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inadmissible hearsay and thus without probative value, the transcript shows that the officers confined their testimony to their observations of the victims' injuries and statements Howard made to them following the crimes; indeed the trial court specifically cautioned at one point that the prosecuting attorney needed to make clear to the witness to confine her testimony to what Howard said to her. [fn] Compare Terry v. State, 262 Ga.App. 654 (586 S.E.2d 357) (2003) (deputy sheriff's testimony about facts told to him by other officers was inadmissible hearsay).” Cobb v. State, 300 Ga.App. 565, 685 S.E.2d 458 (October 21, 2009). In defendant’s prosecution for “numerous sexual offenses against his minor daughters,” trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence of prior sexual offenses against another daughter and niece. Defendant’s convictions on the prior offenses had been reversed on appeal based on improper evidence admitted at trial. “There was no determination that the evidence was insufficient as to any count.” Defendant contends that on remand he was acquitted based on a speedy trial violation. Held, a speedy trial acquittal does not prevent use of the underlying transaction as a similar transaction. “‘Although some jurisdictions have adopted a per se rule prohibiting any evidentiary use of independent offenses where an acquittal was obtained, this [C]ourt has not. Instead, the application of collateral estoppel requires an examination of what facts were in issue and necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial.’ Salcedo v. State, 258 Ga. 870 (376 S.E.2d 360) (1989) (citations and punctuation omitted). Given the circumstances under which Cobb's first case was terminated, it cannot be concluded that the facts in issue were necessarily resolved in Cobb's favor.” Standfill v. State, 267 Ga.App. 612, 600 S.E.2d 695 (May 27, 2004). “‘There can be a substantial variation of circumstances where there exists a logical connection between crimes which are essentially dissimilar.’ [Cit.] Circumstantial proof may be used to prove the connection, which does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Where similar transaction evidence is used to show “course of conduct, modus operandi, intent, bent of mind, scheme, plan, and motive for being in the store, … a lesser degree of similarity is required than when the similar transaction evidence is offered to prove identity. [Cit.]” Accord , Quezada v. State , 236 Ga.App. 718, 512 S.E.2d 401 (February 19, 1999); Collum v. State , 281 Ga. 719, 642 S.E.2d 640 (March 19, 2007); Price v. State , 303 Ga.App. 867, 694 S.E.2d 712 (April 7, 2010); Hunt v. State , 288 Ga. 794, 708 S.E.2d 357 (March 18, 2011); Ricks v. State , 327 Ga.App. 291, 758 S.E.2d 624 (May 7, 2014). Lowenthal v. State, 265 Ga.App. 266, 593 S.E.2d 726 (January 23, 2004). Similar transaction evidence was admissible notwithstanding defendant’s offer to stipulate to prior offense. Distinguishes“Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574) (1997) (when proof of convict status is at issue, ‘a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns [the defendant’s offer to concede the fact of the prior conviction] and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction’). Here, Lowenthal’s prior conviction was not an element of the pending DUI charge; rather, the prior incident – as distinguished from the prior conviction – was used to show bent of mind. Further, contrary to Lowenthal’s argument, the fact that he had committed a prior similar transaction is not a ‘legal status’ analogous to ‘convicted felon’ status.” Smith v. State, 265 Ga.App. 57, 592 S.E.2d 871 (January 7, 2004). “‘It is well settled that there need not be a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible,’” quoting Brown v. State , 201 Ga.App. 473, 474, 411 S.E.2d 360 (1991). Accord, Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004) ( prior offense admissible as similar transaction despite no bill by grand jury – but not if defendant acquitted at trial); Rogers v. State , 285 Ga.App. 568, 646 S.E.2d 751 (May 25, 2007); Breland v. State , 287 Ga.App. 83, 651 S.E.2d 439 (August 1, 2007); Dyer v. State , 298 Ga.App. 327, 680 S.E.2d 177 (June 12, 2009); Hill v. State , 298 Ga.App. 677, 680 S.E.2d 702 (July 2, 2009); Hunt v. State , 288 Ga. 794, 708 S.E.2d 357 (March 18, 2011); Ricks v. State , 327 Ga.App. 291, 758 S.E.2d 624 (May 7, 2014). Ferguson v. State, 262 Ga.App. 28, 584 S.E.2d 618 (June 3, 2003). “‘A defendant does not have to be positively identified as the perpetrator of a similar transaction. Rather, circumstantial proof may be used to establish his connection to it. And, that connection does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. State, 255 Ga.App. 599, 565 S.E.2d 917 (May 31, 2002). Defendant argues that it is inherently prejudicial to present similar transaction evidence to the jury prior to presenting evidence of the offense at trial. While acknowledging the possibility, the Court of Appeals declines to establish such a “bright line rule.” Accord, Hamilton v. State , 274 Ga. 582, 584-585, 555 S.E.2d 701 (2001).