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that conviction was merged with statutory rape, anyway. “[T]here is “‘nothing more basic which should be properly charged in an accusation or indictment than the name of the alleged perpetrator.’ Noeske v. State, 181 Ga.App. 778, 780(2) (353 S.E.2d 635) (1987). Thus, where a count of an indictment fails to name the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense charged in that count, the omission of the defendant's name is fatal to that count of the indictment as to that defendant. Id.; see also Culpepper v. State, 173 Ga. 799, 800-801 (161 SE 623) (1931) (accord); Knapp v. State, 297 Ga.App. 844, 845-846(1) (678 S.E.2d 501) (2009) (accord).” Knapp v. State, 297 Ga.App. 844, 678 S.E.2d 501 (May 11, 2009). Defendant’s DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash. “The accusation was styled ‘ State of Georgia v. Jane Marie Knapp, ’” but “the body of the accusation identified as the defendant an individual named ‘Billy Thomas Jones.’” Based on Culpepper v. State , 173 Ga. 799 (161 SE 623) (1931), holding that misstating defendant’s surname (Culpepper) as “McGruder” “designated a distinct and separate person as the perpetrator of the offense. The surname of the defendant must be alleged in the charging part of the accusation, and its omission therefrom is fatal to the accusation or indictment. 173 Ga. at 799-800 (citations omitted).” Issue was properly raised here by defendant’s motion to quash the accusation “on the ground that it did not charge ‘this defendant’ with any crimes.” Original conviction was in probate court, affirmed on appeal to superior court. Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 528 S.E.2d 312 (January 19, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to quash based on accusation which named him as “Douglas F. Vanorsdall” instead of “Douglas F. Vanorsdall II.” “‘A defendant may be indicted properly under a name by which he is generally known and called, whether this be his true name or not.’ Vanorsdall does not contend that the accusation did not correctly identify the name by which he is commonly known. [fn] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to quash the accusation. See generally Thompson v. State, 163 Ga.App. 828, 829(4), 296 S.E.2d 123 (1982) (holding that it was ‘inconsequential’ that a defendant was indicted under the name ‘Floyd Thompson’ and sentenced under the name ‘Willie Floyd Thompson’).” Accord, Thornton (December 13, 2013), above. Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 517 S.E.2d 502 (June 1, 1999). Capital murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied untimely plea of misnomer. “Palmer argues that his name is incorrect in the indictment, that his real name is Willie Palmer and that the indictment lists a Willie Williams Palmer. He claims error in the denial of his plea of misnomer asserted during jury selection. However, the proper time for filing a plea of misnomer is before arraignment. Pulliam v. Donaldson, 140 Ga. 864, 865(1), 80 S.E. 315 (1913). Therefore, Palmer's plea of misnomer was untimely. See id.; Robinson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 368, 368-369(1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998). Moreover, Palmer is clearly the person named in the indictment. See Robinson, supra.” 24. PREDICATE OFFENSE Kimbrough v. State, A15A1738, ___ Ga.App. ___, 785 S.E.2d 54, 2016 WL 1138791 (March 24, 2016). Interlocutory appeal; trial court properly denied special demurrers to indictment charging RICO and drug offenses. Contrary to defendants’ argument, “OCGA § 16–14–4(b)’s ‘participate in [an] enterprise’ language” is not subject to challenge as vague and overbroad, based on Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 427-428 (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986). “Largely tracking the statutory language, and in accordance with the principles of Chancey, count one of the indictment alleges that the defendants participated in [the enterprise] Executive Wellness through a pattern of racketeering activity. It generally describes the racketeering activity as unlawfully obtaining possession of oxycodone by withholding information from the practitioners who prescribed the drug and then describes that activity more specifically by incorporating the remaining counts of the indictment, which set out the predicate acts with more specificity. This is sufficient to allege the manner in which the defendants participated in the enterprise.” “It is true, as the defendants argue, that where the statutory definition of an offense includes generic terms, the state may be required to state the “species of acts charged [and] descend to particulars.” [ State v. Delaby, 298 Ga.App. 723, 725 (681 S.E.2d 645) (2009)] (citation and punctuation omitted). But here, the state did just that, specifying in the counts alleging predicate acts the acts that amounted to the defendants’ participation in the enterprise.” Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 766 S.E.2d 28 (November 17, 2014). Murder conviction as to one victim affirmed, but not as to other victim; evidence didn’t support finding that “Walker caused the death of [infant] Tyler ‘in the commission of’” the specified predicate felonies. Predicate felonies alleged here: the murder of the child’s mother and the concealment of her death. “There is no proof, however, that the murder of Ramona proximately caused Tyler's death. This is not a case in which an infant died as a result of neglect, prolonged exposure, or some other dangerous circumstance from which the child could have been rescued, but for the killing of its only potential rescuer. To the