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Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007). “‘If the defendant is proven to be the perpetrator of another drug crime and the facts of that crime are sufficiently similar or connected to the facts of the crime charged, the separate crime will be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct.’ Bailey v. State, 259 Ga.App. 293, 297(5) (576 S.E.2d 668) (2003). This is true even when similar transaction evidence involves a smaller amount or a different illegal drug. See Smith v. State, 263 Ga.App. 76, 80(2) (587 S.E.2d 226) (2003).” Multiple drug offenses here involved possession of cocaine, scales, and giving false name. “Although Jackson points to a number of differences between the crimes, our Supreme Court has held that ‘[t]he proper focus is on the similarity, not the differences, between the separate crime and the crime in question.’ Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 39(3) (495 S.E.2d 34) (1998).” Accord, Sherrer v. State , 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008). Collins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (January 5, 2007). “[I]t was improper for the prosecutor to cross- examine [defendant] about the punishment he received on his prior convictions admitted as similar transactions evidence. See Miller v. State, 250 Ga.App. 84, 85-86(2) (550 S.E.2d 134) (2001); Weaver v. State, 206 Ga.App. 560, 561(3) (426 S.E.2d 41) (1992); Groble v. State, 192 Ga.App. 260, 260-261(2) (384 S.E.2d 281) (1989).” Johnson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 98, 630 S.E.2d 612 (April 26, 2006). No prejudice to defendant where exhibit proving similar transaction also referenced other charges, where jury was properly instructed. “Johnson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to State’s Exhibit 4 – the certified court documents relating to one of the similar transactions. Specifically, he claims that the exhibit placed his character in issue by showing that he had been charged with other crimes beyond the drug offense that formed the specific basis for the similar transaction. The record, however, reveals that the trial court specifically limited the jury’s consideration to those issues directly related to the similar transaction, and instructed the jury to disregard any reference to other alleged offenses that had nothing to do with the similar transaction. Thus, evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that no prejudice resulted to Johnson from his counsel’s failure to object to this evidence.” Hurston v. State, 278 Ga.App. 472, 629 S.E.2d 18 (March 7, 2006). “Hurston … complains that the trial court erred in allowing testimony and evidence regarding the similar transaction, because the State failed to lay a proper foundation to admit his blood test results, which also appeared on the uniform traffic citation. But Hurston ‘pled guilty to that independent DUI, and the blood test result appears on the face of the accusation to which he acknowledged his guilt . A certified copy of the accusation and plea was entered into evidence. Pursuant to Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 643(2) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991), the officer testified before the jury to the identity of [defendant] as the person he arrested on that charge. It was not error to admit the evidence .’ Roos v. State, 208 Ga.App. 506, 507(1)(a) (430 S.E.2d 870) (1993).” Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga.App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592 (June 6, 2005). “[Defendant] submits that the trial court should not have admitted items seized in connection with the similar transactions. Specifically, he contends that the state should not have been permitted to ‘present[ ] a laundry list of items against [him] as part of its similar transaction evidence.’ When arrested in South Carolina, John [Goldsby] had a firearm, hydrocodone, marijuana and methamphetamine in his possession. Police seized several handguns when John was arrested in North Carolina, and these items were also admitted into evidence by the trial court. The admission of evidence showing the commission of a different crime than the one charged ‘is subject to the same standard of relevancy and materiality applicable to other evidence. Thus, the admission or exclusion of this evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court , whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Nealy v. State, 246 Ga.App. 752, 753(1) (542 S.E.2d 521) (2000).” (Emphasis added.) Smith v. State, 265 Ga.App. 57, 592 S.E.2d 871 (January 7, 2004). “‘It is well settled that there need not be a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible,’” quoting Brown v. State , 201 Ga.App. 473, 474, 411 S.E.2d 360 (1991). Accord, Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004) (prior offense admissible as similar transaction despite no bill by grand jury – but not if defendant acquitted at trial); Rogers v. State , 285 Ga.App. 568, 646 S.E.2d 751 (May 25, 2007). Grant v. State, 237 Ga.App. 892, 515 S.E.2d 872 (April 8, 1999). Similar transaction evidence was properly admitted although defendant’s conviction for the offense was reversed on appeal, where reversal didn’t call into question defendant’s participation in the prior offense. Here, defendant’s prior conviction for robbery “was reversed on a very narrow ground: the State’s failure to show that the victim was aware, at the time of the theft, that anything was being taken, as required by OCGA § 16-8-40. [Cit.]. No question was raised in that appeal concerning Grant’s identity or the