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evidence that the sample was routinely handled, the State did not establish a reasonable assurance of its identity, and testimony as to the results of the November 4, 2003 blood test was therefore inadmissible. [Cit.]” Heller v. State, 275 Ga.App. 637, 621 S.E.2d 591 (September 28, 2005). “Absent affirmative evidence of tampering, ‘mere speculative doubt as to the handling of evidence while in the possession of the Georgia Crime Lab is a matter for consideration by the jury. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (519 S.E.2d 221) (1999).” See also Maldonado (July 23, 2004), below. Accord, Cook v. State , 287 Ga.App. 81, 650 S.E.2d 757 (August 1, 2007); Ray v. State , 292 Ga.App. 575, 665 S.E.2d 345 (June 12, 2008) (not necessary to present testimony of person who transferred evidence from one Crime Lab office to another); Eaton v. State , 294 Ga.App. 124, 668 S.E.2d 770 (October 20, 2008). Arnold v. State, 274 Ga.App. 187, 617 S.E.2d 169 (July 7, 2005), reversed on other grounds, 280 Ga. 487, 629 S.E.2d 807 (May 8, 2006). Not error to admit lab test reports despite “two-day discrepancy between the date upon which the evidence custodian testified he hand delivered the bagged substance to the GBI crime lab and the date upon which the chemist testified the lab received it. Yet, we find the State adequately met its burden ‘to show with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has been no tampering or substitution.’ (Citation omitted.) Shivers v. State, 188 Ga.App. 744(1) (374 S.E.2d 233) (1988). By the identifying marks on the packaging, it was established through testimony from several witnesses that the substance which tested positive for cocaine and which was introduced at trial was the substance purchased from Arnold, double bagged by the Narcotics Division investigator, placed in the evidence locker, retrieved and transported to the GBI crime lab, and subjected to testing by that lab. Accordingly, while a small discrepancy between specific dates may exist, the identity of the evidence itself was preserved. Id. ‘When there is only a bare speculation of tampering or substitution, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 247 Ga. 397, 399(2) (276 S.E.2d 603) (1981).” Wilson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 359, 609 S.E.2d 703 (January 21, 2005). “ The state failed to establish an adequate chain of custody to authorize admission in evidence of its Exhibit One [the bags of cocaine]. Although Cribbs testified that he collected the substances in state’s Exhibit One, bagged them, and turned them over to Buckelew, he did not testify that he had made any identifying markings or writings on the bag or bags or that he had sealed them. [Cit.] Buckelew testified that he placed the substances in a lock box at police headquarters, to which the department’s evidence technician had access. But, like Cribbs, Buckelew did not testify to any identifying markings on the bag or bags or that they were sealed; and he did not testify that ‘only’ he or the evidence technician had access to the lock box. [Cit.] [Crime lab expert] testified that the substances in state’s Exhibit One were turned over to her for analysis and that the bags were sealed. But no showing was made how the bags were transported from the local police department or received by the crime lab. Mathis v. State, 204 Ga.App. 244 (418 S.E.2d 800) (1992), relied on by the state, holds that ‘[t]he fact that one of the persons in control of a fungible substance does not testify at trial does not, without more, make the substance or testimony relating to it inadmissible.’ Id. at 244(1). Here, more than one of the persons in control of the substance failed to testify. In Mathis, the defendant presented no evidence of tampering or substitution. Here, Wilson argues that there is such evidence because the investigating police officers testified that the powdery substances were seized from the motel room, whereas the crime lab chemist testified that the substance she tested was a solid material.” Distinguished, Stringer v. State , 285 Ga.App. 599, 647 S.E.2d 310 (May 30, 2007) (disparity in description of substances as either “crystal” or “solid material” was not mutually exclusive). Maldonado v. State, 268 Ga.App. 691, 603 S.E.2d 58 (July 23, 2004). Federal drug agent sealed suspected cocaine in distinctive containers and mailed it to DEA lab in Miami. Lab technician from DEA lab in Washington testified he tested the substance and confirmed it was cocaine. Held, the absence of testimony explaining how the substance got to Washington, when mailed to Miami, did not disturb the chain of custody. 1. “[T]he Miami office and the Washington, D.C. office are simply branches of the federal DEA crime lab; they are not separate laboratories owned by different entities. Absent affirmative evidence of tampering, a crime lab and all its branch offices and employees are considered as a single link in the chain of custody . Givens v. State, 214 Ga.App. 774, 775(2) (449 S.E.2d 149) (1994) (‘[s]ince there is no affirmative evidence of tampering, the trial court did not err in treating the Georgia Crime Lab as a single “link” in the chain of custody for admissibility purposes’). See Whitfield v. State, 217 Ga.App. 402, 404(2) (457 S.E.2d 682) (1995) (test-results testimony from chemist in Savannah branch of State Crime Lab admissible even though some evidence showed specimen was originally received in the Augusta branch).” Accord, Heller (September 28, 2005), above; Postell v. State , 279 Ga.App. 275, 630 S.E.2d 867 (May 9, 2006) (“[T]he State was not required to present testimony from the GBI crime lab employee who physically retrieved the plastic bag from the mail and placed it in the crime lab’s lockbox.”); Kelly v. State , 281 Ga.App. 432, 636 S.E.2d 143 (September 1, 2006); Stringer v. State , 285 Ga.App. 599, 647 S.E.2d 310 (May 30, 2007); Ray v. State , 292 Ga.App. 575, 665 S.E.2d 345 (June 12, 2008) (not