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necessary to present testimony of person who transferred evidence from one Crime Lab office to another); Simmons v. State , 299 Ga.App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (July 13, 2009) (State Crime Lab treated as one link in chain of custody absent evidence of tampering). 2. “Second, even if a link in the chain of custody were missing, such would not alone require the exclusion of the test results. … The State need only show with reasonable certainty that the substance tested is the same as that seized, with no tampering or substitution. [Cit.]” Accord, Hayes v. State , 276 Ga.App. 268, 623 S.E.2d 144 (November 7, 2005); Postell v. State , 279 Ga.App. 275, 630 S.E.2d 867 (May 9, 2006) (“The cocaine was not rendered inadmissible merely because the State declined to call the police department’s evidence custodian to testify about mailing the cocaine to the GBI crime lab.”); Copeland v. State , 281 Ga.App. 11, 635 S.E.2d 283 (August 7, 2006); Buckholts v. State , 283 Ga.App. 254, 641 S.E.2d 246 (January 11, 2007); Stringer v. State , 285 Ga.App. 599, 647 S.E.2d 310 (May 30, 2007); Thomas v. State , 288 Ga.App. 602, 654 S.E.2d 682 (November 28, 2007); Barr v. State , 302 Ga.App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (January 20, 2010). 3. “Third, where the testimony shows that the police placed the substance in a tamper-proof identifiable container and that the crime lab technician who tests the substance received it in the same container with no proof of tampering or substitution, the State has met its burden of showing with reasonable certainty that the substance tested was the same as that seized.” Accord, Franklin v. State , 281 Ga.App. 409, 636 S.E.2d 114 (August 31, 2006); Buckholts v. State , 283 Ga.App. 254, 641 S.E.2d 246 (January 11, 2007); Barr v. State , 302 Ga.App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (January 20, 2010); Neal v. State , 308 Ga.App. 551, 707 S.E.2d 503 (February 22, 2011). Shoemake v. State, 266 Ga.App. 342, 596 S.E.2d 805 (March 18, 2004). “Discrepancies in the testimony about whether the sample was sent to the GBI crime lab by mail or UPS go to the weight of the evidence and do not preclude admission of testimony about the blood sample.” McKinney v. State, 261 Ga.App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463 (April 17, 2003). Chain of custody of blood sample was properly established without evidence from person who actually drew the blood. “‘[W]hen blood samples are handled in a routine manner and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is admissible and “the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.”’ J ohnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (519 S.E.2d 221) (1999).” Harrell v. State, 257 Ga.App. 177, 570 S.E.2d 607 (August 23, 2002). Evidence of state crime lab analysis of defendant’s urine sample was admissible despite lack of evidence of transportation of sample or preservation in sealed police refrigerator. Misspelling of defendant’s name on outside of container does not require exclusion. “[W]hen a urine sample is routinely handled and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the urine tested was other than that taken from the defendant, the evidence of tests on such urine is admissible.” “The State need not negative every possibility of tampering, and need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the evidence. When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.” Accord, Simmons v. State , 299 Ga.App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (July 13, 2009); Belcher v. State , 302 Ga.App. 36, 690 S.E.2d 431 (January 13, 2010). Sanders v. State , 243 Ga.App. 216, 534 S.E.2d 78 (March 28, 2000). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; chain of custody for drug was properly shown although “the cocaine was left in the agent's car trunk for several days after the sale [and] a month passed between the time the cocaine was sold and the date it was delivered to the state crime lab.” “The state traced the travels of the cocaine from Sanders' hands to the state crime lab. At every point, the cocaine was clearly marked and well secured. Although we do not encourage officers to routinely leave evidence in a police car for days after the crime, there is no evidence in this case that the substance admitted at trial was tampered with in any way. The state has given reasonable assurance of the identity of the evidence. See Redding v. State, 239 Ga.App. 718, 722(5), 521 S.E.2d 840 (1999).” Mullins v. State, 241 Ga.App. 553, 525 S.E.2d 770 (November 19, 1999). In defendants’ prosecution for possession of amphetamines with intent to distribute, no error in admitting testimony of crime lab chemist as to testing of drug samples though sample admittedly had been opened by another chemist. Testing was first performed by one chemist who then left the employ of the crime lab. Testing was then done again by another chemist, who testified at trial. Weight and condition (i.e., container stapled shut rather than sealed) of sample as testified to by chemist were therefore different from weight and condition of sample as delivered to crime lab; first chemist unavailable to testify to complete the chain of custody. Court of Appeals rules that “when the State wishes to introduce evidence of a fungible nature, its burden is simply to show that the evidence is the same as that seized and that it has not been tampered with or substituted. Scott v. State , 227 Ga.App. 900, 901, 490 S.E.2d 208 (1997). The State need not rule out every possibility of tampering, but the circumstances must establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the substance. [Cit.] Staples v. State , 209