of the elements of the crime of sexual battery. Although recitation of the statute may, in certain cases, be a sufficient, though not desirable, method of apprising a defendant of the charges against him, see Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116, 117(1), 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990), recitation of portions of the statute is not sufficient if, reading the accusation together with the statute, a defendant is unable to determine which of his acts are alleged to be criminal in nature. See generally England v. State, 232 Ga.App. 842, 844(2)(a), 502 S.E.2d 770 (1998) and State v. Black, 149 Ga.App. 389, 391(4), 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979) (where crime may be committed in several ways, failure to charge manner in which crime was committed subjects accusation to special demurrer). Under the facts of this case, we find that mere recitation of portions of the statute was not sufficient to enable D’Auria to prepare for trial and respond to the charges against him. Accordingly, there being no valid accusation filed within two years from the time of the alleged crime, it was error for the trial court to deny D’Auria’s plea in bar based on the statute of limitation.” Majority suggests this decision is based on the peculiar fact that defendant was a doctor who was authorized to touch victim, and needed to know which touching was in question; three dissenters (Benham, writing for Thompson and Hines) argue that the decision means that “a sexual battery indictment or accusation is fatally flawed if it does not state with specificity the intimate part of the body allegedly touched improperly by the defendant.” Maddox v. State, 236 Ga.App. 209, 511 S.E.2d 294 (February 3, 1999). No fatal variance where accusation for deposit account fraud alleged that check was for “wages” when it fact it was for other “present consideration.” Distinguishing Hutto v. State , 198 Ga.App. 325, 401 S.E.2d 339 (1991) (check was neither given for wages nor other present consideration, so no violation of OCGA § 16-9-20). 23. MISNOMER See also subheading ALIAS, above Thornton v. State, 325 Ga.App. 475, 753 S.E.2d 139 (December 13, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in simple battery prosecution; trial court properly denied plea of misnomer (styled as general demurrer and motion to quash). Record shows that defendant was charged as “Latoya Jordan.” “In a plea of misnomer, the defendant generally claims that she is not the person named in indictment or accusation, and that she is not known or called by the name of the accused. See OCGA § 17–7–112. ‘However, a defendant may be indicted [or charged by accusation] properly under a name by which [s]he is generally known and called, whether this be [her] true name or not.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 876(2)(d), 528 S.E.2d 312 (2000). Consequently, to sustain a plea of misnomer, the accused must show that she was never known under the name used in the accusation. See Walker v. State, 113 Ga.App. 526, 527(1), 149 S.E.2d 153 (1966). In this case, the record supports the trial court's decision that the accusation properly charged Thornton. Notably, Thornton admitted that she had been previously arrested and booked into jail under the name Latoia Jordan, and Jordan's listed date of birth matched that of Thornton. Additionally, Thornton signed a waiver of formal arraignment in this case, which specifically listed her name as Jordan a/k/a ‘Thornton.’ Consequently, contrary to Thornton's claims, the evidence clearly shows that Jordan was another name by which Thornton was known.” Hester v. State, 304 Ga.App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (June 16, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no fatal variance where victim’s name is misspelled in indictment. “[T]he misnomer of the victim in the indictment is not a fatal error. ‘A variance between the victim's name as alleged in the indictment and as proven at trial is not fatal if the two names in fact refer to the same individual, such as where a mere misnomer is involved,’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.)” quoting Parks v. State, 246 Ga.App. 888, 889(1) (543 S.E.2d 39) (2000). Accord, Bostic v. State , 294 Ga. 845, 757 S.E.2d 59 (March 28, 2014) (no fatal variance where indictment identified murder victim as “Latana Hollinger” instead of “Latavia Hollinger”); Stills v. State , 327 Ga.App. 767, 761 S.E.2d 159 (June 25, 2014) (no fatal variance where indictment listed robbery victim as “Franco Bernardo” instead of “Bernardo Franco.”). Davis v. State, 303 Ga.App. 799, 694 S.E.2d 381 (April 21, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for statutory rape affirmed; count of indictment which attempted to charge child molestation was void for failure to name an offender at all, but