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State, 229 Ga.App. 772, 774(2)(a), 495 S.E.2d 109 (1997); Eiland v. State, 213 Ga.App. 838, 839(1), 445 S.E.2d 765 (1994); Adams v. State, 208 Ga.App. 29, 33, 430 S.E.2d 35 (1993) (physical precedent).” 2. “Lee's additional claim that a military court-martial judgment of guilt does not amount to a criminal conviction, and thus is not provable merely by certified documents, is also without merit. A court-martial is a lawful military court convened for the trying and punishing of armed forces members who commit criminal offenses. 57 CJS, Military Justice, §§ 2, 138; 6 CJS, Armed Svcs., § 166. ‘There is a “conviction” in a court-martial case when a sentence has been adjudged.’ (Citation omitted.) 57 CJS, Military Justice, § 402. And in at least one case the Supreme Court of Georgia has implicitly determined that a court-martial finding of guilt is a conviction …’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hance v. Kemp, 258 Ga. 649, 653, n. 4, 373 S.E.2d 184 (1988).” Dixon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 644, 524 S.E.2d 734 (November 2, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for burglary and eluding an officer affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s Alford pleas to prior burglary offenses as similar transactions. “[B]ecause an Alford plea requires a court determination that there is a factual basis for the plea, and because in Georgia an Alford plea is not a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea may be used as evidence of a similar act.” State presented other evidence that defendant committed the previous burglary. Sheffield v. State, 237 Ga.App. 701, 516 S.E.2d 563 (April 21, 1999). Prior conviction not properly proven merely by certified copy of conviction. Accord, Naillon v. State , 276 Ga.App. 799, 625 S.E.2d 73 (December 12, 2005). 8. EVIDENCE – GENERALLY Wilson v. State, A15A1848, 336 Ga.App. 60, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 822832 (March 3, 2016). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted other acts evidence to prove defendant’s intent. “Georgia employs a three-prong test to determine the admissibility of evidence of other acts under Rule 404(b): ‘(1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2) the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice; (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act.’ Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656(3), 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015) (citation and footnote omitted).” Williams v. State, 297 Ga. 460, 773 S.E.2d 213 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; jury instruction on “other acts” evidence wasn’t plain error. State presented evidence of two prior incidents where defendant fled from police, to show his intent in doing so this time. “Although he contends that his admission that he fled from police removed any question of those crimes from the jury's consideration, and hence, obviated the need for the State to present any evidence regarding his intent as to those crimes, his ‘plea[s] of not guilty contested every allegation of the criminal charges against him that was necessary to establish guilt.’ Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 773(1) (504 S.E.2d 679) (1998) (Disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 903(2) (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000).” Wise v. State, 321 Ga.App. 39, 740 S.E.2d 850 (March 28, 2013). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly admitted crime lab evidence regarding prior drug conviction without proving chain of custody. “ Here, … the cocaine was not admitted into evidence; instead, the trial allowed the chemist to testify that she had indeed tested a substance related to a pending similar transaction that she determined to be cocaine. The State presented this evidence merely to establish the basis for the charge in the pending similar transaction, rather than Wise's guilt or innocence in the present case. In this circumstance, there was no requirement that the chain of custody account ‘for the safekeeping and transportation of the evidence from seizure to trial.’ Phillips v. Williams, 276 Ga. 691, 692, 583 S.E.2d 4 (2003). Moreover, ‘in a drug possession case, the concept of corpus delicti requires that there be proof by the state that the accused possessed the illegal drug; there is, however, no invariable requirement that the drug itself be produced.’ Chaney v. State, 265 Ga. 415, 421, 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986). Thus, as the testimony was offered as proof of the possession charge in the 2004 case, rather than proof of the cocaine that Wise possessed in the present case, the trial court did not err in allowing the chemist to testify about the substance she tested.” Howard v. State, 318 Ga.App. 329, 733 S.E.2d 859 (November 2, 2012). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove similar transactions although victims didn’t testify. State here offered testimony of investigating officers plus certified copies of convictions. “[O]ur Supreme Court has found essentially the same type of evidence that was presented here to be sufficient to establish a similar transaction. Rose v. State, 275 Ga. 214, 216(2) (563 S.E.2d 865) (2002) (prior crime sufficiently established by testimony of responding officer and certified copy of conviction). And although Howard also argues that the police officers' testimony was