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and related offenses affirmed. Evidence supported admission of defendant’s blood test results despite discrepancy in medical record number on two documents. The witness explained the discrepancy and affirmatively testified that the blood sample was the same. Smith v. State, 291 Ga.App. 353, 662 S.E.2d 176 (May 1, 2008). Lab results were not rendered inadmissible where officers violated lab protocol by failing to initial the evidence. “‘[I]n proving chain of custody, the state is not required to show that the substance was guarded each minute it is in one’s custody.’(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dempsey v. State, 265 Ga.App. 175, 177(3) (593 S.E.2d 362) (2004). ‘The [s]tate need only show with reasonable certainty that the substance tested is the same as that seized, with no tampering or substitution.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) Maldonado [ v. State, 268 Ga.App. 691, 694(1) (603 S.E.2d 58) (2004)]. The State’s evidence showed the chain of custody, and the trial court did not err in denying Smith’s objection. Smith has cited no authority, and we are aware of none, that deviating from laboratory protocol renders evidence inadmissible.” Accord, Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012) (evidence properly admitted although officer didn’t initial sample). Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. Chain of custody of blood sample was unbroken. “Schlanger … argues that the condition of the blood sample evidence was questionable because it took nine days from the day it was mailed to be received by the GBI. But, once it has been established that the blood sample is the same as that which was seized, any argument as to the purity of the sample goes to its weight, not admissibility. Smith v. City of East Point, 189 Ga.App. 454, 456(3) (376 S.E.2d 215) (1988). See also Maldonado v. State, 268 Ga.App. 691(1) (603 S.E.2d 58) (2004); Campbell v. State, 136 Ga.App. 338, 341(3) (221 S.E.2d 212) (1975) (‘In light of the sealed nature of the container and the lack of any evidence of tampering, we are convinced that the chain of custody is unbroken up to its opening by the state analyst.’).” Gassett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (January 31, 2008). “To show a chain of custody adequate to preserve the identity of fungible evidence, the [s]tate must prove with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has been no tampering or substitution. The [s]tate is not required to foreclose every possibility of tampering; it need only show reasonable assurance of the identity of the evidence. (Citation omitted.) Postell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 275, 278(2) (630 S.E.2d 867) (2006); Hayes v. State, 276 Ga.App. 268, 271(4) (623 S.E.2d 144) (2005). Here, the state met its burden through the testimony of the officers who collected the evidence, and the GBI Crime Lab forensic chemist who tested the cocaine. The collecting officers testified that they sealed, stored, and maintained the evidence in secured lockboxes. The officers also testified to their use and maintenance of a written receipt to record and track custody of the evidence. In addition, the GBI Crime Lab forensic chemist testified that the sealed evidence packages were retrieved from the lab’s lock box and showed no signs of tampering. This evidence adequately established a proper chain of custody. Postell, 279 Ga.App. at 278(2); Hayes, 276 Ga.App. at 271(4). Although the state failed to present testimony from the officer who transported the evidence to the Crime Lab, ‘[t]he fact that one of the persons in control of a fungible substance does not testify at trial does not, without more, make the substance or testimony relating to it inadmissible.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Postell, 279 Ga.App. at 278(2); Hayes, 276 Ga.App. at 271(4).” Accord, Scott v. State , 298 Ga.App. 376, 680 S.E.2d 482 (June 16, 2009); Bush v. State , 305 Ga.App. 617, 699 S.E.2d 899 (August 19, 2010) (evidence admissible although officer didn’t specifically state that he “put the evidence bag in a lockbox”). State v. Brady, 287 Ga.App. 626, 653 S.E.2d 72 (September 24, 2007). Trial court erred in dismissing indictment based on destruction of lab samples at public hospital, absent showing of bad faith on part of police . “‘In dealing with the failure of the state to preserve evidence which might have exonerated the defendant, a court must determine both whether the evidence was material and whether the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197-198(3) (599 S.E.2d 177) (2004). ‘Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Milton v. State, 232 Ga.App. 672, 679(6) (503 S.E.2d 566) (1998) . Here, A.M. initially sought medical attention for an infection. The lab samples were obtained by a hospital, in a clinical setting, without prior suspicion of criminal activity. Neither the police, nor the prosecutor, nor a State investigatory laboratory (such as the GBI lab) had any involvement whatsoever in the initial testing of the lab samples. Compare Swanson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 551, 551-552(1)(a) (545 S.E.2d 713) (2001) (affirming conviction in light of lack of bad faith on the part of the State crime lab). The hospital’s lab disposed of the sample in accordance with its standard operating procedure. Accordingly, there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the State or police in connection with the destruction of the initial vaginal sample from A. M.” Distinguishing State v. Blackwell , 245 Ga.App. 135, 537 S.E.2d 457 (2000): “In Blackwell, a DUI case, this Court held that bad faith on the part of the State need not be