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issue before trial, the defendant may still require the State to prove at trial that the charge is not barred by the statute of limitations.’ (Footnotes omitted) Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598, 604-605(1)(B) (604 S.E.2d 789) (2004).” Evidence at trial showed that the amount stolen was a felony amount. Henry v. State, 274 Ga.App. 139, 616 S.E.2d 883 (June 30, 2005). “‘The general rule is that when the exact date of the commission of the crime is not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense may be proved to have occurred any time within the statute of limitations.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dean v. State, 252 Ga.App. 204, 206(3) (555 S.E.2d 868) (2001). In this case, there is no statute of limitations issue. The victim’s testimony, alone, was sufficient to establish the time frame. OCGA § 24-4-8. Additionally, the fact that the indictment provided a six-year time frame does not render it insufficient. See Dean, supra at 207(4) (‘defendant could have been convicted upon proof that he committed the crimes alleged between March 1991 and March 1998’). Finally, as is required, the indictment informed Henry of the charges against him, enabled him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and protected him against another prosecution for the same offense. See Greeson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 161, 165(4) (558 S.E.2d 749) (2002). Thus, the indictment was not deficient.” Accord, Northern v. State , 285 Ga.App. 303, 645 S.E.2d 701 (May 8, 2007) (where date not material, and single date not known, any date within statute of limitation may be proven). McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga.App. 14, 616 S.E.2d 489 (June 23, 2005). The exception to the statute of limitation was properly pled where it was set out as a separate count of the accusation and incorporated by reference into each other count. Heath v. State, 269 Ga.App. 872, 605 S.E.2d 427 (October 4, 2004). “Heath claims the trial court should have granted him a continuance after the State gave notice during argument on a pre-trial motion the day his trial began that it would present evidence that the crime occurred in 1996, not 1995, as alleged in the indictment. The trial court correctly concluded that the dates in the indictment were not a material element of the crimes with which Heath was charged. See Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 510(1), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997) (rape and child molestation case). ‘Where the date alleged in the indictment is not a material element of the offense, the State may prove the offense as of any date within the statute of limitation.’ Id.” Defendant not entitled to a continuance on this basis unless asserting an alibi defense. Tompkins v. State, 265 Ga.App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 599 (February 23, 2004). Seven-year statute of limitations for non- capital felonies committed against persons under age 14 years (OCGA § 17-3-1(c)) is a general limitation, not an exception to the general four-year limitation for other non-capital felonies; hence, it need not be expressly stated in the indictment to be applicable. Disapproves contrary language in Grizzard v. State , 258 Ga.App. 124, 572 S.E.2d 760 (2002). Affirmed (on other grounds), 278 Ga. 857, 607 S.E.2d 891 (January 10, 2005). Accord, Lyde v. State , 311 Ga.App. 512, 716 S.E.2d 572 (August 25, 2011) (“an indictment alleging the molestation of a child ‘under the age of 16’ sufficiently invoked the statute of limitation tolling provision set forth in OCGA § 17–3–2.1.”). Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444 (March 24, 2003). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant’s first indictment was nolle prossed after running of the statute of limitations, and a second indictment issued. Defendant moved to quash the second indictment for failing to affirmatively allege an exception to the statute of limitations. Held, the motion to quash was properly denied. OCGA § 17-3-3, providing for an extension of the statute of limitations for six months when the first indictment is nolle prossed, is “an extension of the statute of limitations period and not an exception to it that must be pled in the indictment.” Accord, Hicks v. State , 315 Ga.App. 779, 728 S.E.2d 294 (May 3, 2012); Johnson v. State , 335 Ga.App. 886, 782 S.E.2d 50 (February 10, 2016). 28. SURPLUSAGE Evans v. State, 330 Ga.App. 241, 766 S.E.2d 821 (December 5, 2014). Convictions for possession of codeine and related offenses affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion for directed verdict, as State wasn’t required to prove the allegation of the indictment that the codeine was “a Schedule V Controlled Substance.” “We have previously held, however, that a description in an indictment to a specified controlled substance by reference to a particular Schedule in the Act is ‘mere surplusage.’ (Citation omitted.) Wright v. State, 232 Ga.App. 104, 105(2) (501 S.E.2d 543) (1998). That is, the Schedule which defines a substance as a controlled substance under the Act is ‘an unnecessary fact’ in the determination of guilt. Id. See also Freeman v. State, 201 Ga.App. 216, 217(2) (410 S.E.2d 749) (1991) (finding Indictment's reference to Schedule II ‘an unnecessary description of an unnecessary fact, which need not be proved’). Under the Act, codeine appears in Schedule II,[fn] Schedule III,[fn] and Schedule V. For purposes of sentencing an offender who is found guilty of violating OCGA § 16–13–30(a), subsections (c), (e), (g), and (l)(1) specify the range of punishments that may be imposed, with the severity of the punishment depending on whether the controlled substance is classified within Schedule