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within four years of the date the alleged victim learned of Bair's actions, and the trial court did not err by granting Bair's plea in bar based on the statute of limitation. See Newsome v. State, [296 Ga.App. 490, 492-493(1), 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009)]. Moreover, this second indictment would impermissibly broaden and substantially amend the first indictment. See Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 726(2)(a), 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999).” Rader v. State, 300 Ga.App. 411, 685 S.E.2d 405 (October 8, 2009). In prosecution for theft offenses, 1. t rial court erred in failing to rule on defendant’s plea in bar, based on statute of limitation, pre-trial; proper procedure, as outlined in Jenkins v. State , 278 Ga. 598 (604 S.E.2d 789) (2004), “required the court, in ruling on Rader's plea in bar, to employ a procedure analogous to a Jackson v. Denno [cit.] hearing. Under Jackson v. Denno, a court must conduct a pretrial hearing to ‘determine whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that [a defendant's] statement was made freely and voluntarily.’ Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 794(2) (671 S.E.2d 815) (2009). This determination necessarily requires the court to resolve factual disputes; a mere ruling by the court that the issue is in dispute and will go to the jury is insufficient. Payne v. State, 249 Ga. 354, 360(7) (291 S.E.2d 226) (1982); see Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 543(IV) (87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593) (1967) (‘Under Jackson [ v. Denno ], it was for the trial judge to first decide these [evidentiary] conflicts and discrepancies.’).” 2. Indictment sufficiently alleged exception to statute of limitation: ““The indictment informed [co-defendants] Rader and Cooke that the state intended to prove that the statute of limitation was tolled until October 8, 2004, when an interested party (Brian Post) learned of the crime and his knowledge was thereby imputed to the state. This language was sufficient to apprise Rader and Cooke of what they ‘must be prepared to defend against.’ Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367, 368(2) (659 S.E.2d 600) (2008) (citation omitted). The state's potential inability to prove at trial that it lacked knowledge of the alleged crime before October 8, 2004, see Merritt v. State, 254 Ga.App. 788, 789(1)(a) (564 S.E.2d 3) (2002) ( state bears burden of proving when offense became known, and thus when statute of limitation began to run), because of earlier knowledge imputed from another source, did not render this language insufficient.” “ Leftwich v. State, 299 Ga.App. 392, 682 S.E.2d 614 (July 7, 2009). Trial court properly found that indictment effectively recited tolling of statute of limitation. Defendant’s indictment for rape and related offenses contained an apparent typographical error in Counts 2, 4 and 5: language therein explaining that the statute of limitations had been tolled for 14 years because the perpetrator was unknown erroneously “referred back to Count 1, rather than the count in question. Leftwich contends that the tolling provisions were essential elements of each of the Counts, which needed to be perfect in form. We disagree that the language in question constitutes a fatal flaw in Counts 2, 4, and 5. Under OCGA § 17-3-2(2), the period of limitation is tolled during any period in which ‘[t]he person committing the crime is unknown....’ However, ‘where an exception is relied upon to prevent the bar of the statute of limitation, it must be alleged and proved.’ McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga.App. 14, 16(2) (616 S.E.2d 489) (2005).” The exception here was stated in each relevant Count; the reference back to Count 1 was merely “superfluous language.” Accord, State v. Godfrey , 309 Ga.App. 234, 709 S.E.2d 572 (March 15, 2011). Parks v. State, 294 Ga.App. 646, 669 S.E.2d 684 (November 18, 2008). Defendant’s “motion for directed verdict of acquittal,” based on alleged deficiency in the accusation and resultant running of statute of limitation, was not timely. Defendant contended that the statute of limitation had expired, because the accusation charging defendant with theft by deception “did not specify the amount stolen, and therefore only charged him with a misdemeanor subject to a two-year statute of limitation. The accusation was filed approximately three years after the crime, and thus was untimely, he contends.” “ Because Parks has already been tried and convicted of the alleged offense, ‘post-conviction review of the sufficiency of an indictment is limited to determining whether an imperfection therein was harmless; i.e., whether the defendant was “misled to his prejudice.”’ White v. State, 269 Ga.App. 113, 115 (603 S.E.2d 686) (2004). ‘An indictment which fails to allege the specific amount taken is not subject to a general demurrer, because such amount is not an essential element of the offense. Thus, even though the amount taken is not alleged, a defendant cannot admit the facts alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of the offense. The true test of the sufficiency of the indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged....’ (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Forthe, 237 Ga.App. 134, 136-137 (514 S.E.2d 890) (1999). ‘The stealing of one cent is larceny as truly as the stealing of a thousand dollars. The amount may vary the degree, but it does not change the character of the crime.’ Id. at 136. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that, ‘ the proper procedure for litigating a plea in bar based upon the statute of limitations should be analogous to a pretrial Jackson v. Denno hearing, wherein if the defendant prevails on the issue of the voluntariness of a statement, the jury never hears the statement; if the State prevails on a pretrial Jackson v. Denno hearing the statement is admissible, but the defendant is still entitled to present evidence and argument that it was not voluntary, and the State must prove otherwise. If a defendant prevails on a pretrial plea in bar on the statute of limitations, the charge should be dismissed; if the State prevails on this