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the indictment that it is charging a person as a party to the crime. [Cit.]’ Glenn v. State , 278 Ga. 291, 294(1)(b), 602 S.E.2d 577 (2004)” is not contradicted by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which requires that “‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury’ and that an indictment must include all facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment.’ Id. at 301(II). While the finding that the defendant in Blakely acted with ‘deliberate cruelty’ was an essential element used to increase his sentence, Hill’s status as a party to the crimes in question did not increase the sentences he received. As a result, Blakely did not require that the State indicate in the indictment that it was charging Hill with being a party to the crimes, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that Hill could be convicted of being either the principal perpetrator of the crimes or of being a party thereto.” Accord , Riley v. State , 292 Ga.App. 202, 663 S.E.2d 835 (June 25, 2008); John (October 9, 2007), above. Trumpler v. State, 261 Ga.App. 499, 583 S.E.2d 184 (June 5, 2003). Indictment need not allege that defendant was a “party to a crime.” “Although the State was required to prove that Trumpler was a party to the crime under [OCGA § 16-2-20], it was not required to allege these provisions in the indictment.” Accord, Souder v. State , 281 Ga.App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (August 29, 2006); Carswell-Danso v. State , 281 Ga.App. 576, 636 S.E.2d 735 (September 15, 2006); In re: B.D., 287 Ga.App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129 (August 9, 2007); Byrum v. State , 282 Ga. 608, 652 S.E.2d 557 (October 29, 2007); Alford v. State , 292 Ga.App. 514, 664 S.E.2d 870 (July 7, 2008); Metz v. State , 284 Ga. 614, 669 S.E.2d 121 (November 3, 2008) ( reversed on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011)); Brown v. State , 297 Ga.App. 7, 678 S.E.2d 172 (May 8, 2009); Allen v. State , 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (November 22, 2010); Jones v. State , 289 Ga. 111, 709 S.E.2d 773 (April 18, 2011) (“It is not the purpose of an indictment to set forth the role each co-indictee played in the commission of the crime.”); Scruggs (May 13, 2011), above; White v. State , 289 Ga. 511, 712 S.E.2d 834 (July 8, 2011); Tabb v. State , 313 Ga.App. 852, 723 S.E.2d 295 (February 1, 2012). 26. PRIOR CONVICTIONS Arnold v. State, 276 Ga.App. 680, 624 S.E.2d 258 (December 6, 2005). “State and federal constitutional principles do not demand that prior felony convictions be set forth in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in order to be used as a sentencing enhancement.” Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington , and others. 27. STATUTE OF LIMITATION State v. Godfrey, 309 Ga.App. 234, 709 S.E.2d 572 (March 15, 2011). In defendant’s prosecution for rape and aggravated child molestation, counts of indictment which referenced that victim was “under the age of 16 … sufficiently invoked the tolling provision of OCGA § 17-3-2.1 . That Code Section provides that if the victim of certain sexual offenses, including those at issue here, ‘is under 16 years of age on the date of the violation, the applicable period within which a prosecution must be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other applicable statute shall not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency, prosecuting attorney, or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier.’” Counts which did not recite defendant’s age, however, did not invoke the tolling provision; trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar as to these counts. State v. Bair, 303 Ga.App. 183, 692 S.E.2d 806 (March 26, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar to second indictment based on statute of limitation; statute of limitation wasn’t tolled by first indictment which was fatally defective. Trial court had granted demurrer to first indictment alleging that defendant committed theft by taking “between the 1 st day of August, 1999, and the 1 st day of February, 2002.” Indictment was filed in June 14, 2005. Trial court granted the demurrer on grounds that some of the dates in question fell outside the four year statute of limitation for felony theft by taking. State then re-indicted, alleging 31 separate counts of theft by taking, and alleging that the new indictment was timely because the crimes were previously unknown. Second indictment was issued on June 10, 2008, well outside statute of limitation but within six months of the dismissal of the first indictment. Trial court found that that second indictment was barred by the statute of limitation, holding that the State couldn’t “renew” the first prosecution under OCGA § 17-3-3 because it was void. Court of Appeals agrees: “Because of the second indictment, we now know that, without question, the first indictment did not inform Bair of all the charges she must defend against at trial and was not specific enough to protect her from multiple prosecutions. The indictment apparently was intended to include 31 separate acts and to allege all events that occurred on 31 different dates, not one crime on one date. Moreover, the indictment did not inform Bair of the manner in which she was alleged to have committed the crimes. As in D'Auria [ v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 512 S.E.2d 266 (1999)] , we find that the first indictment was not sufficient to enable Bair to prepare for trial and respond to the charges against her, or to protect her against multiple prosecutions. The State cannot allege a single defective charge of theft by taking that may have been barred by the statute of limitation, and upon its dismissal, inflate that single, defective one count indictment to one alleging 31-counts. Therefore, no valid indictment was filed