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6. EVIDENCE – CONFESSION Dean v. State, 292 Ga.App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (July 11, 2008). Defendant’s uncorroborated confession to a separate offense, for which he was neither tried nor indicted, was admissible as a similar transaction. “The inquiry must be whether the similar transaction evidence was sufficiently similar to the current crime and of substantial relevance to the issues being tried. Dean's confession related to the first robbery satisfied this inquiry in the affirmative. That his confession was uncorroborated would be relevant in affirming a conviction for that crime, which would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, see OCGA § 24-3-53, but that is not the case here.” 7. EVIDENCE – COPY OF PRIOR CONVICTION/PLEA Harper v. State, 330 Ga.App. 561, 768 S.E.2d 755 (January 28, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred by admitting evidence of defendant’s first offender pleas to prior robbery charges as similar transaction evidence. Harmless, however, because the incident itself was still properly admissible. “‘[A] prior bad act need not result in a criminal conviction in order to be used as a similar transaction,’ because the critical element is the similarity of the facts rather than the adjudication of any charges brought as a result of the prior act. Id. at 278(2), 496 S.E.2d 699. See Tilly v. State, 197 Ga.App. 97, 99(2), 397 S.E.2d 506 (1990) (first offender disposition and discharge of the earlier accusation did not preclude admitting evidence of underlying conduct as a similar transaction).” Bell v. State, 287 Ga. 670, 697 S.E.2d 793 (July 12, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted certified copy of prior jury verdict in another murder case as similar transaction evidence. “While the trial court could have admitted the certified copy of that conviction, it decided to permit the introduction of only the verdict form so that the jury in this case would not learn of the sentences imposed on Bell in the Brown case. Under these circumstances, we treat the certified copy of the verdict form like a certified conviction.” Higgins v. State, 304 Ga.App. 771, 698 S.E.2d 335 (July 5, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy reversed based on ineffective assistance. “The record shows that trial counsel failed to object to the State's admission of the unredacted juvenile disposition order that the State used to prove a similar transaction despite having raised the need for redaction of the sentence in a pre-trial hearing and having obtained an agreement from the State to do so. … Counsel's failure to object specifically to admission of the sentencing portions of the juvenile court disposition order at trial constituted deficient performance. See Miller v. State, 250 Ga.App. 84, 85-86(2) (550 S.E.2d 134) (2001) (sentence from similar transaction should not be admitted); Weaver v. State, 206 Ga.App. 560, 561(3) (426 S.E.2d 41) (1992) (error to admit sentence in similar transaction).” Accord, Brinson v. State , 289 Ga. 150, 709 S.E.2d 789 (April 26, 2011) (error to admit sentence from similar transaction, but harmess in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt); Matthews v. State , 294 Ga. 50, 751 S.E.2d 78 (November 4, 2013) (issue waived by failure to object, but in any event harmless error to admit sentence because “it is highly unlikely that the admission of the sentence contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict.”); Long v. State , 324 Ga.App. 882, 752 S.E.2d 54 (November 20, 2013) (admission of sentence harmless error, citing Matthews ). Daniel v. State, 292 Ga.App. 560, 665 S.E.2d 696 (June 17, 2008). Defendant waived any objection to sentencing records and parole records submitted with similar transaction evidence by failing to object thereto. “[W]e do not agree, as suggested by Daniel, that the admission of the parole board documents from the prior convictions was tantamount to arguing in the presence of the jury that Daniel could be eligible for pardon, parole, or clemency in this case. See OCGA § 17-8-76(a); Nickerson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 829, 835(2)(e) (545 S.E.2d 587) (2001) (finding that prosecutor did not violate OCGA § 17-8-76 since he did not actually argue to the jury that if the defendant was convicted, he might not suffer the full penalty imposed by the court).” Washington v. State, 286 Ga.App. 268, 648 S.E.2d 761 (July 3, 2007). Certified copy of prior conviction was sufficient to show similarity of sexual offenses. “The only testimony about the earlier crime came from the investigating officer, who identified Washington as the defendant, but did not provide any details of the crime.” Distinguishing Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 652(2)(d) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 469(6) (405 S.E.2d 483) (1991), both involving drug offenses. “In cases decided after Williams and Stephens, this Court has held that, because of the liberal admission of similar transaction evidence in cases involving sexual offenses, especially those against children or teenagers, ‘a certified copy of a prior conviction for a sex crime against a child may, with no other evidence, sufficiently prove that the prior crime is similar to the current crime.’ Lee v. State, 241 Ga.App. 182, 183(2) (525 S.E.2d 426) (1999) (certified copy of conviction for raping a 15 year old girl adequately proved similarity of that rape to the rape