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Causey v. State, 154 Ga.App. 76, 79(2), 267 S.E.2d 475 (1980). ‘A person commits the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy.’ Burnette v. State, 241 Ga.App. 682, 683, 527 S.E.2d 276 (1999), citing OCGA § 16-4-8. ‘The essence of conspiracy is a common design, and conduct which discloses a common design may give rise to the inference of conspiracy. [Cit.]’ Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 747(10)(b), 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997). Thus, Pasha’s argument is unavailing, since there is no requirement in a conspiracy case that the State prove that Pasha personally committed the underlying predicate offenses themselves. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Pasha’s special demurrer to the indictment.” Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 611 S.E.2d 52 (March 28, 2005). Count of the indictment charging defendant with felony murder predicated on aggravated assault did not describe the aggravated assault; however, the count charging defendant with malice murder did describe an aggravated assault, alleging that defendant “caused the victim’s death ‘by shooting her with a pistol’ with malice aforethought.” There was no separate count charging aggravated assault alone. Because the malice murder count “set forth sufficient facts to put [defendant] on notice he was accused of the compound offense of felony murder with aggravated assault as the predicate offense[,] … the … indictment satisfied due process.” This is true even though the defendant ultimately was tried only on a redacted, one-count version of the indictment charging only felony murder. The felony murder count was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because defendant couldn’t admit its allegations and not be guilty of a crime. “[Defendant’s] contention that the felony murder indictment was deficient because it did not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault is, in essence, a special demurrer seeking greater specificity with regard to the predicate felony. We agree with the State that [defendant’s] failure to file his special demurrer seeking additional information before pleading not guilty to the indictment constitutes a waiver of his right to be tried on a perfect indictment. [Cits.]” (Footnote omitted.) Mikenny v. State, 277 Ga. 64, 586 S.E.2d 328 (September 15, 2003). “‘An indictment which omits an essential element of the predicate offense [here, child cruelty as a predicate of felony murder] in a count charging a compound offense can nonetheless satisfy the requirements of due process “as long as the indictment charges the predicate offense completely in a separate count.”’” [Cites omitted] Although the felony murder count omitted the element of malice in describing the child cruelty, the count charging the child cruelty itself did so properly. The felony murder count therefore “complies with the requirements of due process and is sufficient to support the conviction for that crime.” In re: E.S., 262 Ga.App. 768, 586 S.E.2d 691 (August 15, 2003). Delinquency petition that charged juvenile with participating in “a criminal street gang by engaging in a pattern of criminal gang activity” was void because it failed to set out any of the predicate acts, an essential element of the offense. 25. PARTIES TO A CRIME Scruggs v. State, 309 Ga.App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (May 13, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied special demurrer to indictment. Indictment wasn’t required to “specify which of the accused had the gun, or whether they each had a gun, or whether one aided and abetted the other.” Davis v State, 287 Ga.App. 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (October 10, 2007). No fatal variance where indictment charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon “on his person,” but evidence showed that the firearm was only constructively possessed by defendant while in the actual possession of his co-defendant/co-conspirator. “[I]t was not necessary for the indictment to charge Davis with being a party to a crime in order for the state to prove his culpability in that manner. See Wakily v. State, 225 Ga.App. 56, 60(7) (483 S.E.2d 313) (1997); Perkins [ v. State, 194 Ga.App. 189, 190(1) (390 S.E.2d 273) (1990)] (no fatal variance where indictment charged defendant with possession of a handgun ‘on his person’ but evidence showed that another perpetrator had the gun during the robbery).” Accord, Elamin v. State , 293 Ga.App. 591, 667 S.E.2d 439 (September 18, 2008). John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (October 9, 2007). Failure to specify in the indictment that defendant is being charged as a party to a crime does not violate “ Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000). There, the United States Supreme Court noted that ‘“any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”[Cit.]’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 476(II). As an allegation that the defendant was a party to the crime would not increase the maximum penalty for that crime, [defendant's] reliance on Apprendi is misplaced.” Hill v. State, 282 Ga.App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (December 7, 2006). Rule that “‘[t]he State is not required to indicate in