☢ test - Í

Adame v. State, 244 Ga.App. 257, 534 S.E.2d 817 (May 18, 2000). Victim’s prior accusation for simple battery, which was nolle prossed, was not admissible to impeach his testimony that he never hit a woman; statements of victim’s ex-wife from their divorce pleadings were not admissible since such statements are not treated as evidence in a criminal case unless they are authorized by party against whom they are admitted. The court properly refused to conduct a similar transactions hearing. Griffin v. State, 241 Ga.App. 783, 527 S.E.2d 577 (December 30, 1999). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered evidence to show why he armed himself, to explain one of the similar transactions offered by the State. Defendant’s witness “allegedly would provide evidence that Griffin's act of arming himself when dealing with [similar transaction victim’s] dogs was reasonable because the dogs were vicious and placed Griffin in fear. … When called to the stand, however, [witness] Crable testified about his own perceptions of the dogs' viciousness and his own fear of the dogs. He could not provide any testimony about Griffin's fear of the dogs so as to bear upon the reasonableness of Griffin's actions. The trial court found that Crable's perception of the dogs was irrelevant and ruled out that testimony. Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, a trial court's refusal to admit evidence on grounds of lack of relevance will not be disturbed on appeal. Bevil v. State, 220 Ga.App. 1, 2(4), 467 S.E.2d 586 (1996). We find no abuse of discretion here.” 9. EVIDENCE – HEARSAY Jones v. State, 329 Ga.App. 478, 765 S.E.2d 657 (November 5, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; detective’s testimony regarding similar transactions was either properly admitted, or harmless error. 1. Testimony gathered on answering the call wasn’t hearsay. “‘The record shows that the detective who testified regarding the prior burglar[y] was the lead investigative officer thereof. At the time of ... [the] burglary, the detective answered the call, interviewed the [witnesses], and viewed the crime scene. The detective's testimony was factual in nature and was based upon his own investigations. Since the investigator actually investigated and had personal knowledge of the burglar[y], his testimony as to [that] offense[ ] was not hearsay.’ Castellon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 85, 86(1) (522 S.E.2d 568) (1999). See Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 709–710(1) (699 S.E.2d 742) (2010) (‘We have frequently held that an investigating officer's testimony concerning his personal knowledge of the crimes investigated by him is not hearsay.’) (citations omitted); Terry v. State, 262 Ga.App. 654, 655–656 (586 S.E.2d 357) (2003) (What an investigating officer saw during her investigation of the prior offense and what the defendant told her during that investigation is not hearsay and is admissible at trial.); compare Bowdry v. State, 211 Ga.App. 626 (440 S.E.2d 59) (1994) (law enforcement officer's testimony at trial concerning the similarity of a prior offense is inadmissible hearsay when the officer does not have personal knowledge of the facts of the prior offense.) Moreover, statements made within minutes of a crime and to an officer responding to a call for help are admissible under the res gestae exception to hearsay. 2. Information the detective gathered later, including statements by Jones’s co-defendant and girlfriend and another witness, were improper hearsay, but cumulative and therefore harmless. Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 699 S.E.2d 742 (June 30, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; similar transaction evidence was properly admitted. “We have frequently held that an investigating officer's testimony concerning his personal knowledge of the crimes investigated by him is not hearsay. See Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 70(3)(a) fn. 6 (635 S.E.2d 125) (2006) (investigating officer's testimony as to his observations and what the defendant told her during that investigation is not inadmissible hearsay); Terry v. State, 262 Ga.App. 654, 655 (586 S.E.2d 357) (2003). Contrary to Smith's contention, the victim's identification of Smith as one of the robbers was based on Officer Christian's personal knowledge. Inman, supra, 281 Ga. at 70(3).” Accord, Jones (November 5, 2014), above. Cannon v. State, 296 Ga.App. 687, 675 S.E.2d 560 (March 17, 2009). Admission of officer’s hearsay testimony about prior molestation was error, but harmless because cumulative of victim’s own testimony. Here, “[t]he officer testified that Cannon had a previous arrest for child molestation in 1991, and that the facts were ‘very, very similar to what [the victim in this case] had told us.’” Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 635 S.E.2d 125 (September 18, 2006). “A law enforcement officer’s testimony at trial [fn] concerning the similarity of a prior offense is inadmissible hearsay when the officer does not have personal knowledge of the facts of the prior offense. Bowdry v. State, 211 Ga.App. 626 (440 S.E.2d 59) (1994). [fn] However, hearsay is admissible in the presentation of similar transaction evidence when it falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Brite v. State, 278 Ga. 893(3) (608 S.E.2d 204) (2005) (eyewitness’s statement to police regarding a similar transaction admissible under necessity exception). Likewise, similar transaction hearsay which does not fall within a recognized exception has been ruled inadmissible on appeal. Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31(1) (549 S.E.2d 107)