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shown where (i) a urine sample, the only evidence of intoxication, was destroyed at the State crime lab after the trial court had ordered the State to preserve the evidence, and (ii) the destroyed evidence had obvious and inherent exculpatory value because the same sample had field tested negative for alcohol (a subsequent lab test was positive). Id. at 138-141(2)(b) and (c).” Accord, Davis v. State , 329 Ga.App. 797, 764 S.E.2d 588 (October 29, 2014) (in rape prosecution, no bad faith on State’s part where fetal tissue sample was contaminated beyond use by private clinic placing it in formaldehyde before it was delivered to State for DNA testing; sample thus had no apparent exculpatory value when later destroyed by GBI Crime Lab). Ward v. State, 285 Ga.App. 574, 646 S.E.2d 745 (May 25, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for manufacturing methamphetamine, evidence of fluid samples was properly admitted although officer who collected them was not available to testify. “Officer Patrick Cook, who also investigated the crime scene, testified that Commander Hill [who was unavailable to testify] took one of the samples from a jar found in the cooler outside of Ward’s residence and that Commander Hill gave him that sample immediately after taking it. Officer Cook did not see Commander Hill take the second sample, but he testified that Commander Hill gave it to him ‘a few moments’ after giving him the first sample. The samples were contained in identical containers, and Officer Cook was not able to distinguish between the sample that originated from the cooler and the sample that was given to him a few moments later. A forensic chemist with the State Crime Lab testified that one of the samples taken by Commander Hill contained methamphetamine and the other did not.” “‘The burden is on the State to show with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has been no tampering or substitution. The State need not negat[e] every possibility of tampering, and need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the evidence. When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 247 Ga. 397, 399(2) (276 S.E.2d 603) (1981). Here, Ward was able to question Officer Cook in open court about his inability to identify the source from which Commander Hill drew the second sample. Despite his implication that Commander Hill tampered with or substituted the second fluid sample prior to delivering it to Officer Cook, Ward presented no evidence to support such a claim. Instead, Officer Cook testified that Commander Hill did not leave the scene or do anything that made him suspicious of the fluid samples.” Accord, Cowins v. State , 290 Ga.App. 814, 660 S.E.2d 865 (April 8, 2008) (While chain of custody was broken after testing when local officer opened sealed bag for additional testing, “[t]here is absolutely no evidence and no allegation that the substance was in any way tampered with between the time it was seized by [Officer] Cannon and tested by [crime lab scientist] Brown.”); McMillan (May 5, 2014), above (bare speculation not enough to keep out lab evidence) . Reason v. State, 283 Ga.App. 608, 642 S.E.2d 236 (February 16, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to establish chain of custody; “At trial, Officer Bell, who found the cocaine, testified that the evidence was sealed and turned over to Sergeant Taylor, another officer on the scene. Sergeant Taylor marked the evidence in his own handwriting, which he recognized on the exhibit at trial, and transported it back to the police department, where it was secured with red tape and locked in an evidence locker before transport to the crime lab. Thereafter, ‘ somebody from the Sylvania Police Department’ transported the evidence to the crime lab, where it was taken into possession by Patrick Long, a forensic chemist at the crime lab, and stored in a vault prior to testing. Both Taylor and Long recognized their handwriting on the exhibit at trial, and the integrity of the seals was not questioned.” Accord, Brady v. State , 292 Ga.App. 716, 665 S.E.2d 412 (July 11, 2008); Barr v. State , 302 Ga.App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (January 20, 2010). Paschal v. State, 280 Ga. 430, 628 S.E.2d 586 (March 27, 2006). “‘When blood samples are handled in a routine manner and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is admissible and the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample. [Cit.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382(13) (519 S.E.2d 221) (1999). Subsequent to analyst Pickens’ testimony, the State produced the investigating officers, the crime scene technician, and the Augusta serologist who each testified as to the chain of custody. ‘The order in which evidence is allowed to be introduced must rest, to a considerable extent, in the sound discretion of the [trial] judge.’ Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 140- 141(1) (51 SE 322) (1905). And it is not necessarily an abuse of discretion to allow the introduction of evidence of chain of custody in reverse order. Sprinkles v. State, 227 Ga.App. 112(2) (488 S.E.2d 492) (1997); McKinney v. State, 218 Ga.App. 633(4) (463 S.E.2d 136) (1995).” Warner v. State, 277 Ga.App. 421, 626 S.E.2d 620 (January 30, 2006). Rape conviction reversed; “the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the results of a blood test without the proper foundation being laid.” “[T]here was no testimony at all about the handling of the November 4 sample from the time it was taken to the time it was tested. [fn] And the technician did not testify about how the sample was labeled or packaged or how he received it. Because there is no