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Ga.App. 802, 805(5) (434 S.E.2d 757) (1993). The State’s burden was discharged in this case. The State need not establish a ‘perfect’ chain of custody for evidence within the crime lab itself.” The Court pointed out that the chemist received the sample from her superiors, and had no concern that the sample might have been mixed up, tampered with, or contaminated; and the Defendants presented no evidence of tampering. Accord, Dempsey v. State , 265 Ga.App. 175, 593 S.E.2d 362 (January 15, 2004) (“[T]he [s]tate is not required to show that the substance was guarded each minute it is in one’s custody.”). McNair v. State, 240 Ga.App. 324, 523 S.E.2d 392 (October 8, 1999). Chain of custody of drug sample was properly established although investigator testified that package he placed in evidence locker weighed 22.7 grams, while sample removed from bag by state crime lab technician weighed 15.3 grams. “A discrepancy between the arresting officer and the crime lab chemist regarding the amount of cocaine in a exhibit does not go to the admissibility but the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury to decide. Allison v. State, 217 Ga.App. 580, 582(3), 459 S.E.2d 557 (1995); see Dean v. State, 211 Ga.App. 28, 31(3), 438 S.E.2d 380 (1993) and cits. therein.” Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed; testimony of crime lab technician who tested blood sample was properly admitted despite lack of testimony from technician who collected sample. “‘[W]hen blood samples are handled in a routine manner and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is admissible and “the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.” [Cit.]’ Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. 820(3), 388 S.E.2d 519 (1990). See also Givens v. State, 214 Ga.App. 774(2), 449 S.E.2d 149 (1994) (lack of testimony by Crime Lab employee who originally received exhibits does not break the chain of custody). Absent affirmative evidence of tampering, ‘mere speculative doubt as to the handling of evidence while in the possession of the Georgia Crime Lab is a matter for consideration by the jury. [Cit.]’ Id. at 775, 449 S.E.2d 149.” Accord, Hurst v. State , 285 Ga. 294, 676 S.E.2d 165 (April 28, 2009) (evidence properly admitted despite “the initial failure to label the individual vials” with defendant’s name); Cunningham v. State, 243 Ga.App. 770, 533 S.E.2d 735 (April 11, 2000) (“The fact that one of the persons in control of a fungible substance does not testify at trial does not, without more, make the substance or testimony relating to it inadmissible.”); Hall v. State , 245 Ga.App. 529, 538 S.E.2d 166 (August 10, 2000); Herrera v. State , 288 Ga. 231, 702 S.E.2d 854 (November 1, 2010) (crime lab director’s testimony that “no discrepancies in the chain of custody were noted by the crime lab employees … demonstrated with reasonable certainty that the substance teseted was the same as that obtained.”); Collins v. State , 290 Ga. 505, 722 S.E.2d 719 (February 6, 2012); Ashley v. State , 316 Ga.App. 28, 728 S.E.2d 706 (May 18, 2012); Walker v. State , 294 Ga. 851, 757 S.E.2d 64 (March 28, 2014). 3. LAB SAMPLES, DESTRUCTION Dixon v. State, 275 Ga. 232, 564 S.E.2d 198 (May 28, 2002). During the five years between the murder and the trial, “several items of physical evidence, including the murder weapon, were disposed of in the normal course of business. [Defendant] contends that this destruction of the evidence was a violation of his due process rights. However, the failure to preserve evidence does not constitute a constitutional violation, unless it is shown that the missing evidence was potentially useful to the defense and was destroyed in bad faith on the part of the police. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). [Defendant] did not show that the evidence had any exculpatory value or that, if it did, the custodians acted in bad faith by disposing of it. Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 787(6), 523 S.E.2d 294 (1999).” Accord, Shoemake v. State , 266 Ga.App. 342, 596 S.E.2d 805 (March 18, 2004) (no showing of bad faith in destruction of blood sample at State Crime Lab “‘as part of a normal purging process’ more than a year after it had been taken from Shoemake”). 4. LAB SAMPLES, DISCREPANCY Perry v. State, 283 Ga.App. 520, 642 S.E.2d 141 (February 8, 2007). “[T]he fact that portions of the suspected methamphetamine had not been tested went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Dorsey v. State, 187 Ga.App. 725, 729(5) (371 S.E.2d 207) (1988).” Accord, Ogburn v. State , 296 Ga.App. 254, 674 S.E.2d 101 (February 20, 2009). Thompson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 253, 581 S.E.2d 596 (March 13, 2003). Fact that substance looked different as a result of testing and processing did not render it inadmissible. “‘Where the State seeks to introduce evidence of a fungible nature, it need only show with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has been no tampering or substitution.’”