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(2001) (narrative portion of police report of similar transaction did not qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay rule); Cartwright v. State, 242 Ga.App. 825(1b) (531 S.E.2d 399) (2000) (error to admit officer’s testimony recounting statement of victim of similar transaction where requirements of the exception for statements within the res gestae were not met).” Here, eyewitness’s statement to officer within minutes of similar transaction was admissible as part of the res gestae. Note no Crawford objection raised at trial, hence not considered here. Accord, Kimbrough v. State , 281 Ga. 885, 644 S.E.2d 125 (April 24, 2007) (also no Crawford objection); Smith (June 30, 2010), above. Murphy v. State, 272 Ga.App. 287, 612 S.E.2d 104 (March 18, 2005). State presented as similar transactions witness a sheriff’s investigator who oversaw prior drug investigation which led to defendant’s guilty plea. The investigator oversaw actions of cooperating witness who conducted controlled buy from defendant, but investigator himself did not personally observe any action of defendant. Held, admission of this testimony was not error because “Murphy’s identity as the perpetrator of the prior drug offense was shown by his guilty plea. Colbert v. State, 275 Ga. 525, 526 (570 S.E.2d 321) (2002). And the state established that the two crimes were sufficiently connected as both involved undercover purchases of methamphetamine. [Cit.]” Booth v. State, 264 Ga.App. 393, 590 S.E.2d 789 (November 26, 2003). Trial court properly allowed transcript of testimony of prior victim, now deceased, to be read into evidence under necessity exception. Evidence was relevant as a similar transaction, and had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness because it was given under oath and subject to cross-examination. Parker v. State, 244 Ga.App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (June 12, 2000). “Hearsay testimony to establish the similarity of other transactions is allowed when given by a law enforcement official who actually investigated and has personal knowledge of the other transactions. Jackson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 485, 458 S.E.2d 153 (1995); Castellon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 85, 522 S.E.2d 568 (1999). Also, prosecuting attorneys are permitted to state directly to the court what evidence they are prepared to produce. Such a statement by the prosecuting attorney alone is sufficient in a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of similar transactions evidence.” Accord, Terry v. State , 262 Ga.App. 654, 586 S.E.2d 357 (August 5, 2003); Kent v. State , 294 Ga.App. 134, 668 S.E.2d 442 (September 16, 2008). Compare Inman (September 18, 2006), above. Cartwright v. State , 242 Ga.App. 825, 531 S.E.2d 399 (March 16, 2000). Rape and related convictions reversed; trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence in the form of “the hearsay statement of the victim who was not shown to be unavailable to testify.” Victim’s statement to police, some ninety minutes to two hours after the incident, was admitted as res gestae. “There was a lengthy interval between the incident at [similar transaction victim] S.H.'s home and her interview at the police station. Her statement was narrative, which ‘“is apt to carry with it the impress of afterthought.”’” Nasworthy [ v. State, 169 Ga.App. 603, 314 S.E.2d 446 (1984)]. … We have found no Georgia case in which a narrative statement given to a police officer at a police station has qualified as res gestae. And the State has cited no such case. Considering the circumstances surrounding the taking of this statement, we find that the trial court's determination that S.H.'s statement was admissible as part of the res gestae was clearly erroneous. See id. at 605, 314 S.E.2d 446 (clearly erroneous standard).” Castellon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 85, 522 S.E.2d 568 (September 16, 1999). No error in permitting investigating detective to present similar transaction evidence . “Castellon's sole contention is that the trial court erred in permitting the detective who investigated the prior offenses to testify regarding the facts of those cases in order to demonstrate similarity; Castellon contends that his testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay. We do not agree. The record shows that the detective who testified regarding the prior burglaries was the lead investigative officer thereof. At the time of each burglary, the detective answered the call, interviewed the victim, and viewed the crime scene. The detective's testimony was factual in nature and was based upon his own investigations. ‘Since the investigator actually investigated and had personal knowledge of [the] burglaries, his testimony as to those ... offenses was not hearsay. [Cits.]’ Jackson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 485, 489(4)(c), 458 S.E.2d 153 (1995). See also OCGA § 24-3-2; Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 122, 511 S.E.2d 223 (1999).” 10. EVIDENCE – OFFENSES COLLATERAL TO SIMILAR TRANSACTION Miller v. State, 292 Ga.App. 641, 666 S.E.2d 35 (June 24, 2008). Called to testify about defendant’s aggravated assault of her, similar transaction witness also volunteered that defendant took money from her. Held, “the trial court’s curative instruction was sufficient to prevent the improper testimony from having any prejudicial impact.”