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contrary, the State relied at trial on testimony that Walker admitted causing Tyler to asphyxiate by placing his hand over the face of the child.” Conviction for concealment of mother’s death also reversed for lack of evidence that any act of Walker had the purpose or effect of concealing her death. Evidence could have supported a finding of either malice murder of the child or felony murder predicated upon a felonious assault, but neither theory was charged. State v. Biddle, 303 Ga.App. 384, 693 S.E.2d 539 (March 10, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for first degree vehicular homicide reinstated; trial court erred in finding that indictment only charged second degree vehicular homicide. Indictment read charged that defendant “did … cause the death of [the victim], a human being, through a violation of Official Code of Georgia Annotated Section 40-6-390, Reckless Driving, by driving his vehicle in a reckless manner, to wit: driving on the wrong side of a roadway and hitting the vehicle wherein [the victim] was a passenger.” Trial court found that this description only supported second degree vehicular homicide because “it does not use the language of the definition of the offense of reckless driving in its definition of the offense, but rather it uses driving on the wrong side of the road.” Court of Appeals disagrees: “By alleging that Biddle violated OCGA § 40-6-390, Reckless Driving, the indictment incorporated the elements of that offense that Biddle drove his ‘vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property’ and was sufficient to assert an indictment for vehicular homicide in the first degree. Duggan v. State, 225 Ga.App. 291, 297(8) (483 S.E.2d 373) (1997).” Cochran v. State, 288 Ga.App. 538, 654 S.E.2d 458 (November 21, 2007). Indictment was insufficient to allege felony fleeing and eluding where it failed to include element of “flee[ing] in traffic conditions such that the general public is placed at risk of serious injuries.” Other counts of DUI, failure to maintain lane, and stop sign violation, were not sufficient to supply this element, distinguishing Howard v. State, 252 Ga.App. 487 (555 S.E.2d 884) (2001) (predicate offense such as reckless driving may supply missing element of another offense – vehicular homicide – if fully set forth in a separate count). “In the instant case, unlike Howard, nowhere in the indictment is the predicate offense ‘flees in traffic conditions such that the general public is placed at risk of serious injuries’ mentioned. Where the indictment does not contain one of the four predicate offenses required for conviction of a felony under the fleeing or attempting to elude statute, the trial court may not sentence the defendant for the felony offense. Thomas v. State, 255 Ga.App. 777, 780 (567 S.E.2d 72) (2002).” Distinguished, Hinton v. State , 297 Ga.App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (April 17, 2009) (indictment alleged “traffic conditions which placed the general public at risk of receiving serious injuries.”). Dowdell v. State, 278 Ga.App. 142, 628 S.E.2d 226 (March 8, 2006). Indictment charged defendant with possession of “a firearm ... during the commission of a felony, to wit: armed robbery, which is a theft from a building.” Held, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment based on the erroneous description of armed robbery. “Although the indictment was not perfect in form, it was not rendered void because Dowdell was not explicitly informed that armed robbery is a crime ‘against or involving the person of another.’ Count 3 of the indictment sufficiently informed Dowdell of the charge asserted against him and protected him from subsequent prosecution for the same crime. [Cit.] We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Dowdell’s motion in arrest of judgment or motion for new trial on this issue. [Cit.]” Polk v. State, 275 Ga.App. 467, 620 S.E.2d 857 (September 9, 2005). “Polk contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a timely demurrer to the burglary count of the indictment on the grounds that it was fatally defective because it did not specify an underlying felony. We agree. … In Lockhart [ v. State, 24 Ga. 420 (1858)], our Supreme Court held that an indictment which charged solely the offense of burglary without identifying the underlying felony was a nullity. Id. at 422. In Ealey [v. State, 136 Ga.App. 292 (221 S.E.2d 50 ) (1975)], citing Lockhart, supra, we reversed a conviction for burglary because the indictment in the case did not specify an underlying felony. Ealey, supra. at 292-293. The state argues that the case sub judice is distinguishable because we may infer that Count 1 of the indictment, which charged Polk with aggravated stalking, supplied the underlying felony for the burglary charge. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55(1) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995), holding that ‘[a]llegations set forth in one count of an indictment cannot be imputed to a separate count, absent specific reference to the allegation sought to be imputed .’ [Cits.] … A fortiori, counsel’s performance was deficient in his failure to challenge timely the validity of the burglary count on this ground. [Cit.] The failure to do so contributed to Polk’s conviction on a void count, thus it harmed Polk and prejudiced his case. [Cit.]” Pasha v. State, 273 Ga.App. 788, 616 S.E.2d 135 (June 21, 2005). Defendant challenges his RICO conviction, based on scheme to purchase jewelry stolen from stores by his co-conspirators. “[W]hile Pasha argues that he was not adequately charged with the predicate offenses, he misapprehends what is central to conspiracy, namely, that each actor in a conspiracy is responsible for the overt actions undertaken by all the other co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.