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punctuation omitted.) Id. Accord Toney v. State, 304 Ga.App. 25, 27(1) (695 S.E.2d 355) (2010). In the case at bar, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence concerning crimes preceding and connected to those of which Greenwood stands convicted. Id. Accord Cantrell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 693, 696(2)(b) (498 S.E.2d 90) (1998).” Chandler v. State, 311 Ga.App. 86, 714 S.E.2d 597 (June 14, 2011). Felony forgery conviction affirmed; 1. trial court properly admitted evidence of prior similar transaction “as part of the res gestae.” In both instances, defendant went with others to Wal-Mart, where defendant provided another person with checks to cash; the similar transaction was “about a week” prior to the crime on trial. “These events constitute ‘acts and circumstances forming a part or continuation of the main transaction [and] are admissible as res gestae.’ Toney v. State, 304 Ga.App. 25, 27(1) (695 S.E.2d 355) (2010). In Brewer [ v. State, 224 Ga.App. 656, 659(7) (481 S.E.2d 608) (1997)] , statements made as part of the planning phase of a drug deal were held to be admissible as res gestae, even though they were made a week before. Similarly, in the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting [witness/accomplice] Kipp's statements as res gestae evidence because they showed the planning process for the forgeries in question.” 2. Prior act was admissible despite no showing that other check cashed was forged. “‘The [s]tate need not prove that the conduct resulted in a conviction or criminal charge; although a prosecution may fall short of proving a criminal offense, evidence as to certain conduct may nevertheless be admissible in a trial of another offense if ... the defendant was the perpetrator of the conduct and the conduct or transaction is similar to or has a logical connection to the offense being tried.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 222 Ga.App. 52, 54(2)(a) (473 S.E.2d 232) (1996).” Branton v. State, 292 Ga.App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (June 19, 2008). No similar transaction notice required where offense was part of the res gestae of the offenses charged. Here, defendant was employed servicing ATMs; evidence showed a pattern of taking money from ATMs during a single week using defendant’s computerized key. A shortage of $6,000 in one machine was questioned, and defendant replaced the money. Company officials then audited defendant’s access to other machines, disclosing other, larger shortages – the subject of the charges against defendant. Held, the $6,000 shortage was not charged, but was properly admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. Gant v. State, 291 Ga.App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (June 5, 2008). Convictions for aggravated assault and firearms possession charges affirmed; evidence of drug transaction which led to the assault was not a similar transaction. “[T]he complained-of testimony was part of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the charged offense. As such, it was admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime, and was not subject to the notice and hearing provisions of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3. See Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga.App. 523, 527-528(3) (615 S.E.2d 592) (2005); Thomas [ v. State, 253 Ga.App. 58, 61(2), 557 S.E.2d 483 (2001)].” Fortson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 304, 529 S.E.2d 429 (February 9, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of another offense without similar transaction notice to impeach defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified that he only committed the burglary, and forged a check taken from the victim, because his co-defendant forced him to do those things at gunpoint. “Over objection, the State was allowed to impeach Fortson by showing that about six days after the robbery, without coercion, he forged an endorsement on another check taken from [victim]. … We find no error. The procedural requirements of USCR 31.1 and 31.3 do not apply either to impeachment evidence or to evidence of similar transactions or occurrences which are immediately related in time and place to the charge being tried so as to be part of a single, continuous transaction. USCR 31.3(E). Evidence that Fortson had forged the check at issue without coercion was admissible to impeach his testimony that he had committed the earlier forgery only because he was coerced into doing so. A witness may be impeached by proving that statements made by him in his testimony are not the truth. Middle Ga. &c. R. Co. v. Barnett, 104 Ga. 582, 584(1), 30 S.E. 771 (1898). Moreover, Fortson's forgery of a check taken in the robbery several days after its occurrence was sufficiently connected in time and event to the robbery so that both offenses were part of a single transaction. See Baird v. State, 207 Ga.App. 44, 45(2), 427 S.E.2d 37 (1993); Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 208(5), 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992).” Sprayberry v. State, 241 Ga.App. 501, 527 S.E.2d 224 (December 15, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted cab driver’s testimony that she had, on prior occasions, “picked [defendant] up and delivered him to the same location where the victim was robbed.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, “the testimony simply explained the officer's conduct and established that Sprayberry had previously hired taxicabs which had picked him up and delivered him to the location where the victim was attacked. Such testimony did not put his character into evidence and was not similar transaction evidence requiring notice pursuant to USCR 31.3.”